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What is the democratic potential of the Internet? Will the Internet facilitate or impede 
the global democratization? Using subaltern public spheres as the democratic ideal, 
the Internet is expected to empower the subordinated social groups and promote 
democracy. RearWindow to Movies is a Chinese online discussion board which 
focuses on the topics of movies. I used this case to answer my core research question: 
How the online discussion board acts as a subaltern public sphere? To answer this 
question, I analyzed the accessibility and discursive deliberation of RearWindow, and 
its relationships with the state, the market economy and the wider publics. The data 
were collected from an online survey, two content analyses, fourteen in-depth 
interviews, discourse analysis of selected postings, and participant observation. My 
research finds that the Internet supports the conceptualization of subaltern public 
spheres instead of a unitary public sphere. The online subaltern public sphere is open 
to their members and could satisfy most of the requirements of discursive deliberation. 
Although online deliberation is not totally achieved, the online subaltern public sphere 
is able to provide safe discursive spaces for subaltern publics in spite of the increasing 
control from the state and the economy. The subaltern public uses online spheres to 
form their own discourse which can resist the discursive domination from the state. In 
addition, they try to disseminate their counter discourse into the outer world through 
the interactions with the state, the economy and the wider publics. In my research, 
RearWindow got the acquiescence from the state, mobilized resources from the 
market economy, and reached wider publics through the mass media. However, I also 
find that these interactions have the risks of being misappropriated and subaltern 
publics must struggle with the misappropriations. 
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Introduction 
There are millions of online discussion boards in cyberspace and "RearWindow to 
Movies" (RearWindow) is just one of them. RearWindow is a virtual space where 
young movie lovers get together to discuss movies and their significance. After four 
years of development, RearWindow has become the most famous and active online 
discussion board on movies in China. It was named as one of “the four biggest private 
movie watching activities" in China by Nanfang Weekend\ a nationwide newspaper. 
Now some of the online posters who grew up on RearWindow have entered the 
offline media and constitute the new Chinese folk movie reviewers. These folk movie 
reviewers are creating discourse that represents the voices from the civil society, 
which is an underdeveloped but promising social arena other than the state and the 
market economy in China. However, RearWindow as a discursive birthplace is limited 
in its members and resources. Only a small part of social members have access to stay 
there. In addition, RearWindow often suffers the threats from the external world. The 
government may forbid its movie watching activities. The commercial powers may 
transform it into a moneymaking machine. The mass media may distort their images 
in the reports. The other social members may misunderstand and reject their discourse 
due to the three misappropriations above. In spite of these uncertainties, RearWindow 
still keeps its interactions with the offline world if only conditions permit. 
RearWindow is just an individual case when compared to the immensity of 
cyberspace. As a BBS, it is only one of the several communication forms on the 
Internet. As a board, it is only one of the thousand of boards in the BBS website. Thus 
the study of RearWindow is only able to explain a part of the Internet. This part of the 
Internet could be called the public space in cyberspace, in which people can enter 
freely and discuss serious issues that reflect communal interests. It is firstly different 
from the closed space on the Internet, such as the private spaces for friends only. Then 
1 Huang Xiaoxie. "The Watchers of Chinese Movies". Nanfang Weekend. March 19, 2001. 
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it is different from the open spaces which are aimed at providing entertainment or 
emotional support. However, even in the same category，the online public spaces 
differ in thousands of ways. For example, some public spaces allow any public topics 
including political, economic and cultural ones. But the others such as RearWindow 
only focus on a certain topic and other topics are forbidden. These differences reflect 
the increasing diversity of the Internet. Cyberspaces instead of a unitary cyberspace 
are appropriate to name for the present day online world. The online diversity has its 
root in the offline social differences. It also reflects that the online and offline world 
cannot be detached anymore. Furthermore, the interaction is no longer one-directional 
from offline to online and the online life intrudes in offline life profoundly. In addition, 
the Internet is no longer the Wild West for pioneers. The state and the economic 
power have extended their control into cyberspace. Although this study is only a case 
study, I want to manifest the increasing diversity of the Internet, the integration of 
online and offline world, and the extended control on the Internet through the analysis 
of RearWindow. 
Considering the public space nature of RearWindow and the diversified nature of the 
Internet, I chose the theory of subaltern public spheres as my theoretical framework in 
which I can discuss the phenomenon of RearWindow. On the one hand, the subaltern 
public spheres theory is advantageous in its sensitivity to social differences and the 
domination and resistance among these differentiated social groups. On the other hand, 
the subaltern public spheres theory considers the powers of the state, the economy, 
and the dominant public as well. When applying this theory to my study, the 
complexity of the Internet could be clarified more easily. However, there are few 
Internet studies which completely use subaltern public spheres as the theoretical 
framework. In this thesis, I reviewed a lot of studies which used Habermasian public 
sphere as the theoretical framework. In addition, studies of Chinese civil society were 
also reviewed so as to make my discussion of Chinese online discussion board more 
contextual. 
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This thesis is divided into seven parts. In the first part, I proposed the theoretical 
framework of subaltern public spheres. Among various studies on the democratic 
potential of the Internet, subaltern public spheres are only one kind of the democratic 
ideal. It relates closely with the grand theory of Habermas, the public sphere theory. 
But it also has many differences from that. I analyzed the sameness and differences of 
the two public sphere theories in this part. Then I reviewed the Internet studies which 
used both of the two theories and tried to locate some analytical tools which could be 
applied in my study. The second part concerned with a discussion of Chinese civil 
society. After a historical review, I discussed the contemporary Chinese civil society 
and its embodiment the social organizations. I found that the public sphere as the 
discursive aspect of civil society was ignored in the studies of Chinese civil society. I 
analyzed the limitation of Chinese mass media in serving as a public sphere and 
argued that the online public discussion boards might provide subaltern public spheres 
to certain social groups. 
I put forward my research questions in the third part: How the online discussion board 
acts as a subaltern public sphere? After an introduction of the online discussion board 
RearWindow to Movies, I explained why the specific BBS on movies was the 
appropriate research subject which could answer my research questions and 
theoretical problems. Then I introduced the research methods I used in this study, 
which includes two content analyses, one online survey, 14 in-depth interviews, 
discourse analysis of postings, and participant observation over the duration of a year. 
Part four answered the first two research questions about the openness and 
deliberation of the subaltern public sphere. In other words, as a discursive space 
mainly for discussions, how RearWindow fits the requirements including openness for 
its members and deliberative discourse. After a detailed review of the development 
and users of RearWindow, I examined its accessibility to the users. Since the 
dominant discourse on RearWindow is discussions, I analyzed their level of 
deliberation in the latter part. Using a case of discussion about movie and politics, I 
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examined whether the discourse on RearWindow have satisfied the requirements of 
deliberation, which includes goals as mutual understanding, equality of the 
participants, rationality of discussions and personal communicative rationality. 
Part five to part seven mainly discussed the complex relationships among the 
subaltern public spheres, the state, the economy and the wider publics. In part five, I 
first analyzed the system of control from the state on the Chinese Internet. Then I did 
a discourse analysis to reveal the resistance toward the state from RearWindow. In 
part six, I analyzed three kinds of market powers to reveal the relationship between 
the subaltern public sphere and the market economy, which are the Internet economy, 
the pirate movie industry, and other market resources mobilized in the civilian movie 
watching organized by RearWindow. The seventh part is about how RearWindow 
reached the wider publics via the mass media and at the same time, how the 
relationship with mass media was influenced by both the state and the market powers. 
4 
I Subaltern Public Spheres on the Internet 
Democracy and the Internet 
The democratic potential of the Internet embraces other unprecedented changes in our 
times and raises the issue of new politics. Before I begin the discussion of the 
relationship between the Internet and the new politics, I introduce the basic changes 
that transform our world. Most of these changes are drawn together in the trilogy The 
Information Age of Manuel Castells (1996, 1997, 1998). He argued that we now 
inhabit in a "network society", in which the flow of information decisively alters 
previous ways of life. In the “network society,，，place is no longer the inhibitor to act 
that it once was. And neither is time. Those who are the creators, designers, and 
disseminators of information flows, constitute "informational labour". Information 
labour makes changes happen and is well suited to coping with the changes. In 
contrast, "generic labour" is rigid and inflexible, doing work once typical of manual 
employees. To Castells, information labour is the class of the future while generic 
labour is doomed. 
These changes have important consequences in terms of politics (Webster, 2001). First, 
with the decline of older forms of stratification, the class bases of politics are denuded, 
and with them are undermined the nationally based institutions. In their place come 
“identity politics" which are simultaneously global and local. Identity politics is 
capable of capturing and expressing cultural shifts in sensibility, which are irreducible 
to straightforward class affiliations. Second, identity politics offer promise of gaining 
collective identities to participants and herald novel forms of political agitation. For 
example, feminist politics provides women with a collective identity and 
environmental movement manifests the transnational connections. Third, 
contemporary politics become more and more media-centric. Today's core skills for 
the politician include an easy manner, a persuasive voice, a well-prepared belief, and 
a willingness to address the voters through the television console. Fourth, today's 
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information networks make it impossible for politicians to maintain effective control 
simply because the network society is too fluid, too leaky, too undisciplined and too 
rampant to be held. 
Corresponding to the trends of today's politics mentioned above, the research of the 
democratic potential of the Internet can be classified into three clusters. The first 
cluster focuses on the empowerment effect of the Internet for the marginal or 
subordinate social groups, which manifests the "identity politics" well. Most of the 
research yields some optimistic results that the Internet has the ability to empower the 
marginal groups (Arnold & Plymire, 2000; Berry & Martin, 2000; Mallapragada, 
2000; McLean & Schubert, 1995; Pullen, 2000; Shaw, 1997). The second cluster 
examines how the activist groups and non-governmental organizations use the 
Internet as a tool, facilitating some new forms of political agitation (Bach & Stark, 
2002; Danitz & Strobel, 1999; Diani, 2000; Hand & Sandywell, 2002; Klein, 1999; 
Lax, 2000; Mele, 1999; Scott & Street's, 2001; Uncapher, 1999; Washboume, 2001). 
The last cluster investigates a broad issue whether the Internet could make this world 
more democratic and in particular, provide a public sphere for the citizens. The 
Dystopians (Hauben, 1997; Kedzie, 1997; Jordan, 1999; Kitchin, 1998; Poster, 1995; 
Roper, 1998; Slevin, 2000; Thu Nguyen & Alexander, 1996: 99-124) have made 
critiques on the Utopians both philosophically and empirically (Dutton, 1996; Ess, 
1996; Graham & Marvin, 1996; Kichin, 1998: 99; Luke, 1998; McChesney, 1995; 
Resnick, 1998; Schuler, 1995; Streck, 1998). The Internet does not radically overhaul 
existing democratic structures but rather reinforce existing hegemonic structures. At 
best, it makes the existing structure more transparent and accountable at both the local 
and global level. 
Taking the three clusters of research as a whole, there is a contradiction. Although the 
empowerment effect of social groups exists, the whole situation of democracy is not 
changed at all. Which one is more convincing, the optimism on the micro level or the 
pessimism on the macro level? I think the macro democratic goal is an ideal and thus 
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difficult to achieve, no matter whether it be in industrial or information societies. We 
should not ignore the micro progress the Intemet brings, even if it cannot accomplish 
the democratic ideal. 
Public sphere as a democratic ideal 
There are three forms of democratic ideals: The plebiscite, the communitarian, and the 
pluralist (Abramson, Arterton & Orren, 1998). Plebiscite democracy emphasizes 
individual autonomy and the freedom which allows as many people as possible to 
participate as directly as possible in the affairs of government. The Utopian 
expectation of the Intemet to result in direct government follows this route. However, 
the plebiscites threaten to become majoritarian systems in which individual and 
minority rights may be crushed by majority rule. 
The second form of democracy is communitarian. This form stresses service to the 
common good, in contrast with the emphasis on individual autonomy and private 
interests in plebiscitary democracy. Communitarian democracy emphasizes 
participation in public space. This form of democracy also runs a danger, emphasizing 
the values of one community in the name of common good, to the exclusion of other 
communities. 
The third type of democracy is the pluralist democracy. Pluralism here is a principle 
of free competition between groups representing specific interests. It provides 
minority groups the chance to organize coalitions and ensure the participation of 
many communities. However, this pluralism suggests that democratic politics is 
nothing more than a game of power. Thus Abramson and colleagues argue that 
conjoining pluralist with communitarian democracy will offset the deficits of both. 
With these discussions, we can find that the democratization claim of the Intemet has 
its significant problems (Ess, 1996: 197-230). First, some research consists of 
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inadequate and inconsistent definitions of democracy. In addition, most research takes 
plebiscite democracy as the ideal form. This form cannot be realized in the real world 
due to its assumption of direct government of the whole population. The failure of 
plebiscite democracy does not mean the Internet cannot promote democracy at all. 
The question is: "What kind of democracy will the Internet facilitate? And can these 
forms of democracy be defended against the charges of ideology and utopianism?" 
(Ess, 1996: 202) He considered Habermas' public sphere as a kind of theory which 
provides a definition of democracy and connects the democratic polity with the 
communication pattern of the Internet. 
Habermasian public sphere 
In a central work, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Habermas 
(1989) defines the public sphere as "a homogenous space of embodied subjects in 
symmetrical relations, pursuing consensus through critique of arguments and 
presentations of validity claims" (Poster, 2001: 181). The concept of "public sphere" 
is a fundamental concept of a theory of democracy and denotes all those conditions 
such a kind of democracy needs. 
According to Habermas, the public sphere indicates at least two conditions of 
democracy. First, a liberal political culture rooted in motives and values. Second, the 
institutionalizations to support a public sphere. The first condition could be 
considered as some norms of Habermasian democratic model, the public sphere. The 
second condition is even more important since the success or failure of these 
institutions will decide whether the public sphere is a Utopian or a practical concept. 
(Habermas, 1992: 453). 
Habermas' public sphere assumes that the public sphere is autonomous from both the 
state and the market. The first dimension is related to the quantity of participants, 
which means all citizens have the opportunity to enter such a public space. The 
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second dimension is the quality of discussions, which means a deliberative discourse. 
The deliberation requires several sub-criteria. First, the goal of the discussion is to 
reach mutual understanding instead of any dominant discourse. Second, the discussion 
is rational and critical, which means all the assertions of participants are open to 
critique in spite of various cultural, social and economic backgrounds. Third, to 
ensure the goal and the critical discussion, each participant must have the 
communicative rationality, which means reflexivity, ideal role-taking, and sincerity. 
However, even though people are conscious of all these communicative norms, the 
public sphere could not be achieved without the institutional supports. Habermas 
discussed a great variety of the institutions of the public sphere to demonstrate the 
practicability of the public sphere. I will elaborate on this point later. 
With the material and normative bases, a public sphere could function as the 
birthplace of public opinion. All the legislations and the state administrations should 
be consistent with the public opinion. It is because the public debate comes into being 
as the consensus about the interest of all. The public sphere as a "quintessential 
concept" indicates the norms, institutions, and functions at the same time. When we 
apply the theory of the public sphere to our research, we should differentiate these 
three levels of the concept. 
Habermas kept emphasizing the importance of the institutions of the public sphere. 
From his historical analysis of various public spheres, we find that the bourgeois or 
liberal public sphere is just a kind of public sphere in history. At least four kinds of 
institutions of the public sphere have emerged in human history and they are 
representative public sphere, literary public sphere, bourgeois or liberal public sphere, 
and mass media public sphere. These four forms of public spheres correspond to 
different historical stages as well. 
As the first public sphere in Habermas' discussions, representative public sphere 
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existed in the feudal society of the High Middle Ages. However, it was a 
pseudo-public sphere since there was no basis for division between the public sphere 
and the private domain at that time. “This publicity of representation was not 
constituted as a social realm, that is, as a public sphere; rather, it was something like a 
status attribute" (Habermas, 1989: 7). The prince and the estates of his realm 
represented their lordship not "for" but "before" the people. Here the people 
functioned as the backdrop before which the ruling estates displayed themselves and 
their status. The institutions of this public sphere were the great hall of court and the 
strict codes of noble conduct such as the famous Spanish ceremonial. 
The public sphere in the world of letters, which I called the “literary public sphere", 
built a bridge between the old courtly public sphere and the new bourgeois public 
sphere. It preserved a certain continuity with the publicity involved in the 
representation enacted at the prince's court. In the literary public sphere, the bourgeois 
avant-garde learned the art of critical-rational public debate and the critical debate 
ignited by works of literature and art was extended to economic and political disputes 
at last. In this sense, the bourgeois public sphere evolved from the literary public 
sphere. The institutions of the literary public sphere were the salons which replaced 
the great hall at court In this sphere, one sees the combination of the urban 
aristocracy with writers, artists, and scientists. 
When the literary critique turned into political debate, the bourgeois public sphere 
came into being. The new institutions were coffee houses in Britain and the salons in 
France. In both countries they were centers of criticism, literary at first, then also 
political. In Germany, similar elements existed, beginning with the learned table 
societies and old literary societies. 
Finally the mass media replaced all the coffee houses, salons and societies to become 
the institutions of today's bourgeois public sphere. However, the mass media is not the 
eligible institution for the public sphere. The mass media changed the 
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culture-debating public into the culture-consuming public (Habermas, 1989). The 
culture-consuming public took part in noncommittal group activities such as watching 
movies in theatres instead of convivial discussion. So-called debates in the mass 
media were turned into a flourishing secondary business. The critical-rational political 
discussions were lost in the mass media public sphere. 
What I am particularly interested in is the initial development of the bourgeois public 
sphere. In other words, what drove the literary public sphere to evolve into the 
bourgeois public sphere? In the early stage of the bourgeois public sphere, “in relation 
to the mass of the rural people and the common people in towns, of course the 
public... was still extremely small" (Habermas, 1989: 37). The elementary education 
was inferior and a reading public with the critical ability was not formed. However, 
the new commercial relationships including the traffic in commodities and news 
created by early capitalist long-distance trade strengthened the bourgeois class and 
improved its public sphere. These new commercial relationships became the 
fundamental momentums to change the bourgeois from the subaltern position to the 
central one. In addition, they expanded the number of the bourgeois and made the 
bourgeois the center of economic activity and then of the political activity. In this 
sense, the bourgeois public sphere was not a natural dominant public sphere and it 
was suppressed by the representative public sphere. In the early stage of the bourgeois 
public sphere, it was as subaltern as the "women" or “proletariat” public spheres. 
Multiple public spheres 
The most powerful critique on the bourgeois public sphere is its exclusion, namely of 
women, proletariats, and so on. This exclusion contradicts with its claimed universal 
access and bracketing of social inequalities. Although these critiques are very 
reasonable, Habermas was not totally blind to "the others". He realized that the 
bourgeois public sphere was class-limited. However, he did not deny the norms of the 
bourgeois public sphere because he believed that this open and rational discursive 
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space can absorb "the others" without colonizing them. According to Habermas, the 
proletariat public sphere or the "plebian" public sphere was just a variant of the 
bourgeois public sphere. It was “a bourgeois public sphere whose social preconditions 
have been rendered null" (Habermas, 1992: 426). Although he admitted the exclusion 
of women has structuring significance, he said that “This convincing consideration 
does not dismiss rights to unrestricted inclusion and equality, which are an integral 
part of the liberal public sphere's self-interpretation" (Habermas, 1992: 429). In his 
eyes, the success of feminist movement reflects the potential of the bourgeois public 
sphere for self-transformation. 
Habermas has simplified the critiques of the repressed others. He equaled their efforts 
to the entering into the bourgeois public sphere. In fact, both the women public sphere 
and the proletariat public sphere have substantial differences from the bourgeois one. 
They disagreed with the norms of the bourgeois public sphere and thus their 
institutions demonstrated totally different characteristics. Here rises the theory of the 
post-bourgeois public sphere. It is called the multiple public spheres or subaltern 
public spheres or counter publics. Among these analyses, Fraser provided the most 
systematical one. I will introduce her critiques on the assumptions and norms of 
Habermas' public sphere. 
As discussed before, Habermas' public sphere assumed that a functioning democratic 
public sphere requires a sharp separation between civil society and the state. In this 
context, the civil society means the nexus of nongovernmental associations that are 
neither economic nor administrative. The discourse within the public sphere based on 
such a civil society does not interact positively with the use of state power. Moreover, 
when the opinions from the public sphere are accepted by the state power, the 
autonomy of the public sphere is threatened because the public would become part of 
the state. This results in a weak public with low ability of decision-making and action. 
If the public does not have the ability to limit the state power, civil society will lose its 
significance. 
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To solve this problem, I will introduce a civil society under the republican tradition 
(Lu & Chen, 2001). The boundary of this civil society is the same as that of 
Habermas'. It is separated from the economy and the state. However, considering the 
function of the civil society, they take the republican tradition rather than the liberal 
one. Under the liberal tradition, civil society functions as the instrument to antagonize 
the state power and maximize the individual freedom. However, this over-emphasis 
will result in the weak ability of action. Republican tradition stresses the balance 
between the individual and community. The citizenship is not only the freedom and 
rights but also the obligations. In the civic community, citizens consider the 
participation into the governance of public affairs as the civic virtue. Thus the civil 
society is not necessarily opposed to the state and it can cooperate with the state to 
improve the governance. The cultural foundation of the republican civil society 
emphasizes the individual freedom and rights, at the same time, emphasizes the 
obligation of citizens and the virtue of participation into public affairs. 
The first dimension of Habermas' public sphere is related to the universal accessibility, 
which means all the social members could take part in one sphere in spite of their 
different social status. First, Habermas assumes that it is possible for a public sphere 
to bracket social inequalities. However, full accessibility is in fact not realized and 
social inequalities are hardly eliminated. At least the feminist counter public (Fraser, 
1992) and the oppositional public of the working class (Negt & Kluge, 1993) are not 
included in the bourgeois public sphere. Second, Habermas assumed that a single, 
comprehensive public sphere is always preferable to a nexus of multiple public 
spheres. This kind of public sphere operates for the advantage of dominant groups. 
Members of subordinated groups would have no arenas for deliberative discussions 
among themselves. 
The second dimension is about the deliberation of the discourse. In a single public 
sphere bracketing social inequalities, it is impossible to reach the real deliberation. 
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Such bracketing usually works for the advantage of dominant groups when 
deliberation is used to obliterate the voice of the subordinates. Moreover, Habermas 
assumed that discourse in the public sphere should be restricted to deliberation about 
the common good, and that appearance of private interests is always undesirable. 
What will account for a matter of common good will be decided through discursive 
contestation. However, the bracketing of inequalities puts the subordinate in an 
inferior position in this contestation. Discursive contestation was governed by 
protocols of style and decorum that were themselves correlations and markers of 
status inequality. Although bracketing of social inequality prevents formal exclusions, 
it also brings informal impediments to participatory parity. Subordinate groups 
sometime cannot find the right voice or words to express their thoughts, and when 
they do, they discover they are not heard. 
Feminists like Fraser criticize the exclusion of women and question the sincerity of 
rationality in bourgeois public sphere when it is based on fictitious universalism. 
However, they do not deny the belief of rationality and want to recover the real 
"rationality" within subaltern public spheres. They adhere to norms of procedural 
rationality as the best institutionalized procedures for excluding violence from their 
social arena (MaLaughlin, 1993). For example, they think participants of the subaltern 
public spheres are totally equal and benefit from the critical discussions within these 
spheres. These activities will reinforce the common good of this specific group. That 
is why Habermas (1992) did not think the women public sphere destroyed the norms 
of the bourgeois public sphere. He thought the only difference between Fraser and 
him was the subjects of their theories. Habermas believed that the rationality of the 
bourgeois could help them to extend their class public sphere continuously and absorb 
the other classes finally. Fraser questioned this possibility and claimed that rationality 
only exists in certain social groups who consider their own interests. 
Felski (1989) criticizes Habermas' ideas further. She attacks Habermas' public sphere 
from both poststructuralism and feminism. In addition to asking the public sphere to 
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account for gender differences, she continues Lyotard's (1984) question whether a 
rational and uniform subject is the foundation for democracy. In her analysis of 
feminist literature, she found that autobiography and self-discovery narratives are very 
popular in the women public sphere because women could share their life experiences 
with these books. Not only rationality, but also the affective experience can contribute 
to the constructing of the women public sphere. Negt & Kluge (1993) are the scholars 
who talked about the proletariat public sphere. They are amongst the most radical 
critics of the Habermasian public sphere. They defined the public sphere as a horizon 
for the organization of social experience and there are at least three types of public 
sphere: The liberal-bourgeois, the industrial-commercial, and the proletarian public 
sphere. While Habermas' notion of public life is predicated on formal institutions of 
critical-rational discussions, Negt and Kluge emphasize questions of constituency, 
concrete needs, interests, conflicts, protest, and power. (Hansen, 1993: xxx). The 
proletarian public sphere involves three elements: The experience of re/production 
under capitalism; the separation of the experiencing subjects from the networks of 
public expression and representation; resistance and imaginative strategies as a 
response to the separation. In this sense, any practices that bring the proletarian 
experience into the visible horizon of social experience could be the embodiment of 
the public sphere. This definition overthrows Habermas' belief in rationality and gives 
prominence to everyday experience. They also claim that rudimentary and ephemeral 
instances of the proletarian public sphere have already emerged. Habermas has 
admitted that he was too pessimistic about the resisting power and the critical 
potential of a pluralistic mass public (Habermas, 1992: 438). His blindness is partially 
caused by his emphasis on critical discursive practices. According to Negt and Kluge, 
the proletariats have demonstrated their resisting power through the “experience of 
production". 
In addition to the women and proletariat public spheres, there are other new genres 
like the cultural public sphere (Bolin, 2000), black public sphere (Dawson, 1995; 
Austin, 1997; Squires, 2002), and partial public sphere (Hansen, 1993: xxxviii). Their 
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contributions to the public sphere theory are no more than that of feminists and 
leftists. 
The theories of multiple public spheres have changed the notion of Habermas, which 
pursues a unitary public sphere as the embodiment of liberal democracy. The 
revelation of various public spheres and the systematic oppression that beard not only 
request the rights of the suppressed, but also point out the possibility of progress of 
the whole democratic situation. In addition, they respond to the simplification from 
Habermas and argue that subaltern public spheres are not the variation of the 
bourgeois public sphere. 
As Habermas (1992: 426) said, a plebeian public sphere assumes shape interlocked 
with the hegemonic bourgeois public sphere. All the subaltern public spheres 
including that of women, black or proletariat must exist in the opposed relationships 
with the dominant public sphere. If this opposition disappears, these spheres are no 
longer subaltern and assimilated by the hegemony. Then how can the subaltern public 
spheres improve their status? This is an irony similar to Eraser's critique on the 
state-society relation in Habermas' public sphere. Here rises the question of solidarity 
and integration. Since modem society is multicultural and has systematic 
socioeconomic inequalities, the essentially conflictual relationships between dominant 
and subaltern public spheres will lead to a fragmented society in which the dialogue 
crossing spheres will never be successful. However, other scholars like Alexander 
have their beliefs in cross-spheres communications. "According to Alexander, 
stigmatized groups are able to gain recognition and acceptance without ‘closeting’ ‘ 
their particularistic identities while still constructing a referent of solidarity with the 
previous core members of civil society" (Rabinovitch, 2001). 
Consistent with their emphasis on antagonistic relationship between dominant and 
subaltern public spheres, most of the multiple public spheres theorists ignore the 
importance of mass media. They think that "The media constituting the material 
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support for the circulation of views are privately owned and operated for profit, and 
are, therefore, unavailable to unequally empowered social groups" (McLaughlin, 
1993). Fraser and her adherents "miss an opportunity to reveal the media's 
participation in marginalization, thus missing their problematic, and often obstructive, 
role in the dissemination of counter-claims and the creation of oppositional impulses." 
Multiple public sphere theory thus risks cutting ties among different public spheres. 
Both the essentialism of the conflictual relations between dominant and subaltern 
spheres and the ignorance of the role of the mass media in disseminating 
counter-claims are the two main underdeveloped points in the theory of multiple 
public spheres. Due to these deficiencies, the multiple public sphere theory cannot 
answer the integration of the fragmented society and loses the insight of a normative 
ideal of democracy as Habermas has. 
Habermasian public sphere v^. multiple public spheres 
To highlight the differences between Habermasian and multiple public spheres, I will 
make some comparisons in this part. Fraser and other theorists advanced the notion of 
multiple public spheres to replace the conception of the unitary bourgeois public 
sphere. In the multiple public spheres model, there are two basic kinds of public 
spheres: The dominant public sphere and the subaltern public spheres or counter 
publics that are populated by the historically oppressed. 
Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, & Rucht (2002) concluded that these two models are ‘ 
discursive (Habermas) versus constructionist (Fraser). A comparison was made in 
Table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1 The Discursive and Constructionist Public Sphere 
Theory types Criteria for a good democratic public discourse 
Who In what sort of How ideas Outcome of relation 
participates process should be between discourse 
presented and decision-making 
Discursive Popular Deliberative Dialogue Avoidance of 
inclusion Mutual premature, 
respect non-consensus-based 
Civility closure 
Constructionist Popular Empowerment Narrative Avoidance of 
inclusion Recognition creativity exclusionary closure 
Expansion of the 
political community 
Although both discursive and constructionist models share the criterion of "popular 
inclusion", the implications of the criterion are quite different. According to 
Habermas, the inclusion of speakers from the periphery should contribute to an active 
dialogue between the center and the periphery and foster more deliberative speech. In 
this situation, the periphery refers to the civil society actors in lifeworld and 
corresponds to the political center in the system world, including government 
agencies, parliaments, courts, and political parties. However, writers in constructionist 
tradition are indebted to Michel Foucault in identifying discourse as the practices of 
power. They ask for popular inclusion in order to reveal the hidden inequalities within 
the lifeworld itself, such as the marginality of women in politics. The value of 
inclusion is tied conceptually to the empowerment of the marginalized and 
recognition of differences. 
While deliberativeness is the core value of the discursive model, constructionists 
criticize deliberativeness as the pretence of repression. They particularly value 
narrative as the style that challenges both the diffusive power in the lifeworld and the 
concentrated power of the system world. Their final goals are also different. 
According to the discursive model, it is crucial that the political decisions are not 
limited to actors at the center of the political system and legitimization of the state is 
18 
based on consensus from the civil society. Constructionists try to achieve the diversity 
of expression that vitalizes democracy and avoid any exclusion no matter which world 
they are in. 
The modal differences could be seen in the following two graphs. 
Graph 1.2 Habermasian Public Sphere 
O ^ ^ ^ / Unitary \ 
^ ^ ^ ^ V o \ Public Sphere j 
In the discursive (Habermas) model, there is only a unitary public sphere (ellipse) for 
all the social members (little circles). They participate in the public sphere as 
individuals in spite of their different social status (indicated through the difference 
distances from the ellipse). 
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Graph 1.3 Subaltern Public Spheres 
In the constructionist (Fraser) model, however, the discursive space of the civil 
society (big ellipse) is made up of multiple public spheres (six small ellipses). The 
individuals enter the subaltern public sphere first and then interact with other social 
members. The different spheres are various in political success, material resources, 
and interpublic relations. “A，，represents the dominant public sphere which is usually 
state-sanctioned. For example, the white bourgeois males in U.S.A. "B" to "F" 
represent various subaltern public spheres. Squires (2002) distinguished three types of 
such subaltern public spheres based on different social, economic, political, and 
cultural conditions. 
1. "Enclaved public sphere": A public enclave itself, hiding counter hegemonic ideas 
and strategies in order to survive or avoid sanctions, while internally producing lively 
debate and planning. It has few material, political, legal or media resources. It may 
have some contact with the dominant public sphere but rarely with other public 
spheres. "E" represents this kind of public spheres. 
20 
2 "Counterpublic spheres": This kind of public spheres can engage in debate with 
wider publics to test ideas and perhaps utilize traditional movement tactics. They also 
create more opportunities for intersphere discussions. Couterpublicity is facilitated by 
greater independent media resources and distribution channel. “B”，"C", and "D" 
represent such spheres. 
3. "Satellite publics": A public seeks separation from other publics for reasons other 
than oppressive relations but is involved in wider public sphere discourse from time to 
time. It relies on the group media only to support the internal discussions. Satellite 
publics can emerge from both dominant and marginalized groups. "F" represents such 
spheres. 
The constructionist model is different from the Habermasian one in several ways. 
First, it does not provide equal accessibility for all social members to directly enter the 
discursive space of civil society. Members in community F are likely to be excluded 
from it. Second, dominant and subaltern public spheres interact with each other and 
mutually form the discursive space of civil society. 
Public sphere and the Internet 
The Internet got its significance as the potential public sphere mainly through its 
institutional characteristics. These unique characteristics are probably beneficial or 
harmful for the norms required by the public sphere. The discussions about the online 
public sphere focus on what the institutional characteristics are and how they 
influence the forming and maintenance of the public sphere. The Internet or 
cyberspace has a spatial implication which is very similar to the ideal public sphere of 
Habermas, the coffee house and the salons. In cyberspace, people are linked to the 
sharing of common virtual locale and they can interact with each other directly 
although not face-to-face. With this virtual co-presence, people can have dialogues 
which are the essential character of the public sphere. In addition, cyberspace is the 
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most open medium when compared to other mass media such as television or 
newspapers, although it has its own limitations to provide a universal access. As an 
institution, the Intemet has other material supports. From the analysis of the political 
economy of the Intemet, we can find that cyberspace is a space difficult to control. It 
maybe related to the technological characteristics of the Intemet, such as the 
fragmentation and the fluidity. In a word, it is very hard for the state to put effective 
political controls on the Intemet. The commercial economy cannot dominate 
cyberspace due to the low cost of constructing a website. At the same time, we must 
notice that many scholars have studied the progressive control from the state and the 
accretion of the commercial power in cyberspace. Whether the Intemet could protect 
their initial institutional characteristics is still in doubt. 
After the researchers have clarified the institutional characteristics of the Intemet, 
they asked whether these characteristics could help to achieve the public sphere on the 
Intemet. It became a pressing issue mainly because of the decline of the public sphere 
in today's society. The dominant forms of communication today are the mass 
communication through mass media, especially, the television. The public sphere has 
to be dependent on these mass media and a mass media mediated public sphere comes 
into being. As Habermas criticized, the lack of interpersonal exchange and dialogue in 
the mass media public sphere contributes to the demise of the public sphere and its 
refeudalisation, since the notion of the public sphere is closely tied to rational debate 
(Oblak, 2002). As a consequence, the norm of rationality became the focus of the 
discussion: Does the Intemet revive or destroy the rational dialogue within the users? 
That is why most of the Intemet research in Habermasian framework is evaluation 
studies. They continuously compare the reality in cyberspace with the ideal. When 
studying the functions of the online public sphere, there is a long way for the online 
public sphere to become the source of legislation, because the dialogues in cyberspace 
have not became state-sanctioned and widely admitted. It is easy to get a pessimistic 
conclusion when using the evaluation approach to study the Intemet. However, 
research under the multiple public spheres framework inaugurates a new approach. 
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From the previous discussions on multiple public spheres, we can find that this theory 
exists in the same social structure as that of Habermasian public sphere. But they do 
not have any definite norms right now. For example, they do not necessarily ask for 
rational discourse as the only discursive style of the public sphere. And the functions 
of the multiple public spheres could be as simple as a safe space for suppressed 
groups. Since the norms of multiple public spheres are under construction, the studies 
on the multiple public spheres on the Internet could be more unrestricted and sensitive 
to any new changes the Internet brings. In the following pages, I will review the 
public sphere on the Internet from both Habermasian and multiple approaches. From 
these analysis, we can see the importance of the Internet in the development of public 
sphere in today's social structure� 
Habermasian public sphere on the Internet 
This part deals with one question: Could the Internet facilitate the Habermas' 
democracy, or public sphere? The assumption is that Habermas' democracy is not 
Utopian and less flawed than other forms of democracy. To answer this question, 
scholars developed criteria to test the Internet. These criteria are different according to 
their different understanding of the public sphere. 
Fung & Kedl (2000) forwarded three criteria of an ideal public sphere. They are: 
1. Open access, participatory parity and social equality: Despite the fact that people 
have different socio-economic backgrounds, people's claims in the public sphere 
carry equal weight. 
2. Rational discourse and the representative publics: The discussion in the public 
sphere is rational critical discourse; and those engaged in the discussion come to 
conceive of themselves as the representative public, which represents the common 
good. 
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3. Communication for understanding: The communication action in the public sphere 
is oriented toward understanding instead of success. Mutual understanding is to 
gain rational and inter subjective recognition for the validity claims. 
Disagreements by negotiation are regarded as a cooperative process of 
interpretation in which no single participant has a monopoly on or dominance over 
correct interpretation. 
In their case study of a Chinese online community to discuss issues on China/Taiwan 
relations, they found that participants could not detach themselves from their 
identities and resulted in a discourse of "flamings, exclusions and persuasions", or 
communication actions oriented toward success. They concluded that the Internet's 
potentiality as a public sphere is not optimistic. 
Wilhelm (2000: 35) proposed the topography of the virtual political public sphere. 
They are: 
1. Antecedent resources: The skills and capacities that one brings to achieve 
participation in the virtual political public sphere. 
2. Inclusiveness: Ensuring that everybody affected by a certain policy has the 
opportunity to access and use essential digital media. 
3. Deliberation: Subjecting one's opinions to public scrutiny for validation. 
4. Design: The architecture of the network developed to facilitate or inhibit public 
communication. 
In his framework, Wilhelm was aware that the inequality of the antecedent resources 
limits the access to and the participation in the public sphere. Using content analysis 
to study the deliberation, he found that there is insufficient evidence to support a 
optimistic picture of the political public debate in cyberspace. He also demonstrated 
that the design of the Internet affects the nature and scope of online activity, including 
the political activity. 
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Slevin (2000) thought the Internet might create a deliberative mediated publicness, 
although there are limitations of this publicness. The Internet makes information and 
points of view visible and available to others by transcending the particular 
spatial-temporal locales and the face-to-face dialogical interactions. According to him, 
the problem of the Internet is whether it can afford a deliberative publicness. There 
are three criteria of deliberation: 
1. Keeping controversial questions open: Allowing for the dissent voices and 
securing the openness of discussions. 
2. Criticizable rationality: Participants were able to criticize the rationalization 
underpinning the actions and projects of others. 
3. Overall goals, principles and rights: Participants might require referral to overall 
goals for their justification. "General interest" is not sufficient justification for 
denying what participants wish as individuals to have or to do. 
Slevin found that the Internet has the potential to create all the three conditions. 
However, the transformative capacity of the Internet is dependent on the 
characteristics of the participants, their location in time-space, the institutional 
arrangement, and so on. So the prospects of this happening seem dim. 
The most recent work which systematically examines the public sphere on the Internet 
is from Dahlberg (2001). He compared the online deliberative practices with a 
normative model of the public sphere. This model involves six conditions: 
1. Autonomy from state and economic power: Discourse must be based on the 
concerns of citizens as a public rather than driven by the power of the market and 
state. 
2. Exchange and critique of criticizable moral-practical validity claims: 
Rational-critical discourse is open to critique rather than dogmatically asserted. 
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3. Reflexivity: Participants must critically examine their own values, assumptions 
and interest. 
4. Ideal role-taking: Participants must attempt to understand the argument from the 
other's perspective. 
5. Sincerity: Each participant must make a sincere effort to make known all 
information. 
6. Discursive inclusion and equality: Every participant is equally entitled to 
introduce and question any assertion. 
Based on his collection of various research, he tried to undertake a general analysis of 
all the six dimensions. He found that although the autonomy of online public sphere is 
threatened by the state censorship and commercialization, a diverse array of 
non-commercial, non-state controlled interaction continues to exist, and even 
multiplies. The exchange of validity claims with reason is taking place within many 
Internet forums and a deliberative structure exists online. However, the deliberative 
quality of online exchanges is not so good considering reflexivity, ideal role-taking 
and sincerity. Inequalities from outside of and within discourse continue to occur in 
online interaction. These inequalities may dissipate as time goes on. 
As a conclusion, the Internet facilitates an expansion of the public sphere, but the 
quality of the rational critical discourse falls short of the requirements of the public 
sphere model. Dahlberg thought these shortcomings could be solved. Three 
mechanisms could be used: The technology employed, the rules of discourse 
constituted, and the type of forum management undertaken. He evaluated an 
Internet-based initiative that attempts to develop online public discourse with the 
above criteria, Minnesota E-Democracy (Dahlberg, 2001). He found that with some 
artificial control such as the positive management of postings, the discourse could 
overcome many of the problems which presently limit democratic deliberation online. 
Corresponding to the main points of Habermasian public sphere, the discussions on 
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the online public sphere focus on three questions. First, as an institution of the public 
sphere, is the Internet independent of the state or the economy? Second, under such a 
premise, is the Internet open for anyone and bracketing the social inequalities the 
users may have? Third, inside the online public sphere, is the discourse rational or 
critical? If all the three questions are solved, the online public sphere could be an ideal 
one. When using the theoretical framework of multiple public spheres, things are 
different. They do not ask the second question at all, while keeping the first one. As 
for the third one, it is an optional question. Instead of seeking an ideal solvent from 
the Internet, they pay more attention to any changes the Internet has brought, 
including the good and bad ones. 
Multiple public spheres on the Internet 
Although there are extensive articles about public sphere on the Internet, there are 
only sporadic writings relating subaltern public spheres or counterpublics with the 
Internet study. I found two articles which used counterpublics as their theoretical 
framework in the study of the Internet. Palczewski (2001) studied cyber-movements 
and cyber-activism functioning as counterpublics. When reviewing previous studies 
about the cyber-movements, he called our attention to the new changes of social 
movements. In new social movements, identity creation is as important as outward 
directed actions. Although a social movement cannot convince the dominant social 
order to change, it is still meaningful if it validates group member's sense of identity 
and worth. Under this presumption, Palczewski discussed the potential of the Internet 
to provide the counterpublics a safe space. Admitting the unequal access and 
surveillance from government and commerce, he asked readers to notice the attempts 
some websites have done for the formation of counterpublics. At the same time, he 
reminded us of the early stage the Internet is in and that progressive politics are not 
affirmative. 
As level-headed as Palczewski, McDorman (2001) reviewed four primary objections 
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to the Internet: Commercialization will ruin its potential, access is limited to the elite, 
reflective interaction among participants is rare, and it fails to produce truly 
deliberative democracy. Even accepting much of this criticism, he thought the 
expansion of the Internet presents conditions favorable to a broad range of 
counterpublics after he conducted a research on website Right-to-Die. He concluded 
that the Internet offers potential for counterpublics' resistance to state control. First, 
the websites alter the influence, function, and use of media. The new format, in turn, 
provides the possibility which encourages not only more meaningful individual 
participation but also a more egalitarian dialogue. Third, increased participation and 
dialogue enhance the prospects of successful mobilization against the state. 
Combining the above research with other studies on the subculture and marginal 
groups on the Internet, we can find that the functions of the subaltern public sphere 
online are broader and more detailed than that of Habermas. Although the subaltern 
public spheres could not be the source of legislation, they do have some functions that 
should not be ignored. There are seven kinds of functions and I listed them in the 
ascending order of difficulty. First of all, as many Internet researchers found, the 
Internet can provide a safe discursive space for the subaltern social groups. Within 
this space, they may develop their own discourse which is underrepresented in the 
mass media. These discourses describe their communal experience and reflect their 
own interests. After clarifying what they need, they can make some strategies to 
change their status. At the same time, the members of this social group may construct 
an identity and use this identity as the basic resistant strategy. With the aid of clear 
identity, the subaltern public spheres on the Internet may attract more people to 
identify with them and join their discursive activities. Thus they can mobilize the 
dispersed potential members. Under the protection of a safe space, these inward 
activities could be sustained if they totally isolate themselves from others and keep 
invisible from the state and wider publics. However, if they think it is time to make 
them known, they could start some outward activities. These activities could be 
diverse and aim at both the wider publics and the state policy at the same time. If their 
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outward activities succeed and finally change the public attitude and state control 
toward them, the whole democracy status will be improved. In this sense, the 
subaltern public spheres are not only beneficial to the subaltern social groups, but also 
rewarding for the whole society. We must realize that not each subaltern public sphere 
must have all the seven functions and subaltern public spheres could be re-divided 
based on different functions (Squires, 2002). 
The model of multiple public spheres, and especially the subaltern public spheres or 
counterpublics, provides a new angle to study the democratic potential of the Internet. 
They also remind us to pay attention to the broader social context, such as the new 
political changes, and the specific social settings. Furthermore, the appropriate 
borrowing of Western theories is particularly salient in Chinese studies since China 
has experienced a historical process different from the West. Considering my research 
subjects, the subaltern public spheres on the Intemet in China, I must examine the 
public sphere in China first. Since civil society is an important, if not necessary, 
condition to the forming of the public sphere, I should discuss the civil society in 
China. Linking to the historical and local circumstances of China, I can make 
necessary revisions of the theory of the subaltern public spheres to explain the 
Chinese phenomena. 
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11 Subaltern Public Spheres in China 
The history of Chinese civil society 
When did the Chinese civil society begin to develop? There are two kinds of answers. 
First, there existed a pre-modem civil society in the late Qing and Republican periods. 
Second, a real civil society emerged after the market reform began in 1978. The 
implication of this discussion is significant 一 which kind of civil society could and 
should form in China, the one with the special Chinese characters, or the one 
following the Western tradition? 
Researchers found proof of a distinct pre-modem civil society from the corporate 
groups and voluntary associations which were formed outside of, or independent of, 
the state (Yang, 1989). The forms of these groups and associations included guilds, 
native place associations, clans and lineages, surname associations, neighborhood 
associations, and religious groupings. Rowe's (1984, 1989) studies of Hankou in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries emphasized the administrative autonomy and 
municipal identity of the city's guilds. The guilds represented the economic interests 
of the rising merchants and identified their interests with those of a broader urban 
community. Separated from the government, the guilds promoted the real power to be 
balanced between officials and the leaders of the local society. 
Rankin (1986) concluded in his study of elite activism and political transformation in 
China: "the Taiping Rebellion marked a major shift in the balance between the 
Chinese state and local elites, causing the main initiative for local welfare efforts, 
education, and to a lesser extent public security to shift from the bureaucracy to 
society. Meanwhile, commercialization encouraged an incomplete fusion of gentry 
and merchants, who together began to play new managerial roles as activists in a 
rapidly growing public sphere" (Wakeman, 1993). 
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Although both the writers compared the pre-modem civil society in China with 
Western ones, they thought the two kinds of societies share very little in common. The 
basic comparability lies in the intermediate position of the civil society. It is 
distinguished both from direct state coercive control and from private spheres, 
particularly of family or other kin groups. However, the state-societal relations are 
quite different. The late-imperial civil society in China was local and had little direct 
effect on national policy. It was connected to the rise of commerce and a commodity 
economy, but not to capitalism. Management rather than open public discussion was 
its central characteristic. Relations between officials and local elites were generally 
consensual rather than confrontational, and elites did not try to define rights against 
the state or set formal limits on state power (Rankin, 1993). 
The question of authenticity of civil society rises when the researchers used this 
obviously Western term and abandoned its Western implications at the same time. If 
the Chinese civil society in the late-imperial age was not based on a free market 
economy and did not have an influence on the state, is it possible to call it civil 
society at all? Rankin (1993) admitted that he preferred to use the general definition 
of public sphere (not the one of Habermas) than civil society because the public has 
its counterpart in Chinese term, gong. Huang (1993) chose to use "the third realm" 
instead of both public sphere and civil society. The third realm is between state and 
society while both the state and society participate in it. Moreover, this third realm 
took on characteristics and institutional forms over time that needs to be understood 
on their own terms. 
The emphasis on the specialty of China easily leads to the negation of civil society 
itself. Other researchers on Chinese civil society insist on the Western use of civil 
society in their analysis and refuse to treat the local associations in late-imperial China 
as modem civil society. Deng (1997) pointed out that the pre-modem civil society was 
only the folk society {Minjian Shehui) and not the civil society {Shimin Shehui or 
Gongmin Shehui). Since this folk society was not based on the free market economy, 
31 
it relied on the kinship or personal loyalty rather than the rational social contract to 
mediate the relationships within society. Thus it was impossible for the folk society to 
have independence and autonomy from the state and at last, it could not favor the 
modernization in China. 
Gu (2001) argued that Huang's use of "the third realm" really gave up the power of 
explanation of civil society as a conceptual framework. Although the state and the 
society are not completely distinctive and infiltrate into each other, they are still two 
autonomous or independent realms. The dualism of state and society is important in 
our analysis under the condition that we recognize the oppositional relationship 
between state and society is not inherent. Any new terms such as the third realm will 
make us more confused about the relationship. That is why in recent studies of 
Chinese civil society, writers keep the Western implication of civil society (Lii & 
Chen, 2001, Yu & etc. 2001). In this approach, Chinese civil society emerged in 
contemporary China and especially after the economic reform started in 1978. These 
researches focus on the civil society in contemporary China and in its modem 
European meanings. 
Civil society in contemporary China 
Definitions of civil society 
Even under the modem European tradition, the meanings of civil society are different 
in different historical periods. There are mainly three models of civil societies, which 
are enlightened society {Wenmin Shehui), city people's society {Shimin Shehui), and 
public people's society {Gongmin Shehui) (Wang, 1991). The first type of civil society 
rose in Europe from the social contract theory. Theorists sharing this tradition such as 
Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau considered civil society as opposed to the brutal and 
savage state of nature. Civility in this society resulted largely from the existence of 
state. Civil society equals political society or state. 
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The second concept of civil society was espoused by such thinkers as Hegel, 
Tocqueville, Marx, and Gramsci. They agreed with Adam Smith that the market was 
the prime generator of the civil society, which arose between society and state. This 
civil society was protected by a constitutional order, supported by autonomous 
organizations (Des Forges, 1997). However, the thinkers had sharply different 
opinions in the relations between society and state. To Hegel, the state transcended 
society and was devoted to the public good of the civil society. To Marx, the state 
represented the interest of the ruling class such as the bourgeoisie and the proletarian 
class set up the proletarian state to replace the bourgeoisie state. In his opinion, the 
state did not necessarily threaten the existence of civil society. To Tocqueville, the 
civil society was a realm that refuses the intervention of state. At the same time, the 
civil society could prevent the autocratic state to use the "public will" to repress the 
minority. To Gramsci, the civil society was a battlefield where the ruling class and the 
ruled class fought each other. In addition to the state force machine, the ruling class 
actualized its rule through the ideological control within the civil society. 
Shimin shehui refers to a private realm that grew out of the intervention of the state. In 
this realm, people act as individuals or citizens. However, the third concept of civil 
society, gongmin shehui, has a much broader definition than the second one. Gongmin 
shehui was supported by the intellectuals mainly from the socialistic states, including 
Eastern Europe and P. R. China. This kind of civil society not only covered the private 
but also the public realm. It refused the intervention of the state and admitted its own 
right to influence the state affairs. 
In addition to the three types of civil society, I will introduce the civil society in 
Habermas' works. Habermas constructed his understanding of civil society based on 
his dichotomy of the system and the lifeworld (1987). The lifeworld encompasses the 
structural components of cultural reproduction, social integration, and socialization. 
The system, in contrast, encompasses those aspects of society that are self-regulating 
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such as the economy and polity. The lifeworld integration operates through the 
communicative action and concerns the actions of actors in the lifeworld. The system 
integration is carried out by the steering of decisions by institutional sources of money 
and political power. Civil society lies in the lifeworld and should be the source of the 
legitimization of the operation of the system. The salient characteristic of 
Habermasian civil society is the trisection of state, market economy, and civil society. 
Civil society is autonomous not only from the state but also from economic forces, 
especially the big companies and cultural industry. 
Scholars in research of Chinese civil society are quick to realize the limitation of the 
concept of civil society popular in Eastern Europe. They tried to make a balance 
between Tocqueville and Hegel. On the one hand, they emphasized the division 
between state and society. The civil society should be a realm out of the state. On the 
other hand, they accepted Hegel's opinion on the beneficial functions of the state. The 
civil society is not opposed to state but cooperates with state. Their relationship is a 
reciprocal interaction: The civil society can influence the state policy; the state can 
mediate the conflicts of interests within the civil society (Deng, 1997). It is because 
civil society itself was not a heaven and did not lead to democratic polity 
automatically. The researchers started their study of Chinese civil society from the 
economic reform in China. Then they focused on the various social organizations in 
China, which are considered as the main body of the civil society. 
Trade union and the caged social organizations 
The different social organizations in China today have different relationships with the 
party-state. White, Howell, & Shang (1996) identified four categories of these 
organizations from incorporation to toleration and repression. 
1. The caged sector: The mass organizations, including the All-China Federation of 
Trade Unions, the All-China Women's Federation, etc. They are the subordinate 
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agencies of the Party although they have tried to search for greater autonomy and 
credibility. 
2. The incorporated sector: The new social organizations, including business and 
trade associations, professional associations, etc. They have to be officially 
registered to carry on their activities and all are subject to varying degrees of 
governmental penetration or control. These intermediate social associations 
embrace the forces and interests of both state and society. 
3. The interstitial world of civil society: Referring to the urban associations which 
did not achieve formal official reorganizations. They constitute a kind of 
associational "counter-culture". The key role in its expansion is being played by 
members of the intelligentsia and emergent professional strata. One dramatic 
example was the growth of "salons" of intellectuals in 1988/9 which provided 
much of the thought and some of the organizational initiatives behind the political 
mobilization of early 1989. This kind of social organization is most similar with 
the subaltern public spheres I will discuss. 
4. The suppressed sector: Underground civil society, including hostile political 
organizations, secret societies, etc. For example, Falun Gong. They are subject to 
active repression or punitive surveillance. 
I will discuss the first two types of social organizations and demonstrate their roles in 
the formation of Chinese civil society. First, I will focus on the caged organizations 
through the analysis of trade unions. According to Zhang (1997), the trade unions 
transformed from a state corporatist instrument to a representative of worker as a 
social group with the increasing differentiation of interests, particularly within 
enterprises, and the growth of tensions between labor and management brought by the 
economic reforms. The state gave some autonomy to and strengthened the trade 
unions because the trade unions could function as the mediator of labor-management 
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disputes. At the same time, trade unions could find resources in state organs that they 
could use for their own benefit. Thus the trade unions became more autonomous than 
before and kept the intimate collaboration with the state. 
However, this transformation was not so successful (White & etaL, 1996: 63-68). The 
trade unions were under pressure to adapt to profound changes in economic reform, 
but the operation under a basically unreformed political system blocked them from 
change. In general, the trade unions in China still cling to a traditional Leninist notion. 
The failure of the trade unions to protect the interests of workers led to the weakening 
of the influence of trade unions. Alternative worker's organizations appeared rapidly 
and a small band of labour activists emerged. From this analysis, we know that the 
trade unionists themselves find it is hard to maintain their living. It is rather hard to 
ask these caged organizations to facilitate the civil society. 
Entrepreneurial class and the incorporated social organizations 
Economic reform in China triggered a lot of social changes, which made Chinese 
society more complex, fluid, and differentiated. The result was a growing 
redistribution of power and resources in society. The state was no longer the only 
administrator of the society. Instead, in order to mediate the conflicts associated with 
the social differentiation, the state turned to the social organizations. In other words, 
in order to control the emerging new social forces, the state positively reshaped the 
patterns of social organizations. 
The most powerful new social group is the entrepreneurial class, which was 
suppressed by the socialist hegemony before the reform-era came. Entrepreneurs 
today encompass four major kinds of people: Those who manage state-owned 
enterprises (SOE), those who run township and village businesses, those who 
represent Chinese partnership in joint ventures, and those who have their own private 
enterprises (Zhou, 2000). With the resurgence of the entrepreneurial class, various 
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kinds of business associations have appeared in China, such as the organizations for 
private entrepreneurs and for managers of the state-owned enterprises. 
In Zhou's (2000) study, the Suzhou Entrepreneurs Association helped SOE managers 
form social capital and forge a different identity from party cadres. The association 
not only facilitated their interactions with each other, but also between entrepreneurs 
and government bureaucracies. The relationship between entrepreneurs and the state 
has been shown to be a dynamic process of power negotiation rather than the 
domination of the state. Through the good relationships with government policy 
makers, entrepreneurs could be active and influential in the process of policy making. 
Zhou concluded that we should not put society and state in an antagonistic 
relationship and downplay the role of the state in helping in the development of 
society. 
The private sector of entrepreneurs refers to the owners and/or managers of 
small-scale individual or family businesses (getihu) and larger private enterprises 
{siying qiye) (White & etal., 1996). The attitude of the government toward them 
experienced a changing process. In the first wave of private business in the 1980s, 
they did not enjoy stable political recognition and social esteem. However, as the 
second wave of larger-scale private business gathered momentum in the early 1990s, 
official policies and officials themselves became more accommodating. Although the 
grass-roots private entrepreneurial associations remained fairly independent until 
1986, they could not be considered as typical social organizations since they were 
directly linked with the state agency. They existed mainly to satisfy the needs of state 
regulation and control. 
Due to the ambiguous position of the new entrepreneurial class in China, Wank (1995) 
made some empirical test of the alliances of entrepreneurs and wanted to make clear 
their attitudes toward state rule and other social groups. He found that the private 
businessmen and SOE managers in China did not forge horizontal alliances that 
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integrate civil society in the view of Eastern Europe. Entrepreneurs pursue two kinds 
of strategies with regard to the bureaucratic power that pervades the Chinese market 
economy. One is a strategy of avoidance which considers bureaucracy as an obstacle. 
The other strategy is one of alliance which considers bureaucracy as a source of 
opportunity. Both strategies did not reflect any powerful influence of entrepreneurs on 
the state domination. Wank (1995: 75) concluded that "Expansion of the market 
economy and its institutions such as private enterprise does not necessarily empower 
civil society at the expense of the state. Indeed, in some key respects it is the power of 
the local bureaucracy that is most enhanced by the emergence of private capitalist 
business." 
Discussions 
Summing up the different studies of Chinese civil society, I find that most researchers 
embody civil society as social organizations, and especially, the legal or formal 
organizations. They discovered the state-societal relations through the analysis of 
state-social organizational relations. Their findings focused on two points: First, the 
party-state's capacity to control the social organizations has declined and the 
organizations achieved autonomy in a certain degree; second, the relations between 
state and social organizations are interactive and mutually dependent. 
The dependence of social organizations is manifested in several aspects. First, all 
organizations should be registered and under the direct governance of governmental 
departments. Second, as the patron, the state controls the economic resources of the 
social organizations. Third, within some important social organizations, there exist 
party branches (Yu, 1997). Although we cannot deny the possibility of collaboration 
between state and society, could we define the state-organizational relation today as 
an equal cooperative one? I agree with Yu (1997) that this kind of social organization 
cannot represent a mature civil society. In addition, on the theoretical level, civil 
society is not naturally equal to a democratic polity. These social organizations have 
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not promoted democracy in China as yet. 
That is why I choose to use civil society in the Habermasian view in my discussions. 
First, Habermas realized the limitation of the definition of civil society which includes 
both economic and political elements. His public sphere is a realm independent from 
both the state and the entrepreneurial forces. When using civil society in this trisection 
structure, social organizations in China only afford a fuzzy promise of the civil society. 
The second advantage of Habermasian civil society is: He pointed out a realm of civil 
society that out of social organizations, the public sphere. The public sphere is not 
directly dependent on social organizations and more like a discursive aspect of civil 
society in general. The embodiment of the public sphere could be various such as 
coffee houses and mass media. We need not limit our exploration only to the realm of 
social organizations and can turn to the various discursive spaces within civil society. 
However, Habermas' effort was not completed and theories of multiple public spheres 
constitute the section not discussed. According to multiple public spheres, a unitary 
public sphere does not exist and what Habermas advocated is indeed a particular class 
public sphere for the bourgeois. The inequalities within the civil society should be 
noticed, no matter what caused these inequalities, economic reasons or racial ones or 
sexual ones. We should not debase the significance of the subaltern public spheres 
although they cannot represent the whole civil society. The discursive spaces of 
certain social groups in civil society could be another field of study. 
The public sphere is used in this thesis as an analytical framework, which is used to 
explain the emerging discursive spaces on different levels in China and analyze the 
conflicts among the state, the economy, the general public and the specific public, not 
only between state and society, but also within the society. 
Multiple public spheres in contemporary China 
For Habermas, the structural transformation of the public sphere is about the changing 
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capacity of modem citizens to govern themselves on the basis of political institutions 
legitimized by informed discussion and reasoned argument. The development of the 
bourgeois public sphere led to the creation of a new kind of state, which depends for 
its legitimacy on the assent of a rationally constituted public opinion. However, under 
the power of the modem mass media, corporate capitalism, and the powerful 
bureaucracies of the modem state, the subtle forms of propaganda have overwhelmed 
the capacity of an increasingly atomized citizenry to develop an informed 
understanding of the public good through rational discussion. To Chinese scholars, the 
public sphere reveals a form of life in which authority is accountable to common 
norms based on widespread, open, rational discussions among citizens. Although the 
public sphere came into being among a specific set of historical circumstances in 
eighteenth-century Europe, Habermas also implies that it is not necessarily connected 
with those conditions (Richard, 1993). 
From the discussions of civil society in China, we can know that a large variety of 
groups within Chinese society that are partially autonomous from the state have arisen 
or revived. However, this development did not lead to a democratic public sphere 
directly and quickly. At least, from recent studies, we cannot find proof of a totally 
autonomous civil society from the state. Will this differentiation of society lead to the 
public sphere or just a chaotic fragmentation of society? Among the various groups of 
civil society, which kinds of groups are relatively more open to rational 
communication? How about the quantity of their material resources and the quality of 
moral commitment that gave them their vision and strength? Will these kinds of 
groups foster horizontal communication among disparate members of the society and 
eventually facilitate the formation of the discursive space of civil society? 
Considering the fragmentation within Chinese society, I find that "multiple public 
spheres" is more useful in explaining the existing Chinese society than Habermas' 
unitary public sphere. I will introduce the mass media in China and discuss their 
potential and limitations to favor the discursive space of civil society. After this, I will 
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turn to the appropriateness of the theory of the subaltern public spheres to be applied 
in China. 
Mass media and the dominant public sphere 
When asked the question whose public sphere for whose interest, researchers were 
inclined to use political economy as the analytical framework in their discussions of 
the role of the mass media as the institution of the public sphere. So do the studies of 
Chinese mass media. The Chinese system has been transformed from totalitarianism 
to state-capitalist authoritarianism characterized by a higher degree of tolerance for 
relative separation between economic dynamics and political dictates. The Chinese 
mass media also have experienced the process of commercialization. However, the 
marketised media do not oppose the ideological premises of the party-state. The 
freedom of mass media mainly remains in the non-political discourse (Lee, 2001). 
Although Chinese mass media advocates enthusiastically plunged themselves into the 
surging ocean of commercialization, they are deeply embedded in the established 
market authoritarian social order (Zhao, 2001). This reality again proves that the 
capitalist market is a necessary but insufficient condition for civil society. 
According to Zhao (2001), the limitations of mass media in serving the public sphere 
are manifested in several aspects. First, the freedom of the press is still under state 
repression. The mass media promoted the ideology of the market and championed 
market-oriented policies, entrepreneurs, and successful businesses. However, neither 
the media nor the public played any meaningful role in deciding the reforms process. 
Second, commercialization further subjected media outlets and journalists to the 
power of money. To make profit, the tiny political and economic elite and the mostly 
urban-based middle class have been constituted as the most favoured media clients. 
The media outlets are dedicating themselves to the informational and entertainment 
needs of the “new rich". As a result, the Chinese workers and peasants and their 
voices are eliminated from the mass media. The last and most importantly, the mass 
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media have been prevented from serving as vehicles of communication across 
different social groups. 
Instead of focusing on state repression on the mass media, some scholars are eager to 
point out the erosive role of the capitalist economy (Zhang, 1998; Wang, 1998; Gan, 
1998). They echoed Western critics in claiming that the market has led to the decline 
of democracy and the crisis of the public sphere. There were no positive relationships 
between the market and press freedom. The commercialization and globalization of 
mass media would only create new configurations of power and ideology, the ones of 
global capitalism. 
When referring to Habermas' trichotomy of state, economy, and society, the Chinese 
mass media are not independent enough in serving as the public sphere. The mass 
media have a very low autonomy from the state and become more and more 
controlled by entrepreneurial forces. They are not the sphere open to all social 
members and even for the upper middle class. They avoid the political discussions 
that lead to the clarification of the interests of the upper middle class. In a word, the 
recent Chinese mass media cannot afford a unitary public sphere and at the same time, 
they are unqualified to be named as a subaltern public sphere. 
The premises of subaltern public spheres in China 
In addition to the inability of the mass media in serving as a unitary public sphere, the 
subaltern public spheres emerged in China under several other conditions. First, it is 
economic reform that makes more and more material resources and political thoughts 
get out of state control. Second, it related intimately with the differentiation of social 
groups. And in fact, these two conditions are involved with each other. Economic 
reform as a state policy has been the direct dynamics of the stratification in China 
(Zhou, Tuma & Moen, 1996). They argued that changes in state policies could 
dramatically alter opportunity structures, the status of structural locations, and the 
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nature and value of political and human capital. Through this process, a changing 
social structure will be the inescapable result of economic reform. Furthermore, since 
economic reform is in its own process, the stratification in China is not very clear. 
However, some Chinese researchers have tried to clarify the stratification (Li, 2002; 
He, 2000). 
Most local research on stratification in China is still in the frame of traditional 
socialism, which is based on three main classes including the proletariat, the peasants 
and the intellectuals. Sometimes, they add a class called private enterpriser. He 
Qinglian (2000: 94) puts an insightful classification which is more sensitive to the 
differentiation within the three classes and the rising of new classes. He said that there 
is a pyramidal social structure in China, with a tiny and highly overlapping and 
interlocking political and economic elite, an underdeveloped middle class, the vast 
majority of Chinese workers, rural migrants and peasants at the bottom, and the 
unemployed urban workers or pauperized peasants at the margin. 
Since my observation is on the city residents, I will introduce the elite and middle 
layers in He's classification. The tiny elite are made up of a small number of people 
who possess political, economic and intellectual resources. Although there are slight 
differences between the three kinds of recourse possessors, their interests have been 
more and more consistent and start to crystallize their class-consciousness. This one 
percent of the employed population is the real dominant class in China. The 
counterpart of the middle class in Western countries, the so-called petty bourgeoisie 
(Xiaozi) in China, is still underdeveloped. They only occupy four percent of the total 
workforce. They do not have many political and economic resources even though they 
are well educated and progressive in spirit. I would like to classify all the other social 
groups as an uninformative and powerless other public spheres, which together with 
the dominant public sphere constitutes the wider public spheres. They are diverse, 
dispersed and undereducated. 
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Based on such a stratification, we find that the mass media do not afford a platform 
where different groups of people could discuss with each other. Furthermore, in the 
view of multiple public spheres, it is essentially impossible to ask the mass media to 
be a forum for all the social groups. Habermas' public sphere is only for the bourgeois 
or as Zhao (2001) analyzed, the Chinese mass media is only for the tiny elite and 
upper middle class. However, does this mean that there are no rational discussions 
within other social groups? Do the other social groups try to make their voices heard 
through various methods? Especially, as a puny but promising social group, how does 
the underdeveloped middle class try to develop under the pressure from the elite class? 
How do they enlarge their quantity and influence in the society? 
The unique Chinese social structure decides that the "subaltern" in China has its 
special meaning. The underdeveloped middle class becomes the constituents of the 
subaltern public sphere in my analysis. Is this claim arguable? I will discuss it in the 
following section. 
Subaltern public spheres in contemporary China 
Multiple public spheres theorists called the social groups out of the mainstream public 
the subaltern (Fraser, 1992) or counterpublics (Asen & Brouwer, 2001; Warner, 2002). 
What do the "subaltern" and "counter" mean in the context of China? How marginal 
are the various discussions out of the mainstream media? The uniqueness of China is 
that there is not a dominant bourgeois public sphere. The mass media only satisfy the 
information and entertainment needs of their targeted audiences. However, the mass 
media do not provide a sphere for their targeted audiences, the so-called upper middle 
class (Zhao, 2001) to rationally discuss the public affairs related to their common 
good. If subaltern public spheres exist in counter relations with state, marketplace and 
dominant public, how can we talk about "subaltern" when no "dominant" exists? 
Should we call the "marginal" groups subaltern or the rudiment of a dominant public? 
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To answer this question, I first examine whether the dominance of the bourgeois 
public sphere is the necessary condition of subaltern public spheres. The most 
important implication of multiple public spheres is that different social groups have 
different discursive spaces to discuss their own affairs. Do all these discursive spaces 
exist in the opposed relationships with a bourgeois public sphere as that in most 
Western countries today? The first kind of subaltern public sphere is the bourgeois 
public sphere itself. Before it achieved its dominant position in both the economy and 
state control, the bourgeois public sphere was under suppression from the 
representative public sphere, which is the direct manifestation of the power of princes 
and aristocrats (Habermas, 1989). Compared to wider unlettered publics, the 
bourgeois public sphere is small both in its size and influence. Another kind of 
subaltern public sphere which is not bound in the opposed relationships with the 
bourgeois public sphere is called "partial publics" (Hansen, 1993: xxxviii). These 
partial publics could exist within the cultural industries. They do not have a definite 
identity and their constitution is rather complicated. However, they are hidden from 
the public view due to various reasons. They are not as radical or counter as that of 
the women or blacks, but they are still subaltern considering their voicelessness in the 
dominant public sphere. From these discussions, we can find that the subaltern public 
spheres are diverse and not limited to the forms of the feminist or proletariat public 
sphere. A dominant bourgeois public sphere or the oppositional relationships is not 
necessary. "Subaltern" is a concept relative to the "dominant" no matter whether the 
dominance comes from the bourgeois, the state or the cultural industry. As the 
subaltern public sphere in China is differently structured from the bourgeois public 
sphere, it could be said to be an alternative to it. 
There are two kinds of connotations of the "subaltern" (Asen & Brouwer, 2001: 8-10). 
The first appears in the group identity of counterpublic agents. Unequal access to 
power and uneven distribution of symbolic and material resources give advantage to 
dominant social groups and disadvantage subordinate groups in public discourse. 
Taking this circumstance into account, one may locate the "counter" or "subaltern" in 
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the identity of the persons who articulate oppositional discourse. This group-identity 
approach has some shortcomings. It may mask important differences among 
individual group members. Moreover, inhibitors of marginal identities do not always 
oppose domination. The second approach locates the "counter" or "subaltern" in 
topics that have been introduced into wider publics' agendas through counter-publicity. 
It may disclose the processes through which topics once viewed by many as "private 
issues" or "special interests" become "public problems". However, this approach only 
draws attention to those movements from the margin to the center, thus neglecting the 
ways in which dominant or public topics are rendered marginal or private. 
Which kind of "subaltern" is appropriate to be used in China? Here I prefer to use the 
second definition of "subaltern". The "subaltern" exists in topics that are forbidden 
from the bearable social discourse, such as mass media, government documents and 
market reports. In general, the publics in China have limited symbolic and material 
resources and most of them cannot hear voices out of mainstream media controlled by 
the state. The subaltern public spheres in China exist in a quartered structure related to 
the state, the market economy, and the wider public spheres. These wider public 
spheres include the classes both higher and lower than the specific public sphere in 
discussion, namely, the dominant public sphere and other subaltern public spheres. 
The subaltern public spheres function along two directions, both inward and outward. 
For the members of the subaltern public spheres, they can discuss the issues they think 
important and voiceless in state-sanctioned spheres safely and actively. At the same 
time, they are directed toward wider publics and try to infiltrate mass media through 
different methods. With kinds of strategies, the subaltern public sphere introduces 
forbidden topics to the wider publics and tries to get their support. At the same time, 
the subaltern public sphere interacts with the state and the economy. 
Furthermore, the relationships among the state, the economy, the subaltern public 
sphere and the wider publics are not as "counter" as literally understood. The market 
reform in China is often considered as the primer of liberal democracy. Many Chinese 
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scholars have emphasized the collaboration between state and society in order to 
achieve a healthy development. Thus my analysis will pay attention to the negotiated 
relations among the four parts. The state tolerates the existence of these subaltern 
public spheres although it does not admit their legal status. The market economy 
promotes the subaltern public spheres through diverse information rather than 
suffocates them. The most elusive relationship is that between subaltern publics and 
wider publics. On the one hand, the "subalterns" cannot dialogize with wider publics 
directly. Instead, they must take the way through the mass media, which are 
state-controlled in most cases. On the other hand, there may be conflicts between the 
subaltern publics and wider publics since subalterns are only realms for certain social 
groups. Here raises the question of the normative assumption of the Western multiple 
public spheres scholars: Do the activities of subaltern public spheres necessarily lead 
to a healthier civil society? In the case of China, will they promote the public spheres 
which are suppressed by the state? 
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in Research Questions and Research Design 
Research questions 
To answer the questions put forward in the previous two parts, I use the case of a 
Chinese online discussion board to explore three aspects of theoretical concerns. First, 
to what extent, will the Internet facilitate the subaltern public spheres? This concern 
tries to clarify the confusion of the democratic potential of the Internet: The optimism 
on the micro level and the pessimism on the macro level. Second, my study tries to 
develop the theory of the subaltern public spheres. What kind of discursive space 
could be called subaltern public sphere? How can the subaltern public spheres 
function in the formation of the civil society? In addition, there is another theoretical 
concern about the parts of Chinese civil society other than social organizations and 
mass media, which are ignored by many Chinese scholars. 
In this study, I examine the following five questions: 
(1) Is the discussion board open to its members? 
(2) Is the discourse within the discussion board deliberative? 
(3) What is the relationship between the subaltern public sphere and the state? 
(4) What is the relationship between the subaltern public sphere and the market 
power? 
(5) What is the relationship between the subaltern public sphere and the mass 
media? 
Research site: an online discussion board of movies 
The online discussion board for movies I am discussing is called "RearWindow to 
Movies" and often called "RearWindow" for short. RearWindow is one of the 120,001 
(updated on April 20, 2002) discussion boards on the website named Xicihutong in 
48 
Mainland China (http://b2467.xici.nety It is one of the biggest discussion boards on 
xici.net, which has more than 5,000 booking users. In addition, xici.net permits 
non-registered Internet users to read their open discussion board without the right to 
post articles. The exact extension RearWindow has reached is hard to estimate. 
Xici.net itself was initiated as a non-profit folk website on April 14, 1998. Now it has 
3,000,000 users approximately. About two years after its birth, the website was bought 
by elong.com which is a profit-oriented company. I first learned about this website in 
July 1999. At that time, xici.net had become a famous online community covering 
users mainly from Beijing, Nanjing, and Chengdu. RearWindow was one of the first 
discussion boards I regularly went to in my early days on xici.net. In the following 
four years, I kept reading and responding to the articles on RearWindow, had 
conversations one-to-one through the leaving word function of xici, and made friends 
online. 
Why BBS? 
BBS is the short form for "Bulletin Board System". Almost all of the BBS provide a 
way to offer the most common bulletin board features: Electronic mail, bulletins, 
public message areas, and file transfer. The oldest service is the “posting” of 
electronic messages or notices in a public area for others to read. As other users read 
and respond to these postings, a "conversation" develops. Public messages are usually 
organized by topic into "conferences" or discussion areas. Whereas, conference or 
discussion areas are available to all users, electronic mail on a BBS is usually 
"private": Messages can only be read by the sender and recipients. Besides the public 
messages that can be posted, most bulletin boards have one or more collections of 
online bulletins ——text files that can be read by users while online. These are often of 
more lasting interest than messages, and are usually maintained by the system 
manager. The file collections area allows users to review or download the files, which 
are collected and made accessible by the system manager. Finally, many boards have a 
feature known as a "door" 一 a way to exit from the BBS while still online, to run 
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another program (Erik, 1993). 
As one of the most popular services used on the Intemet, the BBS has developed its 
unique characteristics during application. First, it provides a more public cyberspace 
than other services such as email and ICQ. Communication through email or ICQ has 
been directed to certain audiences, while posters on the BBS never exactly know who 
their readers are. Second, compared to IRC (Intemet Relay Chatting), another public 
space online, the texts or the communications on the BBS are more durable than that 
in IRC. In IRC, conversations flow quickly and simulate the speed in face-to-face 
settings, and thus chatters are often unconscious of saving the conversations. At the 
same time, although online chat rooms are open, the chaos in the rooms often causes 
people to lose grasp of all the conversations going on at the time. In addition to the 
interactions, the BBS also can provide much information with clear sortation, marked 
by different discussion areas. Users of the BBS can download software, too. The BBS 
is the service which combines both the informational and the interactional functions 
of the Intemet. 
Because of its salient advantages in multi-to-multi communication, the BBS has 
become one of the most popular online services in China. According to the 
Semiannual Survey Report on the Development of China's Intemet (January, 2003), 
the BBS and community forums services ranked third in the interactional services on 
the Intemet, after email and online chatting including IRC and ICQ. In this report, 
18.9% of the Intemet users used the BBS services frequently, which means 9.8 
million people. On August 8, 1995, the Shuimu Qinghua BBS (SMTH) was built, 
which is the BBS of Tsinghua University. It is the first Internet-based BBS in 
Mainland China. The university BBS are still the most active ones today. There are 
about 50 university BBS and some of them could reach 10,000 users online at the 
same time, such as SMTH. There are also BBS out of the campus, which include 
commercial ones, personal ones and governmental ones. Most of the commercial BBS 
provides information of their commodities and communicate with their potential 
50 
consumers through the BBS. Governmental BBS are similar in releasing information. 
Some of the commercial BBS tried to make money from the users of the BBS directly, 
including my research subject, xici.net. A number of personal BBS exist, too. Due to 
their limited resources, this kind of BBS only has small user groups and low 
influence. 
Since the BBS is a more public technological application on the Internet, they are 
good sites to observe communal actions online. Based on the large number of users, 
we can expect that the BBS may have some influences on reality. In a word, the BBS 
is more appropriate to answer my research questions than email, IRC and ICQ. On the 
one hand, it contains most of the technological characteristics of the Internet, both 
informational and interactional. On the other hand, its public attributes make it 
possible to examine the BBS as a public sphere. 
However, not all the BBSs could be called subaltern public sphere. Judging whether a 
BBS is a subaltern public sphere mainly relies on the openness of the BBS. If the BBS 
is only open to a small group of people who have close relationships such as friends 
or alumni, it is not a public sphere at all. If the BBS is open to everyone on which all 
kinds of opinions mix up, it is not a subaltern public sphere since subaltern public 
spheres are the discursive spaces only for the subaltern publics. The BBSs on 
sina.com or sohu.com fall into this category. There are still many BBSs between the 
private parties and totally open forums. We must pay attention to their relationships 
with state and market economy. If the BBS is controlled by the government or 
commercial companies, such as the online forums of state-controlled newspapers, it is 
not a subaltern public sphere either. In a word, only the BBSs which is open to the 
certain subaltern public only and controlled by the certain subaltern public, could be 
called subaltern public sphere. 
Why movies? 
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Why did I choose a discussion board on movies to answer my theoretical questions? 
Among the 120,001 boards, there are quite a lot discussing political topics only and 
more close to the public sphere. In fact, I have done a research on the biggest 
discussion board on political issues called ReSee Review (RSR) in xici.net. I found 
that the topics on RSR are really diverse: Not only the state governance but also the 
social problems, international relationships and even policies of other countries are 
under hot debate. The debates are so hot that almost no consensus on any topics could 
be achieved. Because of its obviously political characteristics, it has been under tight 
scrutiny from the Chinese cyberpolice like Renmin Luntan (a famous online forum in 
the website of People Daily). Under the strict surveillance, it is totally impossible for 
the participants of RSR to do any actions. Unlike other big discussion boards in 
xici.net, RSR is the only one which never organizes and intends to organize a meeting 
in reality in spite of its long-time existence. A possible explanation is that participants 
do not trust each other at all. Revealing a user's real identity including name or 
working place is fearful. The revealed user will soon change to another nickname. 
Unlike other boards, the users never provide any communication methods such as 
telephone number and mailing address in RSR. In this distrustful environment, users 
are highly dispersed and hardly make an organizational unit. Mainstream media in 
China today have been used to copying articles from the Internet, but they seldom 
copy articles about political ideas from political discussion forums such as from RSR. 
Due to these reasons, the political discussion board online is too radical to come from 
online to offline. The discourse on the Internet may have some illuminating functions 
for the web users but hardly more. At least in contemporary China, we cannot see 
many opportunities for them to have an impact on everyday life because of the strict 
state control and the fragmentation of their participants. 
However, discussions on movies have their opportunities. First of all, movies are 
considered as cultural products rather than political tools after the market reform came 
into the realm of movie production. It is not a coincidence that cultural products such 
as movies and literature become the focus of a public sphere. Habermas used the 
52 
concept of the literary public sphere when he described an early form of the political 
publicity, the "training ground for a critical public reflection" (Habermas, 1991: 29). 
In the institution of art criticism, including literary, theater, and music criticism, the 
lay judgement of a public attained enlightenment and became organized. However, the 
cultural aspect of the public sphere did not lose its significance even after a political 
public sphere had emerged. The concept of cultural public sphere was first suggested 
by Frands Mortensen, who claimed it to be institutionalized in "the association", and 
spatially situated in museums, churches, exhibitions, concert halls, cinemas, libraries, 
sports grounds and theaters (Mortensen, 1977). Thus discussions on movies could be 
the topic of public debates and have the enlightening implications in China which is in 
its early age of the development of a civil society. 
In addition, Chinese movies hold a problematic status. The film industry in China is in 
the process of marketization. The government must face the commercialization of 
cultural products and release their pan-political sensitivity. A relatively free discursive 
space has opened for the movies since they are considered as commodities or 
entertainment information. At the same time, a strict film censorship remains intact. 
These rules and laws have become more generous to commercial films than before, 
but they never loosen their clamp on the film production other than both the 
mainstream and commercial films. The discourse on Chinese movies reflects the 
power relations around the movies. State controlled discourse propagandizes their best 
films and prohibit the dissemination of uncensored films. Commercial films get their 
reputations and box office ratings in the mass market. The critical publics struggle 
with these two discourse and promote their excellent films. A simple question ——what 
is a good Chinese film 一 became the core of the debate from the three parties. This 
situation fits so well with our theoretical framework and implies that a discussion 
board on movies may manifest the relationships among the state, the economy and the 
civil society. Since online discussion board is only open for certain social groups, we 
can also observe the complicated relationships among different publics. 
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Research methods 
This study uses both quantitative and qualitative methods to collect data. 
1. Content analysis of postings on the board (January 20 — February 19, 1999; 
February 20 - March 19, 2000; March 20 — April 19, 2001; April 20 - May 19, 2002; 
July 9 — 15，2002; April 13 - 19, 2003); 
2. Discourse analysis of selected postings on the board; 
3. In-depth interviews with 14 interviewees; 
4. An online survey of board participants (April 21, 2003 - April 27, 2003); 
5. Participant observation of the bulletin board (June 2002 - June 2003). 
I started my participant observation in June 2002. Since then, I visited the bulletin 
board two to three times a day, reading all of the postings, and observing the online 
activities. For example, how many people were online at the same time? Which 
postings were deleted by the board administrators lastly? In the first six months, I kept 
observing without any actions, including writing new postings or answering others' 
postings. I revealed my identity as a researcher only in January 2003 and after that, I 
started to answer or write postings. I contacted the board administrators and some 
active participants via leaving messages in the website of xic.net. From January to 
May, I conducted in-depth interviews with 14 informants via different methods, 
including face-to-face and email ones. 
Table 3.1 List of Interviewees 
Identity Name Amount 
Boardmasters and Sysop Lvzi, Minjianlihun,, X-Camoufleur, Vian, 6 
VCD, Xiaocai 
Active Participants Guzhiyu*, Hanyu, Takethat*, Zaodao, 5 
Zhuozi* 
Media Staff including Ju, Leon, Maxiangxin 3 
reporters, editors and 
media heads 
* Informants interviewed via email. 
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On April 21, 2003, I posted a message about my survey on RearWindow to invite 
responses to the questionnaire (See Appendix). This questionnaire was on an online 
survey website, which provided free spaces for questionnaires. They did not ask for 
any registration for answering the questionnaire and everyone could reach the results 
without any limitations. After I had posted the message, I asked the board 
administrators to put this message on the head of the board and mark it as "Jian" 
(recommendation) or "Gao" (announcement). Thus the postings could be kept on the 
top of the board for one week. 
During the survey period, I responded to questions and discussion that arose on the 
board about the survey. I also followed up those respondents who left their contacts to 
clarify inconsistent or missing answers provided to the questionnaire. One week later, 
there were 255 responses to the questionnaire and the "Jian" mark was cancelled. I 
posted a message on the board on April 27, 2003 announcing that the survey had 
finished. One hundred and eighty-five valid responses were received. 
At the same time, I collected various kinds of texts from different sources. These texts 
were mainly collected around some issues. The first cluster of texts was on the 
evolution of the xici.net, which was collected from the Internet, the traditional media 
like the newspaper and magazines. The second cluster was about the Internet control, 
including the control from the state and from the commercial powers. The third 
cluster was the biggest cluster, which is directly from the postings on the board. The 
texts in the third cluster were all related to the issues of Chinese films. 
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Table 3.2 Texts about Research Questions 
RQ Source Issue 
The bulletin board An'yang Baby 
3 Internet and other State control of the Internet, Online Police, Film 
media Censorship, Film Prizes, Underground Movies, The 
Sixth Generation, Mainstream Movies 
4 Internet and other Evolution of xici.net, Commercial Movies, Pirate 
media Movies 
5 Other media News reports on RearWindow 
After the survey period, I selected postings to do content analysis. The first posting on 
the board appeared on December 20，1998. There were in total 16,595 postings till 
April 19, 2003. During these 52 months, I decided to choose four months as the 
sample, one month per 13-month section. Since I wanted to examine the evolution of 
the bulletin board and compare postings through the time, I used the random digits 
method to choose one number from 1 to 13. The online random digits generator 
(http://www.random.org) generated "2" as the number and I found out the second 
month in the four 13-month sections. Finally I got January 20 一 February 19, 1999; 
February 20 — March 19, 2000; March 20 — April 19, 2001; and April 20 - May 19, 
2002. To make the analysis more sensitive to the latest changes of the board, I 
selected one additional week from April 13 to 19, 2003. During these periods, there 
were in total 1,255 postings, including 47 for 1999, 154 for 2000, 501 for 2001，463 
for 2002, and 90 for 2003. 
The second content analysis was on a smaller scope which focused on the postings 
during the debate of "whether movies are a kind of politics". In total are 53 postings 
were analyzed, which were posted during July 9 — 15, 2002. 
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IV Bulletin Boards as Subaltern Public Spheres 
What is a subaltern public sphere? Why do I call this bulletin board a subaltern public 
sphere and not other names? To answer these questions, I would like to analyze first 
the characteristics of the subaltern public sphere. At the same time, I will evaluate the 
facts about my research subject, "RearWindow to Movies" (RearWindow), to be a 
subaltern public sphere. As I mentioned before, the theory of multiple public spheres 
and especially, that of the subaltern public sphere is still in progress and more flexible 
than Habermas' public sphere in many criteria. However, these criteria may include, 
first of all, a basic quartered structure, which is divided into the state, the economy, 
the wider publics and the subaltern public sphere. Although there is not a universal 
access，the subaltern public sphere opens to their members farthest. Within the sphere, 
members could construct their own discourse which is oppressed in other places. In 
addition to this discursive function, the subaltern public sphere may have other 
functions, such as provide a safe discursive space to make some strategies, construct a 
communal identity, mobilize the potential members, and change the public attitude 
and state control toward them. However, except for the quartered structure, not all the 
criteria are necessary to being a subaltern public sphere. One of the advantages of the 
post-bourgeois public sphere theory is its diversity and flexibility in evaluating the 
contributions of a subaltern public sphere. 
In this part, I will study the inner activities of RearWindow and examine in what sense, 
RearWindow could be called a subaltern public sphere. At first, I will introduce the 
development of RearWindow during the last four years. Then I will define the identity 
of the users of RearWindow from some basic social-economic status analyses. As an 
online discursive space, RearWindow may have some new features in its accessibility 
to its members. Comparing RearWindow with other traditional discursive spaces, I 
will show the uniqueness of the Intemet to be a public sphere. Maintaining the 
sensitivity to the Intemet, I turn to the discourse on RearWindow. I want to examine 
whether Habermas' deliberative discussion is still a useful criterion of public sphere. 
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Finally, I will discuss both the advantages and the problems that the Internet brings to 
online subaltern public spheres. This part will answer my first and second research 
questions. 
(1) Is the discussion board open to its members? 
(2) Is the discourse within the discussion board deliberative? 
Introduction of RearWindow 
"RearWindow to Movies" (RearWindow) is one of the sub-boards on a bulletin board 
system website, xici.net. It is a movie discussion board and sorted under the title Arts. 
RearWindow was established at the end of 1998, by a movie fan called VCD� . VCD 
worked as a technician and lived in Nanjing, Jiangsu Province at that time. The 
Internet was not so popular and there were a few websites that local users could visit. 
Xici was the biggest interactional website in Nanjing then. Since there was not a 
movie discussion board in xici.net in 1998, VCD decided to establish one on which he 
could communicate with others after watching movies. In the first year of 
RearWindow, there were not many users and most of them were the early adopters of 
the Internet in China, mainly some "white-collar professionals". In addition to film 
reviews, there were many personal interactions on the board in the early stage of 
RearWindow since the size of users was still small and controllable. In the middle of 
1999, a new group of users entered RearWindow, who were the students or teachers 
from Beijing Film Academy. This was directly caused by a commercial activity of 
xici.net. In the middle of 1999, xici.net was bought by elong.com，a profit-oriented 
company. After this purchase, elong.com made a lot of advertisements in Beijing, 
which attracted users to elong and then to xici, and finally some to RearWindow. 
However, the turning point appeared at the beginning of 2000: Many productive 
movie writers entered into RearWindow. They brought their excellent movie reviews 
2 Source: Interview with VCD; "Retrospection of RearWindow", VCD, "RearWindow to Movies", April 14, 2002 
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and the atmosphere of original critiques into RearWindow. This blooming may be 
ascribed to the development of the Internet in China. From 1999 to 2000, the Internet 
in China experienced its fastest increase. The users increased from 2,100,000 to 
8,900,000, at the rate of 323%l Although the number of users reached 59,100,000 in 
January 2003, the increasing rate could never be higher than that of during 1999 to 
2000. After this turning point, RearWindow kept its position as the most popular 
online movie discussion board in China for two years. In the April of 2002, VCD 
abdicated the boardmaster position due to personal reasons. Lvzi and Gedaer now 
administrate this board, one is a postgraduate student, and the other is a music and 
films editor. However, RearWindow stopped growing although the adopters of the 
Internet in China are still increasing. 
The development of RearWindow 
To track the development of RearWindow, I made some content analysis of the 
postings on the board. 
Graph 4.1 Postings per Day from 1999 to 2003 
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From the graph, we can find that in the first year, there was little increase. After the 
movie writers swarmed into the discussion board, the number of postings increased 
dramatically. In the recent two years, the number appeared to decrease a little. In 
addition to the number of postings, the original postings increased as the board 
^Source: Semiannual Survey Report on the Development of China's Internet (Jan, 1999). 
http://www.cnnic.net.cn/develst/report3 .shtml; Semiannual Survey Report on the Development of China's Internet 
(Jan, 2000)，http://www.cnnic.net.cn/develst/cnnic2000.shtml 
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developed. In the sample month in 1999, only 48.9% of the postings were original. In 
2000, the percentage increased to 73.4%. It was 84.2% in 2001, 89.6% in 2002, and 
92.2% in 2003. The percentage of the posting marked by “Cool，，followed the same 
pattern. “Cool，’ is marked by the boardmaster and indicates that this posting is very 
worth reading. 
Graph 4. 2 Percentage of Cool Postings from 1999 to 2003 
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Not only the group of writers but also that of the audience enlarged. This could be 
reflected by the number of replies and clicking. 
Graph 4.3 Numbers of Replies from 1999 to 2002 
4001 





/ reply postings 
- / � S" 100- J ^ —— 
1 ^：^^^^：：：：：^^ 二 1-5。 
2 0 • — “ “ ‘ 51-100 
1999 2000 2001 2002 
Time 
The numbers of replies in all levels have increased and especially that in the level of 
one to ten replies. However, the intense discussion which involved a big amount of 
replies did not increase much. The number of clicking also increased dramatically. 
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These two numbers indicate that the year from 2000 to 2001 was a very important 
phase on RearWindow's development. The movie writers wrote many more excellent 
movie reviews and these articles attracted a larger audience into RearWindow. In spite 
of the persistent enlargement of the number of Internet users, RearWindow now 
stepped into a decline. 
The contents on RearWindow 
I classified the contents into seven categories. Postings during the sample week in 
2003 were initially read with a view to identify appropriate classification categories. 
Taking reference from the integrative study of Nip (2001), the final categories were: 
1. Review and discussions: Postings that review films, film actors, film directors, 
film industry and anything related to the films. This kind of message often calls up 
responses and discussions. 
2. Information: Postings that announce or seek factual details about happenings, 
venues or people. 
2.1 Films: Provide or seek information about the films and film industry. 
2.2 Offline activities: Provide or seek information about activities, including watching 
movies or meetings. 
2.3 VCD/DVD/CD: Report about the latest VCD/DVD/CDs about movies. 
3. Expression and sharing: Postings that carry personal feelings or views of the 
poster, not addressed to anybody, and do not necessarily draw replies. 
4. Task and advice: Postings directed to particular board participants and expecting 
replies from these participants so that the message and reply together accomplish a 
task or make arrangements for an event. 
5. Relational: Postings used by the poster to address particular board participants for 
interpersonal liaison. 
6. Management and intrusion: Postings posted to suggest the "shoulds" and "should 
nots" of behavior on the board and postings posted to harass the boardmasters or 
61 
all board participants. 
7. Others: Postings that do no fall under any of the above, including postings have 
nothing to do with movies and advertisements. 
Graph 4.4 Types of Postings from 1999 to 2003 
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From this pie graph, we can see that most of the postings (67.3%) on the board are 
movie reviews and about 24% is information about movies. Only very small portions 
are for relational, task and advice, management and intrusion, and others. Since most 
of the movie reviews are critical discussions, I can claim that RearWindow is an 
online space which is mainly for deliberate discourse rather than expressional 
narratives. The two kinds of postings are quite different. For example, two postings 
have talked about a Chinese movie, "Be There or Be Square" by Feng Xiaogang. The 
deliberate discourse reads like this: 
"He (a Hong Kong director) said that nobody would come to watch 
'Be There or Be Square' in Hong Kong because this movie is so 
limited to its locale. They do not know the background the story 
happens in and cannot understand many dialogues. They felt 
confused." 
nittp://www.xici.iiet/board/doc.asp?id=33962&sub=2&doc old=l 
February 3, 1999) 
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And the expressive narrative reads like this: 
“This dialogue impressed my heart. And from this moment, I had 
another worry, worrying that one day when I am old, I have to say that 
‘I lost my love'. It makes me more worried if at that time, 'Li Qing' 
(the heroine) will not appear and no one will give me a piece of tissue 
to wipe off my tears." 
(http://www.xici.net/board/doc.asp?id=36931 &sub=4&doc old=l 
February 11, 1999) 
The users of RearWindow 
It is very important to find out who are using RearWindow because most of the 
subaltern public spheres assume a marginal or depressed social group. From the 
analysis of the demography of users, we can leam in what sense, RearWindow is a 
discursive space for marginal groups. To answer this question, survey results provide 
most of the materials. Interviews with boardmasters and active participants 
complement the discussion. 
RearWindow is typical of online groups in that its participants are younger, better 
educated and more affluent than average. Nearly all (99.5%) survey respondents aged 
between 18 and 35; 97.3% were educated to the university/college level or above. 
37.8% were students (n=70), 16.2% were company employees (n=30), and 11.9% 
were reporters or editors (n=22); 26.8% of the respondents (n=48) earned a monthly 
personal income less than 500 RMB. However, considering non-students only, 93% 
(n=106) earned more than 1000 RMB per month. Both the numbers are higher than 
the average personal income of city residents, which was 487.83 RMB per month in 
1999.4 
4 The Fifth National Census (2000), National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/ndsi/zgni/mulu.html 
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When compared to the whole of the Internet users in China, users of RearWindow 
demonstrate many differences from the general population. First, the age of the users 
is obviously more concentrated than the population. Most of the users are young 
adults. The education level is much higher. Although the percentage of students of 
RearWindow users is higher than that of the population, the monthly income is not 
lower. In sum, compared to the whole of the Internet users, the RearWindow group is 
a group of young adults who have good education and income. This section of people 
occupies only a small portion of Internet users and even a smaller section of the whole 
Chinese population (Table 4.5). 
Table 4.5 Comparison between RearWindow Users and Internet Users in China 
RearWindow Survey CNNIC Survey^ 
Aged between 18 and 35 99.5% 64.5% 
Education at University/College 97.3% 56.5% 
level or above 
Students 37.8% 28% 
Monthly income lower than 500 26.8% 40% 
RMB 
Monthly income higher than 63.1% 39.1% 
1000 RMB 
Most of the users are from Nanjing, where the company of xici.net is located. Since 
elong.com (the parent company of xici.net) is in Beijing, users from Beijing occupy 
the second position. Areas near Nanjing, like Shanghai and other cities in Jiangsu 
Province, are also many users' locations. It is worth mentioning that there are several 
users living abroad such as in Canada, Australia, North America and England. 
This group of people could be called the "underdeveloped middle class", which is put 
forward by He (2000). They are young and progressive in spirit. They have 
5 Semiannual Survey Report on the Development of China's Internet (Jan, 2003)， 
http://www.cnriic.net.cri/develst/2003-le/iridex.shtml 
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advantages in education and knowledge that could be brought into the virtual public 
sphere. They have some economic resources while still lacking the political recourses. 
They are far more powerless than the political and economic elites in China. Their 
resources maybe limited because there are many students amongst who are some 
promising middle-class members. Nearly three quarters (73.2%) of the respondents 
think they are small in number but 75.5% think they are not weak in influence. 
Considering the use pattern, most of the users could be called regular participants of 
RearWindow. They visited RearWindow regularly and spent much time on it. About 
three quarters (74.1%) of users visited RearWindow at least two or three times each 
week, 46.5% of them spent more than half an hour on the board every time they 
visited it. However, since I put this survey online only for one week due to time 
limitation, it is possible that I could not reach the light users. In addition, 56.2% of the 
users access the Intemet at home and 24.9% in their working locales. 
Accessibility of RearWindow 
This part tries to answer my first research question: Is the discussion board open to 
its members? The accessibility is problematic because of two reasons. First, different 
from the Habermasian public sphere, subaltern public spheres claim that universal 
accessibility was not in fact realized and is not possible to be realized. Second, in a 
unitary public sphere, the subordinated groups have no arenas for deliberation among 
themselves. 
Accessibility of the Internet in China 
The Intemet is expanding in China and becoming more and more popular. From the 
latest national survey^, data show that users educated below university level is the 
6 Semiannual Survey Report on the Development of China's Intemet (Jan, 2003). 
http://www.cnnic.net.cn/develst/2003-le/iTidex.shtml 
65 
majority (69.6%) and this part of users is still growing rapidly. Compared to the 
survey in July 2002, users below university education increased 31.5% while the ones 
with and above university education increased 23.7%. From the monthly income, we 
can find this tendency as well. 84.5% of users earn less than RMB 2000 per month. 
The Internet is no longer limited to a group of elites who possess great educational 
and economic resources. However, this expansion is mainly in the cities and the 
countries lag behind. Only 1% of the users are peasants. In spite of the popularization 
of the Internet, education and economic status remain as the significant barriers to 
access to the Internet. Among non -users, two in five (40.8%) did not have access to 
the Internet since they lack the knowledge of the computer or the Internet. One in four 
(27.7%) had no access because they did not have the equipment. 
The Internet as a medium cannot provide the universal access at this stage. We should 
not expect it to be a medium which can overcome all shortcomings of the traditional 
media. Its significance does not lie in its perfection but in the improvement it brings. 
In my survey, when asking whether the Internet is freer and more open than other 
media, most of the answers agreed (including “totally agree" and "basically agree", 
92.4% for freer and 97.8% for more open). This result corresponds to the "Survey of 
the Use and the Influence of the Internet in China" (2001), which showed that 50.1% 
of users think the Internet has more benefits than disadvantages. 
Accessibility ofxici.net 
When asked, “How did you find RearWindow", over half of the users (50.8%) knew it 
through the home page of xici.net. Since RearWindow is a very active board, its link 
could appear on the home page. Thus the accessibility of xici.net itself may influence 
the accessibility of RearWindow. 
Xici.net was established during March to April 1998 by Xiangma, who was a 
programmer at that time. Similar to many explorers in cyberspace, he dreamed of 
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constructing a ‘‘really free and personally centered" website?. Xiangma admitted that 
when he established xici.net, his first consideration was its function and the second 
one was its ease of use. Under these two guidelines, xici.net formed its own 
advantages in technology. In the BBS websites such as xici.net, an online nickname is 
necessary to communicate with each other. Thus the registration becomes a necessary 
step into the website. Xici.net provides a very easy registration process which only 
takes about 30 seconds. You only need to provide a nickname and a password and 
then log in the BBS. Under this “ordinary user" level, one can read all the open 
discussion boards and replies to the postings there. However, they are prohibited from 
establishing their own board and entering into the private discussion boards. If one 
wants to have these rights, s/he must provide additional information such as email, 
birthday, location, education and become the “registered user". But all the additional 
information will not be verified by the website. Unlike some websites which send the 
password to your email box, xici.net never tried to confirm one's personal identity. 
Thus it is easy to be an anonymous user while you enjoy most of the rights. 
In addition to the common functions the BBSs afford, xici.net provides some more 
personal communication methods within the website. These methods include an 
online leaving message system, a friend list system and a chatting room area. Users 
can leave messages to any other users and these messages are only visible to the 
senders and receivers. A lot of users initiate their personal interactions through this 
leaving message function. The friend list system makes xici.net more like a location 
for a get-together. In this system, one can add and delete friends and check the status 
of online friends. The chatting room area has 50 channels under different topics. If 
you do not want to take part in any of the public channels, you can open a temporary 
private chat room for you and your friends. All these functions make xici.net a super 
BBS which has the functions of the BBS, IRC, and instant message services similar 
with ICQ. 
7 Jinran. "Interview with Xiangma". Star Media, November 16, 2002. 
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However, xici.net has its own deficiencies. The most severe one is the poor capability 
of its servers. Now xici.net has 13 servers in total, some of which are shared with 
• 8 
other websites . Due to the multiple functions it supports, the website requires high 
quality equipments and maintenance. Until recently, xici.net could support 7,000 users 
online at the same time. There are more than five million registered IDs and more 
than one hundred thousands active IDs in xici.net. The technological support still 
cannot satisfy the needs. The website is very difficult to access during rush hours and 
there have been seven times of long-period (more than 24 hours) suspensions due to 
technological reasons from 2001. 
Since both advantages and disadvantages are obvious, the users of xici.net take quite 
different views on the accessibility of xici.net. In my survey, both the voices of 
support and opposition are loud. 
Table 4.6 Accessibility ofXici.net 
Compared to other website, Compared to other websites, 
xici.net is more convenient to xici.net provides better 
access. services. 
Totally agree 7.0% 4.9% 
Basically agree 37.3% 29.5% 
Do not know 20% 27.9% 
Basically disagree 29.7% 31.1% 
Totally disagree 5.9o/o 6.60/0 “ 
Accessibility of RearWindow 
RearWindow To Movies (RearWindow) exists under the sub-title Arts. It is an open 
discussion board which means all users have the right to enter this board, post articles, 
8 Caotian, "Why Xici.net Started to Charge". E Time Weekly, January 14，2001. 
h.ttp://www.etimeweeklv.com/etim.enews/shownews.asp?newsid=97 
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and reply to others' articles. The barriers of the accessibility come from the style of 
the board and the management. Its logo reads that, “The life opens a rear window, 
through which we can watch movies，，. This logo reflects that RearWindow is a space 
for movie fans who consider movies as part of their lives. When asking an open 
question, "Who are the users of RearWindow", a lot of respondents used a similar 
description, "the ones who love movies". Thus RearWindow is not a board for people 
who watch movies but for people who love movies. This kind of style probably 
excludes many ordinary movie audiences. 
Since discussion boards in xici.net are all established by individuals who become the 
boardmaster later, the intention and personal style of the founder could have great 
influence on the board style, especially in the early stage of development of the board. 
In technology, they can determine the level of their boards, such as secret boards, 
private boards, and open boards. They can invite users to join their boards and reject 
some unfriendly users. They are the only people who can delete postings or mark 
postings with "cool", "notification" or “recommendation”. Synthetically applying 
these methods of management, the boardmaster can control his board to a certain 
extent. 
At the beginning of RearWindow, VCD intended to construct a discussion space for 
movie fans like him^. Since he was not a professional in movies at that time, 
RearWindow was inclined to serve the amateurish movie lovers. However, as the 
professionals entered RearWindow, especially the students or teachers from Beijing 
Film Academy, VCD was changed. But the initial style was very hard to change. 
VCD (the founder): RearWindow was a board for the masses when I 
established it. It is probably attributed to my thoughts at that time. We 
watched movies through a very common angle, if not low-class.... 
9 Interview with VCD 
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But when things developed, I found that my interest changed. I did not 
want to watch movies only from the surface, in other words, watch 
movies with a Hollywood taste. ... I tried to pilot RearWindow in this 
direction but I failed. When the discussion board grew, it belonged to a 
group of people and not me anymore. (January 30, 2002) 
VCD abdicated the position of boardmaster in April 2002 for this reason. He assigned 
two of his best friends, Lvzi and Gedaer, to succeed as the boardmasters. Then Lvzi 
assigned another two assistant boardmasters who are X-Camoufleur and Minjianlihun. 
These four persons form the group of administrators of RearWindow today. They told 
me that all the principles about the management are discussed and approved by the 
four together 10. In most cases, they have very clear principles to direct their 
management. The challenge to their management still lies in the problem VCD once 
met, the contradictions between professionals and amateurs. Thus the most important 
principle is "balance". 
Lvzi (the first boardmaster): You cannot define exactly who our users 
are. I feel that on a macro level, I must keep the balance. ... I do not 
want RearWindow to be very professional and at the same time, I do 
not want it to be a discussion board only for commercial movies. 
(January 29, 2003) 
X-Camoufleur (the fourth boardmaster): RearWindow is more 
adiaphorous than other websites. We try to keep the balance. . . .Do not 
make a parade of your talents and at the same time, do not follow 
others. (February 3, 2003) 
Under this principle, they use a lot of methods to manage the board. The most used 
Interview with Lvzi, X-Camoufleur, and Minjianlihun. I did not interview Gedaer face-to-face since he 
happened not to be in Nanjing during my data-collection. However, I have asked him for advices and he answered 
me that other boardmasters could represent his opinions. 
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method is to delete postings. In addition to some nonsense postings or advertisements, 
postings that ask for information are deleted after two days. If there are replies, 
boardmasters will send the posting with replies to the author by leaving messages. 
Lvzi said that she left about 50 pieces of these kinds of messages everyday. Postings 
with very radical opinions are often deleted and so are the too lyrical postings. "For 
example, I watched a movie today and I thought of my lost love." Lvzi said. The 
number of deleted postings varies from time to time. When there are too many 
postings about commercial movies, boardmasters will delete some “not-very-good，， 
postings on this topic. However, if there are many postings about art movies, they will 
repost some articles about commercial movies from other sources instead of deleting 
the ones on art. 
The second method they use is to mark the postings with “cool”. As I explained 
before, a "cool" mark means that this posting is very worth reading. The marking of 
"cool" is a privilege reserved only for the first and second boardmaster, Lvzi and 
Gedaer, could mark “cool’’. Thus it is more flexible than deleting. When there are few 
cool postings, boardmasters will reduce the requirements and mark cool although it is 
not so good. There are some other considerations as well. 
Lvzi: It is very difficult to ensure imparity because we do not have so 
much time to read each posting very carefully. Sometimes, I mark 
"cool" only because of the ID. ... Sometimes, there are some newbie 
whose posting is ok although not very good. He has found the correct 
way and why not give him a cool? A cool can make him stay on 
RearWindow. The third type is the really good postings or postings 
about excellent but unpopular movies. He forwarded it for discussion 
and aroused several good replies. In a word, if you are not so "good", 
your posting must be "good". (January 29, 2003) 
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However, what excellence means is connected to the personal tastes of the 
boardmasters. Lvzi is a master candidate in the department of literature and Gedaer is 
a music and film editor. Both of them are good friends of VCD. In fact, they have 
similar tastes and the difference is that they do not long for the professional style as 
eagerly as VCD does. They still want to keep RearWindow as a space for 
non-professionals. But these non-professionals are well educated and could make 
critical discourse instead of the lyrical ones. 
The effectiveness of the management could be reflected through the responses from 
my survey. More than one-third (36.2%) of the respondents admitted that they did try 
to avoid something when posting their articles. Fourteen of them said that they 
avoided posting unqualified articles and were afraid of being laughed at. This is one 
of the two main avoidances users have; the other is to avoid politically sensitive topics. 
When asked an open question "What kind of management should RearWindow have", 
the most frequent answer was to be more tolerant. However, the second frequent 
answer was to be stricter. This polarization shows the contradiction between 
professional and unprofessional preferences. In fact, there were two times when 
RearWindow lost its important users. The first time, it lost some users from Beijing 
Film Academy. A teacher from Film Academy established another discussion board 
called "Huangtingzi Street No. 50" and they continued their academic and 
professional discussions there. The second time was when VCD established another 
movie board called “DVD Movie Forum", which focused on the technology of DVDs. 
This board took a group of DVD super fans away from RearWindow. 
The above analysis is intended to emphasize one point: The style and management of 
the discussion board could be an effective barrier to accessibility other than 
technologies. Movies as the only topics of RearWindow exclude the Intemet users 
who do not like watching movies. The eclectic style excludes movie fans at two 
extremes, who are either the high-level professionals or low-level masses. In a word, 
RearWindow is open only to its targeted audience. This audience could be described 
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as amateurish movie fans in the underdeveloped middle class. Within this scope, 
RearWindow tries to attract as many people as possible. The boardmaster used 
balancing strategies to make it true. 
Discourse on RearWindow 
My second research question is: Is the discourse within the discussion board 
deliberative? Before I answer this question, I need to explain what "discourse" are 
and what "deliberative" refers to. In Habermas' view, "discourse" refer to the 
critical-rational discussions around the political issues for the common interests. 
However, theorists of subaltern public spheres pay their attention to all kinds of 
discourse within the sphere, not limited to the style of discussion and the topics of 
politics. For example, Felski (1989) took the feminist autobiography and 
self-discovery narratives as her research subjects. This discourse is not only 
critical-rational discussions but also affective expressions. But they are still valuable 
since they provide a discursive space for women to share their life experience. 
According to the topics or issues, the autobiography is not necessarily related to 
politics. Taking the subaltern public spheres approach, I must pay attention to the 
diverse discourse on RearWindow and not limit my view to discussions. 
Content analysis shows that film reviews are the primary postings which reached 
67.3%. Informational postings occupied a significant portion, 21.9 percent. The other 
ones are all lower than 5%. When classifying the postings, film reviews are 
considered as discussions in most time. Postings about films but without any critical 
discussions are sorted as expression and sharing. There are other postings under the 
expression and sharing type as well, mainly some scripts written by the users. These 
types of postings only occupied 4.1%. From these numbers, we can find that although 
there are diverse discourses on RearWindow, discussions are the most popular style. 
The boardmaster Lvzi also mentioned that they deleted postings which were too 
lyrical. In addition, 74.2% of the film reviews got replies from the discussions. 77.3% 
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of the respondents to my survey have participated or observed the discussions on the 
board. Thus I claim that discussions are the most significant postings on RearWindow, 
no matter in quantity or in influence. That is why I will analyze a case which is one of 
the hottest debates on RearWindow. After that I will discuss the significance of other 
kinds of discourse. 
Table 4.7 Statistics of Postings on RearWindow 
Film Reviews 67.3% 一 
Got Replies to Did not get 
Discussions replies to 
Discussions 
74.2% 25.8% 
Informational Postings 21.9% 
Expression and Sharing 4.1% 
Others* 6.7% 
* Including "Task and Advice", “Relational，，，"Management and Intrusion", 
and “others”. 
The issues that the film reviews involved are not political ones most of the time. It is 
very similar to the literary public sphere Habermas introduced, in which people talked 
about literature and art and learned the skills of critical-rational public debate. The 
literary public sphere turned into ideal bourgeois public sphere when economic and 
political issues were included. Although most of the individual film reviews only 
discussed the films as art works, there are several times of discussions involving 
political and economic issues. It is worth noticing that these few discussions were the 
hottest ones during my research period. The first time is a discussion about whether 
Chinese movies are a kind of politics. The second hot debate is about 'Hero' by Zhang 
Yimou, arguing whether this film is a good film or just a profit-oriented one. These 
two were the hottest which lasted for more than a week and hundreds of postings were 
seen. Some smaller debates are also on Chinese movies, including 'Together' by Chen 
Kaige, ‘Kala，My Dog' by Lu Xuezhang and so on. These smaller debates lasted for 
several days and dozens of relative articles were posted. I chose the first debate as my 
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case because it is more politically sensitive than other ones and more appropriate to be 
examined under the criteria of deliberation by Habermas. 
What kind of discussions could be called deliberative? As I reviewed before, 
deliberation includes at least three criteria. First, the goal of the discussion is to reach 
mutual understanding instead of any discursive domination. An important 
measurement is to see whether any consensus is reached after the discussion. The 
second criterion is that the discussion should be rational and critical. Diverse voices 
are equally heard and there is no monopolization of attention. All the discussions 
provide reasons which are open to critique. Third, each participant must have the 
communicative rationality, which means reflexivity, ideal role-taking and sincerity. 
In the following pages, I will analyze the case of "Movies are a kind of politics" and 
see to what extent the discourse fulfilled the three requirements. Data from my survey 
and interviews are the supporting material in addition to the text. I also pay much 
attention to the Internet as the institution of the subaltern public spheres. I will 
examine how the characteristics of the Internet, and especially that of the BBS, 
facilitate or obstruct the realization of these criteria. 
Introduction of the discussions about "Movies are a kind ofpolitics ” 
This discussion began on July 9, 2002 and lasted for more than one week. Until July 
16, the discussion became quiet but not totally silent. Sporadic discussions emerged 
time to time during the following week. There are in total 63 pieces of relative 
postings left but according to my observation, at least 20 postings appeared every day 
in the hottest week. However, in order to keep the order, the boardmaster deleted a lot 
of postings including the personal attacks, non-sense ones, and too short ones. 
The discussion was ignited by a posting written by Liar, who once studied movies in 
Belgium. It is an interview with Jiazhangke, one of the young directors in China who 
75 
are usually called the sixth generation. Liar criticized another sixth generation director 
Wangchao and his movie "An'yang Baby" in this interview. 
Liar: Shit! He (Wangchao) obliterated the essence of life. I got it. My 
feeling is right. I felt that this movie (An'yang Baby) is not good^^ 
He also criticized harshly the authors of a book “My Camera Doesn't Lie". This book 
introduces eight young directors including Jiazhangke and Wangchao. In a 
promotional meeting in Beijing University, the authors claimed that "The difference 
between the fifth and sixth generation is that the Yellow River flows in their blood 
vessels but films in ours!"^^ Their depreciation of the directors of the fifth generation 
was also attacked in Liar's posting. Only two hours after Liar posted his interview, 
another posting called “I Only Believe in Baby's Eyes" counterattacked Liar's 
critiques. The author used an ID similar to the title of the posting, 'Baby's Eyes' for 
short. Although this name/title came from the lyrical of a pop song, it is more 
meaningful than that. First, it demonstrates its support for 'An'yang Baby' and second, 
it sticks to the claim that only the sixth generation does not lie in their movies. It is 
obvious that this ID is registered specially for the debate. Finally, it was revealed that 
the ED owner is one of the authors of the book “My Camera Doesn't Lie". 
The debate reached its first turning point when Zhangdawei posted his article on July 
10. Zhangdawei is a teacher in Beijing Film Academy and very active in promoting 
independent movies in China. He pointed out that the critique on 'An'yang Baby' 
reflected the apathy on Chinese independent movies which still strive to exist in the 
rough political environment. In this phase, the center of the debate became which 
criterion should be applied to evaluate a movie, its art or its political significance. The 
second turning point appeared after Jiangbeimangliu joined the discussion. He wrote 
“ L i a r , "In the Name of Jiazhangke". http://www.xici.ne1:/board/cioc.asp?id=17835768&s.ub=9&doc old=l July 9, 
2002. 
12 Dongdongqiang, "Between the Impudicity and Folly: the Independent Movies Producers in My View". 
http://www.filmsea.com/focus/arti.cle/200206210065.htm 
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that even considering the political significance, Wangchao, the director of 'An'yang 
Baby’，only made use of politics to achieve his personal goals. Wangchao was not 
trying to reflect the real life of the lowest class in his movie. In the response to 
Jiangbeimangliu, Zhangdawei proposed the final topic of this debate, whether movies 
are a kind of politics. 
The first boardmaster Lvzi posted a notice on July 11，which asked participants to 
stop the discussion. Liar and his friend Guxiaobai quitted and Guxiaobai, who was 
one of the boardmasters at that time, quitted due to the critiques on him in the 
discussion. However, the debate got hotter and hotter and more and more users were 
involved. The focus remained on the movies and politics in spite of some personal 
attacks. The heat persisted for four days until Lvyao posted a summary of this debate. 
After that, discussions stepped into decline. The debate totally stopped on July 21. 
In addition to this sequential review of the development of the debate, I will analyze 
the discourse by the criteria of deliberation. The analysis is sensitive to the 
background of debaters and the context of Chinese movies. Intertextuality among the 
postings is also considered. 
The goal of the discussion 
The first criterion is that the goal of the discussion is to achieve mutual understanding 
instead of the success of one party. Discourse oriented to success is strategic, which 
only emphasizes its efficiency in influencing the decisions of other social actors. 
Meanwhile, discourse oriented to understanding is able to facilitate an open debate. 
The most effective measurement of the goal is to see the results of the debate: Did 
anyone in a party change their minds or understand the opponents' position? Other 
measurements include asking the participants directly (interviews and survey) and 
interpreting the text of discussion. 
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At the beginning, the two parties of this debate were the ones who were for or against 
that 'An'yang Baby' is a good movie. Later the two parties became for or against 
movies are a kind of politics. Since the topic was changed, the members of two parties 
also changed. Some new members joined and some old ones left. The complexity of 
the goal was that different participants have different goals. It was difficult to judge 
what the goal of the whole discussion was. 
The first kind of participants like Baby's Eyes，Movie Forest and Movie Mole aimed 
at putting shame on their opponents. 
Baby's Eyes: Mr. Liar is the cheekiest person I have met in 2002.. . . 
Too absurd! You criticized a movie that you never watched only based 
on your dog nose. What is your intention? . . . I t looks like you are the 
spy sent by the Film Bureau. 
aittp://www.xici.net/board/doc.asp?id二 17841508&sub=2&doc old=l 
July 9, 2002) 
Movie Forest: I do not like Liar since he is a chameleon. I do not like 
him because he criticized a movie that he never watched before. . . . I f 
we do not make people know his wrongs, he will become a bane. 
(http://www.xici.net/board/doc.asp?id=17903180&sub二 18&doc old=l 
July 11, 2002) 
Movie Mole: Yes! I am against them! Against Master Zhang 
(Zhangdawei) who sold the politics. Against Madman Cheng (Baby's 
Eyes) who sold his best seller. And against a group of flunkies who 
sold their consciences. 
(littp://www.xici.net/board/(ioc.asp?id=18029613&sub=19&doc old=l 
July 15, 2002) 
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These people did not want to communicate with others and accordingly，they did not 
use the critical-rational discourse to argue their positions. In their eyes, opponents are 
opponents forever. Debate is not a communication but a battle. Their final goal is to 
destroy the enemies and win the battle. Although other participants criticized them for 
this attitude, they did not change their initial goal. For example, in the end of the 
debate, Movie Mole said that “I can resist their hypocrisy only with my tomfoolery. I 
can rip their masks only with my impudicity." 
However, the boardmaster wanted this debate oriented to mutual understanding. They 
used their mediatory strategies to pilot the debate to their expected direction. 
Lvzi: It is impossible to persuade each other under this condition. 
Communication is most important. 
flittp://www.xici.net/boar(i/doc.asp?id=17911019&sub=24&doc old=l 
July 11, 2002) 
VCD: Debaters have expressed their opinions and clarified their 
positions. And the debate has reached the essential level. I think there 
is not a true answer. 
(http://www.xici.net/board/doc.asp?id=17911019&sub=24&doc old=l 
July 11, 2002) 
As the two boardmasters mentioned, I did find that efforts which tried to understand 
others existed. Zhangdawei, one of the core debaters, replied that he would like to 
meet his opponents including Liar and Guxiaobai, not for debating but for 
communicating. In the end of the debate, most of the participants agreed that Chinese 
movies couldn't escape the intervention from politics. Compared to the very 
beginning, they did not have much antipathy for the political significance of movies. 
If there is any consensus achieved, I think it is the recognition of the difficult 
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environment for Chinese independent movies. Meanwhile, they still kept their ideas 
such as the political significance is not the most important criterion in evaluating a 
movie. 
In addition, I wrote in my survey that the goal of discussion is to achieve mutual 
understanding and asked the respondents to choose from 1 to 5 which represents from 
totally agree to totally disagree. The result is that 67.2% of respondents agreed the 
goal is mutual understanding, including totally agree (19.1%) and basically agree 
(48.1%). 
Although I did not find anyone who changed his/her opinion totally, I doubted that the 
discussions in public spheres must result in a consensus. At least, it does not mean 
that the two parties of people will be enemies without a consensus. As I know, they 
are still active on RearWindow after the discussion, including Zhangdawei, Liar, 
Guxiaobai and even some personal attackers like Movie Mole. In addition, 
Zhangdawei, who was unfamiliar with the Intemet at first, now became a regular 
writer on RearWindow. Thus I will conclude that the goal of the discussion is more 
oriented to mutual understanding than successful persuasion. 
The equality of the discussion 
Equality means that all voices are heard equally and there is not a monopolization of 
attention. The Intemet has its advantages in facilitating the equality of users. "A 
common theme within the Intemet literature is that social hierarchies and power 
relations are leveled by the 'blindness' of cyberspace to bodily identity, thus allowing 
people to interact as if they were equals. Arguments are said to be assessed by the 
value of the claims themselves and not the social position of the poster" (Dahlberg, 
2001). However, equality is not easy to achieve due to two reasons. First, users enter 
the online subaltern public spheres with their social inequalities, such as the 
information they know, the knowledge they own, and the discussion skill they could 
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use. An online social hierarchy develops based on these inequalities. Second, it is very 
hard to live online totally concealing one's offline identity. Especially in a partial 
social group like the subaltern public sphere, there are a lot of overlappings between 
online and offline relationships. The offline affiliations or disgusts towards some 
persons will greatly influence one's attitude towards the persons' online discourse. 
I disagree that equality only refers to the numerical equality of postings by all the 
users. I disagree that if there are some posters who post many more articles than 
others, these posters dominate the discussion. I do not think infrequent posters or 
lurkers are unengaged, passive, or non-participating. Theoretically, all subscribers to a 
group have equal opportunity to post. They choose not to speak due to various reasons. 
It does not mean that they are discriminated against. Thus what I will study are the 
reasons that cause some users not to speak. Is there any discursive domination that 
excludes others' discursive rights? Does the inequality of social economic status 
among users directly lead to any domination? 
First I will examine inequalities in terms of offline resources and online hierarchy. 
Although the participants are in the same underdeveloped middle class in China, their 
ownerships of offline resources are different. The group which is represented by 
Zhangdawei is made up of professors in universities and professionals within the 
independent movie industry, which is often called academicians. They have 
advantages in information about Chinese independent movies and theoretical training 
which strengthens their ability of discussion. 
Lvyao: What Liar talked about is just a movie (An'yang Baby). But 
later the debate evolved into the living condition of Chinese 
movies. ... We can find that both Liar and Guxiaobai lacked 
theoretical preparation when we read their postings and replies. It was 
hard for them to avoid being stormy and immature when they met the 
people who lived in the world of theories like Zhangdawei. 
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aittp://www.xid.net/board/doc.asp?id=18029613&sub=19&doc old二 1 
July 15, 2002) 
In addition to the backup of theoretical training, the academicians often provided a lot 
of information to support their arguments. However, the information is not accessible 
to other users usually. In one of Zhangdawei's postings, “About An'yang Baby, 
Again", he listed 22 pieces of information to demonstrate that politics exists 
everywhere. I extracted several lines here. 
Zhangdawei: Politics is that this spring, our general director of the 
Film Bureau said that box office rating is the politics. 
Politics is that one section chief of the Film Bureau said I think that 
there are no big problems of your movie, but we cannot say that there 
are no small problems of your movie. 
Politics is that one general director told the foreign reporters: "We 
never prohibited any movies. We only temporarily forbad them to be 
featured in public." However, some movies have not been screened for 
seven years. Chinese history is so long that maybe seven years still 
could be called temporary. 
nittp://www.xici.iiet/boar(i/doc.asp?id=17931816&sub=64&doc—old=l 
July 12, 2002) 
These facts could be the powerful proofs of the arguments. In comparison, other users 
only have their personal experience and do not have any inside stories. It is easy for 
debaters who owned the information to blame the others as ignorant. At the same time, 
without any accessibility to the hidden facts, other users cannot examine the 
authenticity of these facts. 
However, the oppositional group of debaters has their resources as well. They are 
often called folk movie reviewers, such as Liar and Guxiaobai. Both the two writers 
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have been very famous in movie reviews through the Internet. Other ones like 
Minjianlihun and Naizhu823 are writers in the mass media. They are much more 
popular on RearWindow than the academicians. When I counted the number of 
supporters of both parties, I found that there are more than twenty IDs that expressed 
publicly their support for the folks and only less than ten IDs did so to support the 
academicians. Thus we can see that the voices from the folks are also loud in spite of 
the "lower" quality of their discussions compared to the academicians. In addition, 
this group of participants is younger and more familiar with the netiquette than the 
academicians. They know how to use the Internet flexibly to express their opinions. 
The most significant case of folks' advantages in netiquette is the event of 
self-revelation by Zhangdawei. 
Zhangdawei: Therefore, I tell you my name first: I am Zhang 
Xianming who am teaching in the Department of Literature in Beijing 
Film Academy. 
(http://www.xici.net/board/doc.asp?i(i二 17898934&sub=54&doc old=l 
July 11, 2002) 
Although he intended to ask the participants to be responsible for their discourse, his 
action received fierce critiques. In my interview with two boardmasters, Lvzi and 
X-Camoufleur, both of them said that his self-revelation destroyed the netiquette and 
he should not have revealed his true identity. However, they did not express their 
inclinations during the debate. Another participant described this self-revelation as a 
kind of "hijack". 
Yinghehonghe: The most incendiary action by Teacher Zhang 
(Zhangdawei) is that he revealed his true name. ... This action is very 
similar to that of a passenger who took out a gun on the plane and he 
(Zhangdawei) hijacked the debate, which changed the discussion from 
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its original direction (from An'yang Baby to the existence of Chinese 
independent movies). This action is heroic but violent. It destroyed the 
happiness of the anonymity that the Internet brings to us. Here is a free 
public space at first. We do not have much discursive rights and have 
been very satisfied that we can speak here. Anonymity is very 
important here, with which we can speak out in spite of the burden of 
personal relationships, without which we will hesitate to speak out due 
to self-doubts of the immaturity of our opinions. 
(http://www.xici.net/board/doc.asp?id=17961151 &sub=lQ&doc old=l 
July 13, 2002) 
Compared to Zhangdawei's unintentional destruction of the netiquette, the folks are 
more skillful in using the Internet. Liar announced that he quit this debate as early as 
on July 11. Ten hours later, his best friend and supporter, Guxiaobai quitted as well. 
Lvyao explained in her summary that they quitted because they cherished their online 
IDs and their online lives. However, the people behind the IDs did not really quit. 
Two new IDs emerged which are Zuiaishuifang and Zuiaichufang. These two IDs 
were very active after Liar and Guxiaobai disappeared. Their writing styles are like 
that of Liar and Guxiaobai. However, with these limited cues, no one can prove that 
they are the same persons. 
Another example is the event of the resignation by Guxiaobai. At that time, Guxiaobai 
was one of the boardmasters. A debater questioned him, "As a boardmaster, you kept 
attacking others. This is not good." Guxiaobai abdicated the position of boardmaster 
immediately. From these two examples, we can find that the folk movie reviewers are 
clever at using the Internet. They protected their online reputation and expressed their 
opinions as well. The different resources the two parties owned led to a balance. With 
the help of this strategic balance, no dominant discourse were formed. No one was 
really toneless due to the pressure from dominant discourse. Postings from both 
parties were challenged and defended. My survey shows that 77.2% of the 
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respondents agreed that the debaters were equal. 
From these analyses, I claim that although the offline inequalities are necessarily 
involved with online activities, the offline advantages do not necessarily facilitate 
online domination. The netiquette reflects the consensus of most of the Internet users. 
They have accepted that the Internet should be freer and more equal than real life. 
When the netiquettes are threatened, they will defend them actively and force the 
newbie to leam the manners, no matter whether they are respected persons in real life 
or not. Both parties in this discussion owned certain kinds of resources. If the debate 
is between a proletarian and a bourgeois, the debate may never start at the beginning. 
My data show that equality could be achieved within certain social groups, in which 
members have similar backgrounds and social resources. However, as the theorists of 
subaltern public spheres suggested, even within one subaltern public sphere, there are 
different voices. We should not take for granted that a social group unproblematically 
has one voice. The inside discussion is as ardent as discussions among different social 
groups. Another point I'd like to emphasize is that the Internet becomes a new social 
resource. The folk movie reviewers have less offline resources than the academicians 
but they have gained attention on the Internet. The attention and favors from other 
Internet users supported them to debate against the academicians. Their familiarity 
with netiquette helped them to keep their reputation and attention. In a word, the 
requirement of equality of the discussion is fulfilled on RearWindow. 
The rationality of the discussion 
The requirement of the rationality could be examined through three questions. First, 
were there conversations among debaters or just a lot of monologues? Some 
researchers such as Fung & Kedl (2000) found that their research subjects did not 
argue with their opponents about the feasibility and practicality of the oppositional 
ideas. Rather, they simply did not conceive of the existence of others' opinions and 
repeated their own opinions time and time again. In a word, there were no 
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conversations at all. Challenges were not answered and ideas never collided with each 
other. Second, did the debaters provide reasons to support their opinions? Or did they 
assume that their opinions needed no justification? If they did provide reasons, were 
these reasons subject to criticisms? Third, what kind of critiques did they make? Were 
the critiques the rational ones or just some personal attacks? I will examine these 
questions in the following. 
Conversations are pervasive in the debate. It is reflected on the titles of the postings. 
Liar: "About the Interview with Jiazhangke (Answers for Baby's Eyes, 
Movie Forest, and Qilianshanren)" 
Liar: "Answers for Zhangdawei" 
Liar: "The Last time to Dialog with You, Movie Forrest" 
Zhangdawei: "About An'yang Baby, Liar, Director Jia (Jiazhangke), 
CINE and the Other Things" 
Zhangyaxuan: "My Reply: About Movies, Telephone, the Debate and 
the Other Things" 
Yinghehonghe: “Teacher Zhang (Zhangdawei), Please Do not Shout 
and Let us Murmur" 
Zuiaishuifang: "Teacher Zhang (Zhangdawei), Please Do not Evade! 
Come in Please!" 
Zuiaichufang: “Chufang's Reply for Mrs. Zhang's Reply 
(Zhangyaxuan) and My Opinions about this Debate" 
I did a content analysis about the 53 postings during the first week. More than half 
(58.5%) of the postings were directed to a certain opinion of a certain user, no matter 
whether supporting or opposing. Nearly all the postings mentioned others' opinions 
although some did not address the certain person. 73.6% of the postings got replies 
from their opponents. It is this kind of interaction that pushed the debate to go ahead. 
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A great majority (81.1%) of the postings demonstrated the reasons that they supported 
or opposed one opinion. Even the personal attacks provided reasons. "Criticizable" 
(Dahlberg, 2001) is judged by two steps. One is to see whether the poster talked about 
his reasons as the only truth that everyone should agree with. If not, I will examine 
whether there are critiques toward the reasons by other participants. Both with the 
reasons as only truth and without critiques are sorted as "not criticizable". As a result, 
75.5% of the postings provided valid claims that are criticizable. 
For example, when Baby's Eyes attacked Liar, he explained that "Mr. Liar, you 
criticized the movie which you never watched before. It is totally inconvincible. No 
matter whether one is doing research or expressing one's opinion, one cannot blame 
others without any evidence." In this case, the author did provide reasons why he 
blamed the other user. However, he considered "one cannot criticize a movie before 
watching it" as a self-evident truth. In this situation, I sorted his article as without 
criticizable reasons. Another example indicated what kind of postings was with 
criticizable reasons. When Zhangdawei explained why he revealed his true name, he 
said that "Apathy is more dangerous than extreme. . . . I f everyone were responsible 
for what they said, it is not necessary to reveal one's true name. However, if nobody 
wants to take his responsibility, things will be like someone is killed but nobody is 
condemned." In this case, the author thought the self-revelation of true name is right 
because it can make participants more responsible. However, he did not think 
self-revelation is definitely good since it may be an extreme action. Thus this reason is 
potentially arguable. Then I looked for the critiques of his reasons and found this: 
Yinghehonghe: You (Zhangdawei) can say that your self-revelation is 
just taking your responsibility. However, at that moment, you only 
remembered your heroism and forgot us who stood around you. You 
also forgot where you are and forgot the game rules and consensus 
about the online discussion. Anyway you ruined the public rules only 




July 13, 2002) 
Considering the personal attacks, I think they have two types. As the first type, the 
posters inveigh against others with dirty words. As the second type, posters may not 
be obviously rude but they attributed the shortcomings of others' arguments to their 
personalities. In other words, they not only criticize other's opinions but also others' 
personal lives. For example, Zhangyaxuan criticized Liar and Guxiaobai as this: “I 
consider Liar as a youth loving literature and I am impressed by Guxiaobai's 
immaturity. I want to say tricks cannot be played on all things in the world. And not 
all tricks could be forgiven because of juvenility." Here the age of the opponents was 
used as the proofs of the incredibility of their discourse. Finally I found that there are 
in total 50.9% of the postings containing personal attacks. 
In summary, the criterion of rationality is not totally satisfied. My survey data show 
that only a little more than half of the respondents (56.3%) agreed that the discussion 
is rational. In my interviews with some active participants on RearWindow, they felt 
that the discussion could not be totally rational at all. 
Guzhiyu (active participant): It is the advantage of the Intemet that we 
need not take the burden of personal relationships in real life. We can 
speak out what we think. It is natural that extreme personal attacks 
exist online. (April 16, 2003) 
Zhuozi (active participant): The discussion on the Intemet is the hybrid 
of rationality and emotionality. ... When confronted with critiques, it 
is easy to find irrational obloquy and discourse of personal attacks. 
(April 16, 2003) 
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Since one is free to speak on the Intemet, personal attacks could not be forbidden. 
These discourse made the discussion very noisy and detracted users' attentions from 
the serious discussions. Fortunately, most of the users are aware of the damage 
personal attacks may bring. In the An'yang Baby discussion, attackers are labeled as 
the ones whose opinions are not worth listening to. In Lvyao's summary, she wrote 
that "Postings by Movie Mole only bring himself shame". The boardmaster, Lvzi said 
that "The most significant result of this discussion is that the reputation of Baby's 
Eyes was totally destroyed". Through these two examples, we can find whether one 
will rationally discuss something is related to his personal characters. If s/he does not 
have any reflexivity and sincerity during the discussion, it is impossible for him/her to 
act rationally. That is why I must analyze the communicative rationality of the 
participants of online discussions. 
The communicative rationality of the participants 
Reflexivity, ideal-role taking and sincerity are the three criteria of communicative 
rationality. Reflexivity means the process of standing back from, critically reflecting 
upon, and changing one's position when faced by “the better argument" (Dahlberg, 
2001). "Unfortunately, reflexivity is difficult to detect given that it is largely an 
internal process and changes in people's positions take place over long periods of 
time." The form of Intemet exchange may be seen as facilitating reflexivity since 
arguments are in written form which encourages participants to be thoughtful and the 
asynchronous rhythm could provide participants time for reflection. However, the 
bandwidth limitation discourages posting long articles. The non-linear structure of 
conversations and the rapidity of the exchanges would disturb the process of 
reflection. The measurement of reflexivity is to ask whether the participants 
acknowledge criticisms against them and whether their positions are softened or 
changed. 
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My survey found that few people change their positions totally. The level of 
reflexivity is different among different participants. The most reflexive debater during 
the discussion was Zhangdawei and his reflexivity reinforced his online credibility. 
He often thought about others' criticisms on him and answered with the 
acknowledgement of his own shortcomings. 
Zhangdawei: Thanks for the poster who talked about his opinions very 
seriously. I really hope that I can reflect on myself after I read it. 
flittp://www.xici.net/board/doc.asp?id=17957021&sub=13&doc old=l 
July 13, 2002) 
It is easy in my discourse to be extreme. Sometimes, I forgot sincerity. 
Fortunately, many people criticize me these days. I think I will be quiet 
later. 
flittp://www.xici.net/board/doc.asp?id=17961069&sub=35&doc old=l 
July 13, 2002) 
I totally agree with the poster's opinions and especially with the part 
about me. Thanks. 
(littp://www.xici.net/board/doc.asp?id=17961151&sub=10&doc old二 1 
July 13, 2002) 
However, people with real reflexivity are very rare. Other participants acknowledge 
others' criticisms but never admitted they were wrong. Personal attackers like Baby's 
Eyes and Movie Mole admitted that their attacks were not good but not totally 
unnecessary. Both of them realized their actions induced public anger. However, their 
reflexivity was low-level; they just provided more reasons to support their former 
discourse and did not really want to change their positions. 
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Baby's Eyes: When I posted my first article on July 9, I knew that it 
would start a storm. But I did not intend to stir up trouble. 
(http://www.xici.net/board/(ioc.asp?id=18021731&sub=12&doc old=l 
July 15, 2002) 
Movie Mole: Therefore, I said that if my dirty words will be helpful to 
wake up someone, I do not hesitate to be a personal attacker while 
risking being inveighed. 
Therefore, I risk betraying the morality of the Internet to reply to them. 
I think they have felt the antipathy toward present Chinese 
independent movies from us. 
aittp://www.xici.net/board/(ioc.asp?id=18029613&sub=19&doc old==l 
July 15, 2002) 
Ideal role-taking is that participants attempt to put themselves in the position of the 
others so as to come to an understanding of the others' perspective. Although there are 
many examples of ideal role-taking in this debate, I found that most of them are 
pseudo ideal role-takings, which engendered misunderstandings. In other words, the 
participants took others' positions for granted and conjectured their reactions, which 
fell short of real understanding. The result was that more and more misunderstandings 
were generated. For example, Yinghehonghe wrote about Zhangdawei: 
You have very strong consciousness of politics and discuss with the 
theory of classes immediately. It is because this kind of discussion 
touched your anxiety in emotions. ... When you had such anxiety, you 
put yourself away from the class of the jobless and artificially enlarged 
the difference. 
aittp://www.xici.net/boar(i/doc.asp?id=17961151&sub=10&doc old=l 
July 13, 2002) 
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In the first sentence, it seems that Yinghehonghe tried to understand Zhangdawei，s 
position. But the later sentences imply that this understanding is just used to make his 
critiques more reasonable. However, nobody knows whether Zhangdawei really has 
any anxiety in emotions except himself. It is only an imagination or at best, a 
deduction by Yinghehonghe. Therefore, this kind of ideal role-taking is just a pseudo 
one and the participants did not sincerely try to understand others' positions. 
Sincerity includes the sincerity of participants' goals: Do the participants sincerely 
want to understand each other? The sincerity of the information the participants 
provide: Is the information which is used as proofs all true? And the sincerity of the 
opinions of the participants: Do the participants sincerely express their opinions 
instead of flatter or cause assault? I have discussed the goals before and I concluded 
that the goal of the discussion is more oriented to mutual understanding than 
successful persuasion. 89.7% of the respondents agreed that participants wanted to 
communicate with each other sincerely. As far as the authenticity of the information is 
concerned, most of the information is true since dishonesties are easily recognized 
while others could access the same information source without difficulties. However, 
when the information is about personal lives or inside stories, it is hard to judge 
whether they are true. For example, a user posted a message that Baby's Eyes had 
supper with Zhangdawei, which was used to demonstrate that they are in the same 
faction. This message cannot be examined except by the two persons involved. 74.7% 
of the respondents agreed that in the discussion, participants provided true 
information. The only way to know the answer of the third question is to ask the 
participants directly. I wrote that "Participants in the discussion sincerely expressed 
their opinions" in the survey. The percentage of agreement is extraordinarily high, 
which is 92.9%, including totally agree (41.5%) and basically agree (51.4%) 
To sum up, the communicative rationality of participants is basically unsatisfactory 
while sincerity is more optimistic than reflexivity and ideal role-taking. The three 
measurements of sincerity, namely, sincerity of participants' goals, sincerity of the 
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information, and the sincerity of the opinions, got high agreements which are 89.7%, 
74.70/0 and 92.9%. In comparison, only 58.2% of the respondents supported the 
suggestion that the participants were reflexive and 51.5% agreed with ideal 
role-taking. I attribute this imbalance of communicative rationality to the 
characteristics of the Internet. Anonymity and lack of physical information encourage 
the users to speak out what they think. However, the Internet cannot determine what 
kind of thoughts the users would have in such an "unlimited" cyberspace. The lack of 
physical interaction also leads to the emotional apartness which makes reflexivity and 
ideal role-taking rather difficult. I am not saying that there are no emotional caring in 
cyberspace at all. What I address is that in a setting of discussion like RearWindow, 
debaters' attentions are more focused on the discourse than on the people. Without 
sufficient understanding of others' positions and a sincere feeling of sympathy, 
reflexivity and ideal role-taking are nearly impossible. 
Other kinds of discourse 
Are the discussions the only discourse within the subaltern public sphere? If not, what 
is the significance of other diverse discourse? According to the theories of subaltern 
public spheres, expressions and sharing are very important in the process of 
constructing a collective identity and improving participants' senses of belongings. 
The intimacies among the members may be attractive to the outsiders and encourage 
them to join. Although there are few postings that are expressional or relational, 
emotional interactions still have the space to develop. The content analysis of the 
1,255 pieces of sample postings showed that 19.1% of the postings have relational 
replies, which address particular board participants for interpersonal liaison. These 
kinds of discourse did improve the sense of intimacy among users. 
Minjianlihun is one of the boardmasters and she enjoyed the relational interactions on 
RearWindow a lot. Her online friends include Lvzi, another boardmaster, Liar and 
Guxiaobai, the two famous online movie reviewers. At first, she was just one of the 
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writers on RearWindow and posted a lot of excellent movie reviews. One month later, 
she and Lvzi became buddies although they never met. In real life, Minjianlihun is a 
music editor of a newspaper in Guanzhou. She compared her mass media career and 
her online life. 
Minjianlihun (the third boardmaster): I have never seen a reader called 
an editor or an author and told him/her that I tried my best to find you 
because your article moved me a lot and I came from a great distance 
to meet you. However, it exists on the Internet. S/he often says that 
come to drink together and I promise to serve you the best wine and 
food. Or s/he says how about coming to my home during the spring 
festival? If I go to Nanjing now, there must be a group of friends and 
the journey must be very happy. (July 26, 2002) 
Based on her personal experience, Minjianlihun concluded that “In such a community, 
you can feel that users care about the movie reviews but mainly they care about the 
warm hearts and the appetency." However, the fact is that relational interaction and 
feeling of intimacy only exist within a small group of users. RearWindow is different 
from most of the online communities since its users do not feel that they belong to it. I 
asked active participants a special question "Do you feel that you belong to 
RearWindow?" All the answers were no. It is impossible to establish relational 
interactions among all the users when the discussion board is as big as RearWindow, 
which has more than 5,000 users. Most of the users knew some new friends on 
RearWindow and soon, this group of online friends left RearWindow and constructed 
their own private discussion boards. 
Lvzi: I am too lazy to speak out on RearWindow now. My friends and 
I talk intimately on our private discussion boards. (January 29, 2003) 
From my observation, the lack of sense of belonging does not prevent RearWindow 
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from being a subaltern public sphere. The relational interactions are beneficial to keep 
a group of regular users on the board. However, too many relational interactions may 
lead to differentiation of users and contradictions among fractions. The distribution of 
the types of postings reflects the nature of RearWindow, a discursive public sphere 
rather than a virtual community. That is also why I did not call RearWindow an online 
community and simply named it a discussion board. 
Discussions and Conclusions 
In this part, I first introduced the development of RearWindow, a discussion board on 
movies. RearWindow is a four-year old online discussion board and now it has 
stepped into its mature period. The user group stopped increasing dramatically and the 
postings remained at a fixed level. RearWindow is a discursive space mainly for 
movie reviews and through these critical discourse, users can discuss with each other. 
There are some other postings which are addressed to the relational developments. 
However, they are not the main postings. The users on RearWindow are young adults 
who love watching movies. They have better economic and educational backgrounds 
than average. However, they are excluded from the top elites and do not own much 
political resources. 
The accessibility of RearWindow could be concluded as open for a certain group and 
not open for the whole population. Although the Intemet is more and more popular in 
China, RearWindow did not intend to open for all the Intemet users. It defined its user 
group by the aid of style and management. At the same time, the boardmasters tried to 
make the board as open as possible for its targeted users, which is reflected in their 
balancing strategy. On the technological level, the accessibility of xici.net influences 
that of RearWindow. Xici.net provided some user-friendly functions which attracted 
more users. But the limitation of its servers made it difficult to access, which limited 
the visits to RearWindow as well. If the managing barrier is artificially constructed to 
protect the nature of the board, the technological barrier was not expected. To solve 
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the technological problems, the power of the market had to be considered. 
Commercial activities were linked to the accessibility of the subaltern public sphere in 
this way. 
In order to judge whether the discussion on RearWindow is deliberative, I chose the 
case of movie-politics debate to evaluate the various requirements of deliberation. 
There are four assessment criteria: The goal of the discussion, the equality of the 
discussion, the rationality of the discussion, and the communicative rationality of the 
participants. The goal of the discussion is more oriented to mutual understanding than 
successful persuasion, although I cannot assert that every participant has the same 
goal. Participants in the debate are unequal in terms of the online and offline resources. 
Academicians have advantages in offline information and the ability of discussion 
while folk movie reviewers take the benefits of their familiarity with the netiquette 
and their reputation on the Internet. With the balance between resources, the offline 
inequalities do not lead to the online discursive domination necessarily. However, this 
general equality is within a certain social group and should not be exaggerated. As for 
the rationality of the discussion, I found that conversations were pervasive during the 
debate. Most of the postings provided reasons and most of the reasons were 
criticizable. However, quite a few postings contain obvious or unobvious personal 
attacks. The flame war destroyed the rationality of the discussion to some extent and it 
cannot be totally forbidden. Thus the rationality of the discussion is not well achieved. 
The communicative rationality of the participants is the most difficult to achieve in 
the online discursive space. There are few people who were reflexive on his own ideas 
and discourse. The institution of the Internet does not encourage the reflexivity also. It 
is doubtful that the role-taking is directed to mutual understanding because it is used 
to criticize others. Sincerity is very well satisfied; the information and the opinions are 
sincerely expressed. It is hard to say that participants have communicative rationality 
since reflexivity and ideal role-taking are poorly met. The technological features of 
the Internet influence the result much. 
96 
In conclusion, RearWindow is the kind of subaltern public spheres which is oriented 
to critical-rational discussions rather than relational development. It mobilizes its 
members furthest while excludes the non-members effectively. It could provide a safe 
discursive space for the users and facilitates the formation of discourse which are 
suppressed in other discursive space. However, it does not provide the sense of 
belonging and does not construct an identity. Whether it can change the wider publics 
and the state control will be discussed in the later parts. 
As a discursive space for discussions mainly, RearWindow does not fulfill the criteria 
of deliberation well. However, it does try to achieve such a state. In the survey, 93.0% 
of the respondents agreed that deliberative discussions on the Intemet are possible. 
The deliberation is possible if there is an effective administration on the board and 
people are committed to these regulations voluntarily. Consensus and the management 
of the boardmasters will be useful to promote online deliberation. 
In short, the discussion board is open to its members and the discourse within the 
discussion board satisfies most of the requirements of deliberation. RearWindow, the 
discussion board, could be considered as a subaltern public sphere. 
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V Relationships among the Subaltern Public Sphere and the State 
Habermas put his public sphere into a trisection structure of the state, the market 
economy and the civil society. The public sphere is the discursive aspect of the civil 
society which reflects the oppositional relationships between the civil society and the 
political and economic powers. The prime norm is that the discussion in the public 
sphere generates the public opinions autonomously. These opinions are against state 
and market control and always attempt to make the government submit to them. This 
norm requires that on the institutional level, the public sphere must be totally 
autonomous from the state and the market economy. The material embodiment of the 
public sphere must exist under its own ownership. Based on this self-ownership, the 
institution ensures that the public sphere represents the public interest. At the same 
time, no matter how eagerly the state or the economy wants to control it, the public 
sphere must keep itself out of and struggle against the controls. In this situation, the 
public sphere could function as the birthplace of public opinions of the informative 
and rational citizens. Under the supervisory pressure of the public, the government 
has to legitimize its governance based on the support of the public. 
Theorists of subaltern public spheres inherited the trichotomy in general. The first 
difference is that they divided the civil society into two parts, the dominant social 
members and the subordinated social members. Accordingly, the public sphere as the 
discursive aspect of the civil society includes two parts in fact. The first one is a 
dominant public sphere and the others are the subaltern public spheres. Here emerges 
a quartered structure instead. The prime norm is also autonomy. However, it asks for 
autonomy from any dominant power including the state, the market, and the dominant 
public. The institution of subaltern public spheres correspondingly requires the 
self-ownership by the subaltern social members. The spheres strive to avoid not only 
controls from the state and the economy, but also the colonization and discrimination 
from the dominant public. Therefore, the subaltern public spheres have more 
functions than Habermas' public sphere. They are identity-forming sites, 
98 
belongings-searching homes, and knowledge-gaining schools. When researching 
subaltern public spheres, the focus should not be limited to political or economic 
issues. Scholars should be sensitive to anything that happens within the spheres and 
analyze their significances. 
The second difference between subaltern and Habermas' public spheres is the nature 
of relationships among the four parties: The state, the economy, the dominant and the 
subaltern public spheres. Under the notion of subaltern publics, the first three parties 
are not necessarily dead enemies of the subaltern public spheres. In some cases, they 
have the opportunities to cooperate. Furthermore, the subaltern public spheres usually 
achieve their goals through the interactions with the other three. The extent of 
opposition and collaboration are flexible according to different subaltern public 
spheres. 
In the context of China, several problems make the analysis of subaltern public 
spheres complicated. First, in Chinese studies, social organizations instead of the 
public spheres are considered as the embodiment of civil society. It is claimed that 
there are not any public spheres since the Chinese mass media are state-controlled. 
When I claim that the online discussion boards are a kind of subaltern public spheres, 
I must compare them with the traditional research subjects of Chinese civil society, 
the social organizations. Second, most of the Chinese researchers emphasized the 
collaboration between the state and the society (Deng, 1997). But this collaboration is 
so close that it makes us confused: To what extent, could this collaboration be 
considered as equal relationship instead of covert control? In my analysis of the 
relationship between the state and the discussion board, I will pay much attention to it. 
The third problem is who the dominant public is. Based on the discussions in the 
second part, I will claim that the dominant public is the tiny elites who are deeply 
involved with the state machine and the economic institution. The mass media are the 
discursive space controlled by them and the subaltern public sphere in my study tried 
to influence them through the mass media. In addition, the other social groups, which 
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are in lower social positions than my research subject, are also reached via the 
popularity of the mass media. Thus, when I talk about the subaltern public spheres 
and the mass media, it is not only related to the dominant public but also the other 
subaltern ones. That is why I prefer to use the wider publics rather than the dominant 
public in my study. "Wider publics" is a concept which includes both the dominant 
public and subaltern publics other than in my research subject, the underdeveloped 
middle class. 
These complicated relationships will be discussed in three parts. In this part, I will 
first examine the relationships between the online discussion board and the state with 
some traditional measurements, which are developed during the study of social 
organizations. After that, the state control on such a subaltern public sphere is 
analyzed on four levels which are the state, the websites, the boardmasters, and the 
self-censorships. Integrated data including texts, interviews, and survey results are 
used in the analysis. In addition to the institutional analysis, the state-subaltem public 
sphere relationship will be explored through a discursive analysis. How the 
participants use their discourse to counteract the state control? How these discourse 
together with the actions around them provide a successful resistance? This part will 
answer my third research question, namely, what is the relationship between the 
subaltern public sphere and the state? 
The autonomy from the state 
In the studies of Chinese social organizations, autonomy is considered as a condition 
in which a social organization could influence the policy-making of the state (Zhou, 
2000). Instead of the one-way mandatory control from the state, today's Chinese 
social organizations have developed an interdependent relationship with the state. The 
state supports the existence of the social organizations and the social organizations 
help the state to improve their governance. However, I would rather not take this kind 
of relationship as autonomous. The dependence of social organizations manifests 
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itself in several aspects. First, as the patron, the state controls the economic resources 
of the social organizations. The fund from the state is so important that some 
organizations could not live without this money such as the All-China Women's 
Federation. However, the online discussion boards like RearWindow have a totally 
different economics. Taking the form of online public sphere instead of a social 
organization, RearWindow does not need money to support its living. Although the 
xici.net started to charge for their VIP services from early 2003, the entire money 
needed to keep RearWindow running is five RMB per month paid by the first 
boardmaster Lvzi. The everyday management can be done by the four boardmasters. 
Their services are voluntary and free. The boardmasters need not pay the posters as 
well. As long as xici.net exists, RearWindow could be alive without any investments. 
Since xici.net is a commercial company, it does not need the state funds also. In this 
case, RearWindow can live without any funds and get its economic independence 
from the state. 
The second method used by the state to control social organizations is the strict 
registration process. All the organizations should be registered and under the direct 
governance of one certain governmental department. For example, the Association of 
the Movie Reviewers is subject to the Film Bureau. At the same time, there is a 
limited quota for the organizations. In general, each vocation has one association and 
only when an old one ends, new ones can be registered. It means that even if you want 
to register to be a legal organization, it is not always possible. This strict rule makes a 
lot of social organizations illegal. Since they are illegal, it is easy for the state to 
charge them and put them down by force. RearWindow is not a social organization at 
all, which does not have a definite group of participants, a clear organizational 
structure, or a certain embodiment other than virtual space. It is hard for the state to 
charge an online discussion board to be an illegal organization although the boards 
could function as a connecting site of a group of people. Third, within some important 
organizations, there exist the party branches. As I mentioned before, there is no 
hierarchical management group on RearWindow, not even any party branches. 
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Applying the criteria of social organizations, RearWindow appears to be highly 
autonomous. It owns itself and does not depend on any financial aid. There are no 
laws or rules which could forbid its existence. No direct state controls could reach the 
board. However, this is not a complete picture. In spite of the freedom of the Internet, 
the state has developed a lot of strategies to control it. 
The state control on Chinese Internet takes a hierarchical structure of administration. 
"At the top of the hierarchy is the Ministry of Public Security and its subordinate 
bureaus in the provinces and cities. According to regulations, the cyberpolice is the 
most superior gatekeepers against 'inappropriate' uses of the Internet. ... Under the 
shadow of the cyberpolice, there lies the entirety of China's cyberspace, which is, first 
of all, managed by the national network centers of the Intemet oligarchies. ... Among 
the regional network administrators, some technicians are directly involved in the 
daily maintenance of cyberspace communities. They are called ‘system operators' or 
simply ‘sysops，. ... Their subordinate relations with the state distinguish them from 
the lowest rank of regulators in cyberspace: boardmasters. ... Boardmasters and 
ordinary users are netizens in China's public OPC (online political communication) 
arenas" (Qiu, 1999). 
Control at the level of state 
The state controls the Intemet through different ways. The first is the legal method, 
which is made up of various formal regulations. The second method is to monopolize 
the direct Intemet connection through the ownership of all the four basic nets. The 
cyberpolice applies technologies to control the information flow. They also actively 
monitor the online activities in day-to-day surveillance. The state establishes its own 
websites as the information sources and tries to construct hegemony on the Intemet. 
In addition, traditional mass media are used to reinforce this hegemony. 
102 
The Chinese government made its first Internet regulation in January 1993, which is 
the Temporary Regulation for the Management of Computer Information Network 
International Connection (Qiu, 1999). So far there have been eleven Internet 
regulations issued by China's central governmental These regulations include the 
ones about the security of information systems, the management of domain names, the 
business of net cafes, the online services, and the use of Internet. Among these 
regulations, there are four most important ones, which are the Temporary Regulation 
for the Management of Computer Information Network International Connection 
{No. 195, passed on January 23, 1993 and updated on May 20, 1997), Measures for 
Managing the Safe and Security of Computer Information Network International 
Connection (Measures, issued on December 30, 1997), Measures for Managing 
Internet Content Provision {No. 292, issued on September 20, 2000), and Regulation 
for Managing Internet BBS Service {Regulation, passed on October 8, 2000). 
No. 195 aims at the control over accessibility. “No units or individuals are allowed to 
establish direct international connection by themselves (Item 6). All direct linkage 
with the Internet must go through ChinaNet, GBNet, CERNet, or CSTNet. A license 
is required for anyone to provide Internet accesses to users (Item 8) and registration 
for users to obtain access (Item 10)." In addition, “ ... 'harmful information' that is 
either 'subversive' or 'obscene' is forbidden (Item 13). Punishment measures are 
specified in monetary terms (Item 14, 15)" (Qiu, 1999). No. 195 determines that the 
only legitimate Internet connection providers are the four state-controlled servers. 
Since all traffic going in and out of China must pass through the four nets, it is easy to 
employ filtering technologies. The licensed ISPs (Internet service providers) are made 
gatekeepers (Huang, Hao, & Zhang, 1997). 
Measures is the regulation aimed at Internet users. The users should not use the 
Internet to produce, copy, disseminate and browse the information that instigate the 
13 China Internet Network Information Centre, http://www.cnnic.net.cn/policy/ 
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breaking of laws, subversion of government, abruption of the state, animosity among 
different ethnic groups, disruption of social order, attack on the creditability of 
government. The contents of the fetish, eroticism, violence, gambling, and slanders 
are also forbidden (Item 5). At the same time, Measures regulates that the units and 
individuals who are doing the Intemet business must take the responsibility of the 
surveillance, which includes the registration of the users, the storage of original 
records of forbidden activities, and the deletion of forbidden contents (Item 10). In 
addition to financial penalty, the punishment also includes criminal charges. 
No. 292 is mainly for the ICPs (Intemet content providers). The commercial ICPs 
must be issued licenses and the non-commercial ones must register (Item 4). As long 
as the ICPs find the forbidden contents implied in Measures, they must delete them 
from the web pages, save the related records and inform the government departments 
(Item 16). The ICPs which provide the services of news, publication, and BBS have 
additional obligations. They must record the information contents, their time of 
publication and the IP address or domain name of the source. 
Since the BBSs are the most active discursive spaces on the Intemet, the Department 
of Information Industry enacted a regulation on the BBS service in 2000. In addition 
to the requirements for all the ICPs, regulation asks the BBS service providers to 
reach four conditions (Item 6). First, the sub-titles on the BBS must be fixed and 
cannot provide other sub-titles out of the permitted range. Second, there is a complete 
set of service rules. Third, there are methods for security such as the registration 
process and other technological protecting establishments. Last, there are enough 
administrators and technicians to manage the BBS effectively. The BBS service 
provider must record all the information content, their time of publication, the IP 
addresses or domain names for sixty days. They must provide the information as long 
as the state departments require (Item 15). 
The four regulations form a system of control, which are directed to different subjects 
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around the Internet. The state controls the accessibility of the Internet and the 
cyberpolice monitors and traces the forbidden activities. ICPs are required to take part 
in the surveillance and obliged to provide proofs of crimes. The Internet users are 
asked to be self-regulated and punishments are executed to require their abidance. The 
most "dangerous" cyberspaces such as the BBSs receive especially strict control. The 
providers and the services are limited to the permitted range. The methods of control 
are addressed. Under this structure of Internet regulations, ISPs, ICPs, and the users 
are all subjected to control. However, except for the threats of personal punishments, 
there are few methods to facilitate the practice of these regulations. For example, it is 
still hard to trace back one's offline identity based on the EP address and domain name 
if the users access the Internet through the public computers. In addition，the ICPs do 
not always meet all the requirements. For example, there are registration processes in 
most of the websites, but these processes are nearly invalid in tracing the offline 
identities due to lack of validation. 
The police apparatus administrates the regulations and measures. The earliest 
cyberpolice in China emerged in 1998 in Wuhan City. They began involvement in 
criminal cases in 1999. Until April 2002, there are more than twenty provinces or 
cities which have established the group of cyberpolice. There are in total about one 
thousand cyberpolice in China now "^^ . Most of the cyberpolice are well-educated 
technicians and proficient in Internet technologies. One of their responsibilities is to 
find out the law breakers and evidence of their “crimes，，. The intimidatoral method 
including individual detentions, arrests and sentences functions as threats to Internet 
users. Since January 2000, there were 35 cases of such kind^^. Cyberpolice actively 
monitors the online activities and deletes harmful information. Each cyberpoliceman 
browses the web pages no less than four hours a day^ .^ 
14 "The Yongest Police in China: Cyberpolice". 
http://www.vcwb.eom/gb/content/2003-02/26/content 495568.htm 
15 Digital Freedom Network, http://dfn.org/focus/chma/netattack.htm 
16 "The Everyday Work of Chinese Cyberpolice", 
http://computer.online.sh.cn/computer/gb/coiitent/2003-02/08/content 523225.htm 
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The third method used by the state to control the Internet is through technology. Since 
the entire Internet access is controlled by the state, it is easy to put blockings on the 
flow of information, which is often called the Great Firewall. Keyword blocking that 
blocks some websites containing certain words is often used. Different from blocking, 
which blocks forbidden websites from access by individuals, filtering just blocks part 
of the contents on the websites. The latest important event on blocking was that of 
google.com (September, 2002), a popular search engine website. However, there exist 
other technologies that fight against blocking and filtering. The most commonly used 
one is proxy servers. When using proxy servers, users can access a “safe” website and 
then through this website they can access other forbidden ones. This technology is a 
little bit complicated but still widely used by Internet users in China. According to 
Guo & Pu (2000), there are 9.8% of the respondents who often use the proxy servers, 
25.5% occasionally use it. 
Other methods the government uses include creating the online information 
hegemony and making use of the mass media to reinforce it. The government guides 
the development of the Internet's architecture and protocols, builds national intranets, 
distributes propaganda and conducts information warfare such as hacking as well as 
more tame measures like deploying e-govemment services (Yuen & Chan, 2003). 
Some information sources such as Xinhua News Agency are given the monopolization 
on economic and financial information (Huang, Hao & Zhang, 1997). Another 
significant control is the propaganda in the mass media. The Internet is depicted as a 
two-face monster: On the one hand, it could improve the economy and human life 
greatly and on the other hand, it is so dangerous that control is necessary to protect the 
people. The news reports on mass media often depict online crimes as catastrophic 
and highly technical. At the same time, the cyberpolice are always more powerful in 
technology to conquer the criminals. This image of the Internet makes the later 
adopters limit their activities within the scope of the state hegemony and consider the 
places out of it as minatory to personal security. The successful creation of such a 
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stereotype is very useful in controlling the Internet users. 
Control at the level of websites 
The second level of control is through the various websites. Most of the commercial 
websites are established and maintained by individual companies. The company as an 
entity is located within the system of the political economy. They are real and 
controllable. Firstly, they must obey the various regulations and measures. Xici.net 
has tried to reach most of the requirements from the government. It got the license 
which is Beijing ICP License No. 010011. It has the fixed sub-titles although the 
individual boards under these titles are increasing fast. The website also has a 
four-chapter, forty-item website rule, which regulates the discussion boards and 
clarifies the rights and obligations of the website and the users. The written principle 
is that under the allowance of the law, the website tries to provide the highest freedom 
to the users. Every time the user wants to post his/her article, s/he will find reminders 
of obeying regulations appearing on the computer screen. Xici.net has a group of 
administrators to manage and monitor the everyday affairs. Xici.net is cooperative in 
providing any information that the state department asks for. For example, the first 
lawsuit about online slander in China was between two xici users. The court got the 
evidence mainly from the information provided by xici.net, which can prove that the 
offline person is the online ID and the online ID did make the slander. In general, 
xici.net has tried its best to satisfy the requirements from the state. That is why Qiu 
(1999) thought the websites are subordinate to the state control system. 
It is not totally right to classify the sysops as the cooperators of cyberpolice. A 
commercial website like xici.net needs users' subscription. Therefore, they must 
consider the requirements of the users in addition to that of the state. The Internet 
users always ask for freedom. The management of xici.net focuses on the balance 
between the state and the users. In the interview with sysop Xiaocai, he told me that 
there are two principles: The first is to protect the speech rights of the users as much 
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as they can, and the second is to protect the security of xici.net itself. That is why I 
found that there are some regulations that xici.net does not obey well. One is the 
registration process. At the beginning, xici.net provided four categories of users which 
were passengers, ordinary users, registered users and true users. Passengers share one 
ID and were anonymous. They could read the postings but could not post their own 
articles. After registering a nickname, the ordinary users could log in the website, post 
articles, and chat in the chat rooms. However, they were allowed to enter the open 
discussion boards only. The registered users had to provide additional information like 
email, name, ID card number, address and telephone number. The registered users 
could enter into all kinds of discussion boards if they were permitted by the 
boardmasters. They also could establish their own boards and occupy the position of 
boardmaster. 
As I discussed before, the information of the registered users could not be validated. 
The website system only can detect some obvious deceptions such as 000 for ID card 
number. Email address is not needed to get the password. In this situation, the 
registered users are similarly anonymous as the ordinary users. The true users must 
provide the copies of their ID card to the website and register the real phone numbers. 
The information will be validated before the true users are issued. Each ID card can 
register one true user only. In fact, only this category of users has reached the goal of 
control. Recently, the categories have undergone some changes. Since xici.net added a 
category of VIP users who must pay 5 RMB per month, the category of true users is 
cancelled. True users are replaced by VIP users, who do not need the copies of ID 
card any more. VIP users can pay the fees through several ways, including the mobile 
phone, the remittance through either the post offices or the banks. The mobile phone 
can be traced easily to the offline owner since the mobile phone numbers should be 
applied with ID cards. However, it is not so easy to check the senders of remittance 
from post offices and banks.. 
Another example is about reporting forbidden activities to the government department. 
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This is required by the regulations but the website never did so in the open. A 
discussion board will not be closed if only it is accused by other users or cyberpolice. 
The sysop said that it is due to the huge amount of discussion boards in the website. 
However, many closed boards were so active before their closures that it is not 
difficult to find them. For example, a board called "Asian Beauty Picture Storeroom 
No. 1" was accused of posting erotic pictures and closed. However, at that time, the 
board has more than 10,000 users subscribing to it. 
During the normal surveillance of the contents, the website applied different methods 
flexibly. Xici.net has a group of about ten surveillants who monitor the contents 24 
hours a day. The biggest responsibility is to delete forbidden articles in time. They 
often use keyword detection to find out forbidden contents and keyword blocking to 
prevent the forbidden contents from appearing. Users cannot post articles titled with 
the forbidden key words under the blocking technology. The keywords include Fa Lun 
Gong, June and others in different periods. For example, at the beginning of the 
release of SARS, the Chinese abbreviation Fei Dian was forbidden. The blocking was 
cancelled when the release of information became official. The sysop told me that 
they used a strategy which is called “do not do things that can't be done". It means 
that only the most sensitive and widely forbidden topics are deleted. At the same time, 
postings that are not forbidden definitely in regulations will remain. For example, No. 
195 regulated that the contents that ruin the credibility of government departments 
must be forbidden. It is very difficult to define what "ruin" is and the cyberpolice has 
not enforced punishments under this offence. Thus it is easy to find postings on 
xici.net that criticize the government departments. For example, the critiques toward 
the Film Bureau are usual and harsh. However, they have never been deleted until 
now. No matter which kind of forbidden contents were found, xici.net has never 
outwardly notified the government of the particular user who has done so. 
The relationship between sysops and cyberpolice are not as friendly as we imagine. 
Different from the normal Intemet users, the sysops could feel the pressure from the 
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cyberpolice in their every day life. This is a sensitive personal threat and the sysops 
have to be highly politically alert. 
Author: Are there any other forms of management (from the state) in 
addition to registration? 
Xiaocai (sysop): It is not appropriate to tell you the detailed 
management but I can tell you that there is surveillance. It has been 
reported that now we have the ninth category of police, the cyberpolice. 
It is a career. Everyone knows what they do. It is not appropriate to tell 
you the details. 
Author: Do you contact cyberpolice? 
Xiaocai: Certainly we do because of the business. 
Author: Are these contacts often? 
Xiaocai: It is not appropriate to tell you the details. (January 28, 2003) 
In fact, the cyberpolice will pay special attention to the famous BBSs like xici.net. 
They even delete articles and warn the boardmaster directly. Xici.net is certainly the 
website which is monitored 24 hours. Sometimes, they will ask the website to repose 
and delete the forbidden contents during the suspension. At the end of May 2001, 
xici.net suspended its service for the first time. The suspension lasted for one week 
and in the first two days users still could visit the boards using the direct addresses of 
individual boards. It became the reason that users doubted that it was not closed for 
technological maintenance. However, the website insisted that it was. When I asked 
the recent sysop Xiaocai, he gave me the same answer. After I repeated my question 
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several times, he finally said, “As I know, there are no suspensions for the reasons 
other than the technological maintenance. I do not know whether there were before I 
became the sysop." The suspension did happen before he became the sysop and at that 
time, the sysop was Kuku. However, Xiaocai was working as one of the website 
monitors at that time. The users have their own understandings of the suspension in 
spite of the formal explanations. 
Lvzi: The suspensions were often required by the state. There was one 
time on June (the example I cited). A lot of open discussion boards 
were degraded to the private ones and a lot of private discussion 
boards were deleted. (January 29，2003) 
Control at the level of boardmasters 
The third level of the hierarchy of control is through the boardmasters. They are more 
like the ordinary users (Qiu, 1999). According to the website rules of xici.net, the 
boardmasters must take the responsibility of monitoring as well. However, the 
surveillance is different according to different boardmasters. Some boardmasters are 
vehemently opposed to the monitoring from the website. But boardmasters of 
RearWindow are quite cooperative in this aspect. 
Lvzi: In the discussion of An'yang Baby, two postings saying that 
Chinese movies are mournful were deleted by the website. I felt that 
the postings are objective, but you cannot stop the website from doing 
so. Commonly, we do not want to have contradictions with xici.net and 
we will not appeal when the postings are deleted. Sometimes, we just 
answered the authors that it was due to the website. (January 29, 2003) 
Compared to other normal users, boardmasters are more visible and easily identifiable. 
The boardmasters of RearWindow choose to cooperate with the website since it is 
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beneficial for the development of the board. The good relationship is also attributed to 
the topics of RearWindow: Movies are often seen as politically insensitive, which did 
not incur much control. 
Control through self-censorship 
Self-censorship of the Internet users is the fourth level of control. Under the threat of 
the regulations and real cases, the users would censor their own speeches and actions 
consciously. In the survey of RearWindow, the majority answer to "What did you 
avoid to post" is the politically sensitive postings. Most of the interviewees also 
implied the same opinion. 
Zhuozi: Of course, I will not touch the topics that the state forbids. 
They have no meanings for me. (April 16, 2003) 
Considering the management of xici.net, 50.3% of the respondents agreed that the 
management was strict and only 17.6% agreed that it was loose. It shows that now the 
Internet users know about the surveillance and the possible results of offences. It 
effectively influences the users when they post their opinions online. However, when 
compared to traditional mass media, users still feel more freedom (92.4% agreed). 
The levels of control discussed above could be summarized in this table. 
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Table 5.1 Levels of Control on the Internet in China 
Level Methods 
State Formal regulations 
Ownership of the basic nets 
Cyberpolice aided by technologies 
Construction of online hegemony 
Mass media propaganda 
Websites Website rule 
Administrators group 
Subscription of users 
Keyword detection and blocking 
Closure and degrading of discussion boards 
Collaboration with cyberpolice and government 
Boardmasters Monitoring the board day to day 
Self-censorship Avoiding politically sensitive topics 
In short, the Internet is not totally autonomous as the state developed a more and more 
effective system of control. The four-level structure of control has exerted its 
functions. Since the control started from zero, the Internet is still much freer than the 
mass media in China now. Cyberspace still has its attractions. At the same time, users 
take control of the technologies to counteract the state's surveillance. Therefore, the 
relationship between the control and the users is contrary: The more the control, the 
less the freedom. However, the contradiction could not be exaggerated as total 
opposition. At least, the fast development of the Intemet in China should be attributed 
to the state's intentional support. Another specific reason why RearWindow can exist 
well is due to the state's attitude toward movies. Movies were considered as 
newspapers and magazines to be propaganda tools before the economic reform. 
During the Cultural Revolution, few movies could be produced and featured every 
year. However, the attitude changed after the economic reform. Now the movies are 
considered as entertainment in the first place, and a profitable industry in the second. 
Xiaocai: It (RearWindow) has no relations with politics. ... It is art. 
This is not significant. (January 28, 2003) 
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Ju (editor in chief of Star Media): It is understandable to connect the 
entertainment including the movies to politics if there is something 
happening. It has no need to connect them together in everyday normal 
operation. (February 4, 2003) 
The state supports the development of infrastructure and facilitates the popularization 
of the Internet. The official attitude toward movies, which consider movies as 
entertainment and profitable industry, is significantly helpful in making the topics of 
movies more open to discussions when compared to other topics. These beneficial 
aspects could be seen as the cooperative relationships between the subaltern public 
sphere and the state. However, the main aspect of the relationship is opposition. This 
opposition is reflected not only in the state control on the Internet, but also from the 
discourse opposed to that of the state. In the following part, I will discuss the 
discursive resistance in the subaltern public sphere, RearWindow to Movies. 
The discursive resistance against the state 
Another way to examine whether the subaltern public sphere is autonomous from the 
state is to see whether the discourse within the sphere is autonomous from the state. In 
my study, I found that RearWindow as a subaltern public sphere is the site of 
discursive formation. In addition, the discourse triggers the non-discursive actions and 
influences the practical world. 
RearWindow is a discussion board on movies and its discourse is inevitably 
movie-related. In order to see more clearly the relationship between the state and the 
subaltern public sphere, I chose the discourse on Chinese movies to analyze. For 
example, all the postings which contain the words Chinese films, Chinese directors, 
Chinese actors, Chinese movie prizes, and so on were analyzed. The state-controlled 
discourse and discourse of RearWindow on local movies will be compared and 
discussed. Since all the discourse is historically and locally situated, I will first 
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introduce the power network in which the discourse is embedded. 
The earliest policy on movies in the People's Republic of China was developed from 
the substance of Mao Zedong's Talks at the Yan'an Forum (Chu, 2002). In this talk, 
the principle of artistic practice was regulated as the creation of 
worker-peasant-soldier images. Movies were used mainly as a propaganda tool for 
state governance. The movie industry was ideologically influenced and funded by the 
government. The state government controlled all areas of production, from script 
development to technical competence. Only the state-owned sixteen feature film 
studios could produce movies. Each studio was assigned an annual production target 
by the government. The state-owned China Film Distribution and Exhibition 
Company purchased products from the studios at a fixed price then passed the movies 
to provincial distributors who in turn passed them on to the lower levels of city, 
district or country. This was the only system of distribution in China before 1984. 
The economic reforms during the early 1980s brought change. In 1984, the 
government withdrew its financial backing from the state-owned film studios. Film 
studios are required to make their livings by themselves. However, the state 
government retained its control over script selection, production quantity and films 
censorships. In this situation, films studios were asked to make money from audience 
but they cannot produce films based on the requirements of audience. By the early 
1990s, the movie industry faced its financial crisis. Six of the sixteen film studios 
went bankrupt. The government decided to push the industry further into the market. 
The studios were encouraged to sell their products to distribution agencies at province 
or city levels directly. Later, thirteen films studios at provincial and city levels were 
allowed to produce films. The government also invited individuals and non-state 
enterprises to participate in investment. In addition, ten big-budget Hollywood films 
have started to be imported through the revenue-sharing arrangement since 1995. The 
state control over the production and distribution of the movies seems to be loosened. 
In fact, the government still controls the film production tightly through the strict 
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censorship. All the scripts must pass the censorship before they could be shot. All the 
finished films, no matter who funded them, must pass the censorship again before 
they are released. The government has the power to change their decisions even after 
the film has passed the censorships. Recently, a film called Rice was forbidden to be 
released during its period of commercial promotion. In order to make the balance 
between commercial and ideological movies, the government established the National 
Film Development Special Fund for ideological movies. 
It does not mean that there are no movies in China which are produced out of such an 
institution. On the contrary, the independent movie or underground movie in China 
has established its own system of production and distribution. Chinese independent 
movies emerged in 1990s and the producers are the young directors educated by the 
state-funded film schools and originally expected to work within the institution. 
However, this group of young directors could not get the chance to make their movies 
due to the difficult existence of film studios. In addition, they could not because they 
wanted to make personalized movies instead of the ideological ones. Similar to other 
countries' independent movies, Chinese independent movies often have the 
characteristics such as broader topics, personalized style, and cheap production. 
However, since they do not follow the permitted route to make movies, all these 
movies did not pass the censorship and cannot be released publicly in China. Chinese 
independent movies make their living in another institution. They get funding from 
various sources including individuals, the international movie festivals, and 
investments from foreign film companies. Many young directors produced their first 
movies with very little money. For example, Wang Xiaoshuai made his maiden work 
‘The Days' with 100,000 RMB only. Then they attended various international movie 
festivals and competed for the prizes. A number of the directors finally received some 
prizes and made themselves known throughout the world. After that, when the 
directors want to make movies, they have the reputation to ask for bigger investments. 
Wang Xiaoshuai obtained 3,000,000 RMB when he produced his third movie "Beijing 
Bicycle". The commercial investors made profits through the distribution in countries 
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other than China. The investors like the film festivals did not expect to get the money 
back at all. This institution provided a living space for the Chinese independent 
movies. 
From this analysis, we know that there are three forces in the Chinese movie industry: 
The state, the local market, and the international market. The state continues to make 
its own ideological movies while there is fewer and fewer audience they can attract. If 
movies are not viewed by their targeted audience, propaganda will fail. The problem 
the state encounters is how to make the ideological movies more attractive. The 
market has promoted the production of commercial movies such as comedies and 
romances. But the market for these genre movies is limited. If there are not enough 
box office incomings, the market will decline. Chinese independent movies 
encountered their own problem which is that these movies never reached their local 
audiences. The former independent director Zhang Yuan said that he could not endure 
that his movies will not be watched by local audiences. Now he has returned to the 
state-controlled institution and made ideological and commercial movies. These are 
uncertain elements which potentially will change the existing power relationships. 
Discourse from different powers perform and compete with each other at this moment. 
The core of discursive competence is what kinds of films are good films and what 
kinds of films audiences can watch? 
The discourse of state claimed that the audiences should be directed. In other words, 
the government decides what kinds of movies are watchable. Thus the government 
regulated the principles for movies and became the dominant discursive producer of 
Chinese movies. The first discourse is "developing the mainstream melody, promoting 
the diversity", which means the ideological movies should be specially aided and at 
the same time, commercial movies are allowed. The second discourse is “art for 
socialism and art for the people", which obviously promotes that movies should be 
helpful in facilitating the ideology of socialism. The third discourse is often 
considered as a counteracting to the above two ideological ones, which is "let a 
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hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend". This “double 
hundreds" discourse implies that movies other than the ideological ones should be 
allowed. In order to define what kinds of films are good films, the state established 
three film prizes, which are Golden Cock Prize, Baihua Prize, and Huabiao Prize. 
Through these three state-controlled prizes, the state constructed the discourse of good 
movies. In addition, reports and reviews of the prizewinners on the state-controlled 
mass media helped to strengthen this discourse. 
The discourse formed on RearWindow exists in such a historical and local power 
relationship. It refers to the state discourse usually and forms its own opinions of 
Chinese movies. This discourse is made up of a system of statements and these 
statements are often some judgements. These statements often present a topic first and 
then make judgements on this topic. The topics include Chinese movies, censorship 
(Film Bureau, General State Administration of Radio, Film and Television), Golden 
Cock Prize (Baihua Prize, Huabiao Prize), independent movies (underground movies, 
forbidden movies), and Private movie watching. In addition to the introduction of the 
judgements of these topics, I will discuss the way these statements are formed and the 
competence between them and the state discourse. 
Statement 1: Chinese movies are in trouble because of the institution. 
Chinese movies do not refer to the individual movies but mean the Chinese movie 
industry in general. The difficulties that Chinese movies are encountering are admitted 
by the state, too. The difference is on the discourse of attribution. The state discourse 
would like to attribute it to pirate VCDs and DVDs while discourse here take different 
opinions. 
Luping: It is a long way for the institution to reform. However after the 
entry into WTO, no reform means collective suicide. The perfect 
results of the reform have some characteristics: 
118 
Persons with ability become active. 
Life Time (a forbidden movie by Zhang Yimou) is shown publicly. 
Censorship is cancelled. 
Foreign movies are not dubbed. 
(littp://www.xici.net/board/(loc.asp?id=90000&sub=4&doc old=l July 
7, 1999) 
Further more, they refuted the state discourse which blame the audience for buying 
pirate VCDs and DVDs. 
Fenghuochuanshuo: To a lot of people, they have to choose buying 
pirate movies. ... When new movies are produced, I always want to 
watch them as soon as possible. I will not care about whether they are 
pirated. I once was puzzled about this question (why I cannot watch 
the new movies at the first showing?) but now I do not think about it 
anymore. ... I finally choose pirate VCDs because I have no other 
choices. 
(http://www.xid.net/board/doc.asp?id=474872&sub=5&doc—ol(i=l 
May 4, 2000) 
Statement 2: Censorship is bad and useless. 
Censorship as the reigning tool of the state is described as necessary by the state 
discourse. The state discourse emphasizes that censorship could be beneficial for both 
the movie industry and the audience. Discourse on RearWindow counterattacks such a 
statement. I asked the respondents to give their opinions on censorship in China 
freely. 
Respondent: I once went to the Film Bureau. . . .To tell the truth, my 
impression of the Film Bureau is that this is the concentration camp for 
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Chinese movies. I had to return to the street so that I did not feel as 
stuffy as when I was there. (During April 21, 2003 - April 27, 2003) 
Respondent: Sometimes, censorship is really absurd, hateful and poor. 
(During April 21, 2003 - April 27, 2003) 
Respondent: Censorship is meaningless. We can watch the forbidden 
movies even if they did not pass the censorship. (During April 21, 
2003 - April 27, 2003) 
Film reviews about the forbidden movies and information on shows of forbidden 
movies indirectly invalidate the discourse that censorship is powerful. Censorship is 
described as a weak and evil man. 
Statement 3: Film prizes of the state are bad and not worth caring. 
State film prizes are the main method that the government used to encourage their 
discourse of what kinds of movies are good movies. RearWindow users negate the 
credibility of the film prizes and debate the taste of the prizes. 
Fenghuochuanshuo: Its (Huabiao Prize) taste decides that it cannot 
reflect what people think. It cannot guide the market and reflect the 
box office either. This kind of prize is a waste which has no meanings 
at all. 
There are actors who buy votes for the Baihua Prize. It lost its poor 
self-respect and will say nothing for the representation of the 
audiences. 
Golden Cock has become an ill cock. Its influence gets more and more 
tiny. Not only are the sponsors hesitant to fund it, but the actors are 
also hesitant to attend it. 
120 
The most salient truth is: prizes cannot promote the box office crowd 
and cannot reveal the quality of films. Prizes have become a lampoon 
and a senseless game within a small faction. 
flittp://www.xici.net/board/doc.asp?id=492453&sub=2&doc old=l 
May 8, 2000) 
RearWindow users expressed their attitudes toward the mainstream movies in the 
survey. Most of the respondents said that the mainstream films are bad. Two extreme 
words are cited, which are ‘shit，and 'rubbish'. The second popular attitude is that it is 
nothing to me: I do not care about it and I have not seen such movies for a long time. 
Through the depreciation of the "good" movies supported by the state, the discourse 
of their own good movies is ready to appear. 
Statement 4: The forbidden movies are good in general but "forbidden" has become a 
word of sales promotion. 
I supposed that RearWindow users would classify the forbidden movies as the good 
movies in their minds. However, it is not the truth. They are still very strict in judging 
what a good movie is. When asked their opinions of the forbidden movies, they 
agreed that most of the movies are good but they are aware that “forbidden” has been 
used for sales promotion. 
Respondent: Most of the forbidden movies are good movies which 
were treated unfairly. (During April 21, 2003 - April 27, 2003) 
Respondent: Good movies are easily forbidden. Someone makes use of 
such a mind and sell their movies under the name of “forbidden 
movies". (During April 21, 2003 - April 27, 2003) 
Respondent: We must treat the forbidden movies individually. We must 
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know that it is a real art film or just a camouflage to catch attention. 
(During April 21, 2003 - April 27, 2003) 
From this statement, we find that the discourse in the subaltern public sphere is not 
subordinate to any grand discourse including that of the institution of independent 
movies. In this sense, discourse on RearWindow is autonomous. 
Statement 5: Private movie watching is definitely good but limited. 
Private movie watching is a unique phenomenon in China. Since the distribution and 
movie theaters are controlled by the state, all movie shows, which are out of the 
official channels, are called private movie watching. These kinds of activities are 
often held by the people who have access to the forbidden movies. Private movie 
watching reached its climax in 2000^^. At that time, a lot of cities including Beijing, 
Shanghai, Guangzhou, Nanjing, Wuhan, Chengdu, Kunming and Taiyuan had their 
own private movie watching activity. Quite a number of the audience watched the 
forbidden movies through this way. Most of the informational postings on 
RearWindow are the gathering notices for the movie watching. 
RearWindow users explained that they think private movie watching is good because 
of many reasons. The most used reason is to popularize the movies and the second 
one is that they can communicate with others who have the same taste. Someone said 
that it is beneficial for the development of Chinese movies. 
Respondent: Very good. The more private movie watching, the more 
discursive rights about movies citizens may get. It is a good thing for 
the development of Chinese movies. (During April 21，2003 - April 27, 
2003) 
�7 Huang Xiaoxie. "The Watchers of Chinese Movies". Nanfang Weekend. March 19, 2001. 
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However, they realize that this activity is still limited to a certain group of people. The 
limitation has nothing to do with its good nature but with the practical organizing. 
They suggested that the organizing should be more systematic. Private movie 
watching competes with the dominance from the state and is not encouraged by the 
state. The activities are often checked by the government. For example, activities are 
cancelled because they show movies in bars which do not have the right to do such a 
business. The organizers are often alarmed that they do not have the right to make an 
organization. Private movie watching must struggle to live and the support from the 
audience is important. Support of the private movie watching reflects the opposition 
against the state domination in the Chinese movie industry. 
Combining the five statements together, there emerges the discourse of a subaltern 
public sphere, RearWindow: Chinese movies are in trouble due to the bad and useless 
institution of censorship; good movies are forbidden and bad movies are released. 
However, we are not afraid of the censorship since we can see the forbidden movies 
through the private movie watching. In comparison, the state discourse is: Chinese 
movies are in danger because audiences buy pirate VCDs and DVDs and do not go to 
cinemas. Good movies get the prizes and bad movies are forbidden. Activities which 
promote forbidden movies are also forbidden. In fact, there is another discourse of 
market economy which I did not talk much about. This discourse reads like this: 
Chinese movies are in trouble due to incomplete marketization of the Chinese movie 
industry. Good movies make high box office and bad make low. Audiences should go 
to movie theaters and not stay in their own places to watch movies. 
From the discussions above, we can see that the RearWindow discourse is formed in 
opposition to the state discourse. It provides another system of meanings and reasons. 
However, the most important difference is that the discourse provides a new subject 
position for the RearWindow users. Based on this subject position, more and more 
statements will be made and the discourse could be active to influence the power 
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relationships. The addressee of the state discourse is the receiver while that of the 
market discourse is the consumer. However, the RearWindow discourse defines the 
audiences as the reviewer, who can distinguish what is good and what is bad. In the 
state discourse, audiences are ignorant and should be told the good and the bad. In the 
market discourse, audiences are voiceless and they only need to make the action of 
"buy" or "not buy". However, on the RearWindow discourse, audiences have the 
loudest voice which could judge the quality of one film. This subject position is 
different from that in Western countries as well. Without a professional occupation as 
movie reviewers, the audience themselves take the responsibility to review films. In 
this sense, they grasp as many discursive rights as they can, which are out of control 
of the state, the market, and the social authority. 
Discursive practices are as important as the non-discursive ones because discourse 
trigger actions. There are a lot of actions around a discourse. For example, to write a 
movie review, one must know the movie first, which is the action of searching for 
information. Then one must watch that movie, including the actions of searching for 
the movie and watching it. If the movie is a forbidden movie which can only be 
watched in private movie houses, it involves other actions such as taking part in the 
activity and discussing with others. Although the discourse does not intervene with the 
reality directly, the actions around the discourse are influential in everyday life. That 
is why Parker (1990) claimed that discourse could support institutions, reproduce 
power relations, and have ideological effects. 
The RearWindow discourse supports the institution of independent movies more than 
the commercial one. It does not support the institution of the state at all. As I 
mentioned before, a big problem independent movies face is that they cannot reach 
the local audience. However, discourse implying that most of the forbidden movies 
are good will certainly trigger the interests of common audiences and make more and 
more independent movies well known. In addition, the positive discourse on private 
movie watching also improves the popularization of the forbidden movies if more and 
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more people go to such activities. In fact, independent movies are better known today 
than two years ago. Independent directors are invited to private movie watching 
activities throughout the country. In comparison, discourse of RearWindow does not 
totally support the commercial movies since it claims that the commercial movies 
avoid significant discussions in order to pass the censorship. 
Discourse itself is not power but it reproduces power. The power relations would give 
and take away the rights to speak and determine which kind of discourse could exist. 
If Chinese movie institutions reproduce the power relations among the state, the local 
market and the international capital, the RearWindow discourse implies that there is 
another local force emerging. Although RearWindow is only a subaltern public sphere, 
I would like to consider it as a force of the civil society. This force is still weak and 
only in a defensive mode. However, the discourse shows that RearWindow users now 
grasp the power to determine what a good film is for them. 
Different discourses have different ideological effects. The state discourse is 
ideological because it tells people what to do. The RearWindow discourse is not 
ideological because it just resists existing power relations and does not ask for 
obeisance. The ideological effect of the RearWindow discourse is just to make another 
ideology invalid. The power relations behind the ideology could not trap the subjects 
any more. However, this ideological effect is limited to the social group of 
RearWindow users. As we know, this is a subaltern group which is small in the society. 
Thus the resistance toward ideology succeeds on a micro and personal level. We 
should not exaggerate its success and the state discourse keeps its dominance in 
general. 
Discussions and conclusions 
In this part, I will analyze the relationship between the subaltern public sphere and the 
state. This relationship is often considered as oppositional in which the state tries to 
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control the subaltern public sphere while the subaltern public sphere tries to resist 
such a control. However, I will not focus on the oppositional relationship only and 
also attempt to find out the cooperative side. 
Different from social organizations, the online subaltern public sphere needs no 
financial aid and thus escapes the economic control from the state. In addition, there 
are no registration rules that limit the development of the online discussion boards. 
The online subaltern public sphere does not have an organizational hierarchy and the 
state cannot control it through penetration into the hierarchy. When using such criteria, 
the online subaltern public sphere seems to be totally autonomous. However, the truth 
is that the state has developed a system of control which is effective to some extent. 
The system of control is made up of four levels, which are the state, the websites, the 
boardmasters, and the self-censorships. The state has made a system of regulations to 
control all the aspects of the Internet. ISPs are all state-controlled and ICPs are asked 
to register and help to do the surveillance. Internet users are threatened by arrests and 
sentences. It is the cyberpolice who monitor the running of the regulation system. 
They apply technologies to control the information flow and find out the law-breakers. 
At the same time, Intemet users also apply technology to escape from their control. In 
addition, the state actively constructs the online hegemony through the development 
of online information sources. The state makes use of the mass media to depict the 
Intemet as a dangerous space and persuade users to visit the safe websites and 
contents only. 
The websites were forced to monitor their users and they tried to satisfy the 
requirements from the state. They established rules and monitoring group to do the 
surveillance. They provided the records when asked by the government. However, the 
control from the website is a negative defense rather than a positive intervention. In 
order to attract users, the website did not follow the regulation totally. It tried to 
provide as much freedom as possible to their users under the premise that it can exist. 
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The boardmasters of RearWindow are consistent with the website most of the time. 
They agree with the management from xici.net on political postings while they 
themselves do not intentionally forbid these kinds of postings. 
The control effect is manifested on the self-censorship of the users. They tried to 
avoid the politically sensitive topics in their postings but felt free to talk about movies 
due to the state's tolerance toward movies. The state considers movies as 
entertainments or products and tolerates the existence of RearWindow since it is not 
obviously political. In addition, the state supports the development of the Internet, 
which made the Internet more and more popular in China. 
State control is effective in blocking certain topics from online discussions. The online 
subaltern public sphere is not a safe space for all kinds of discourse. However, 
considering the specific topic of RearWindow, the discourse is autonomous from that 
of the state. The RearWindow discourse on Chinese movies is formed under the local 
and historical situation. Under the power relationships among the state, the local 
market and the international investments, the RearWindow discourse reflects its 
distances from all the three institutions. The statements within the RearWindow 
discourse are totally opposed to that of the state, sometimes opposed to the market 
discourse, and mostly supportive to the international investment discourse. 
These discursive practices also influenced the non-discursive actions. The 
RearWindow discourse promoted the Chinese independent movies and made the state 
institution invalid. The discourse reflects the emerging power from the civil society 
and its effort to enter the power relationships. However, the RearWindow discourse is 
not ideology and just the resistance to ideology. Their ideological effects are making 
the dominant ideology unreasonable and without respect. However, these effects are 
limited to the users of the subaltern public sphere. Whether the discourse could be 
extended into the wider publics is the topic discussed in part VII. 
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In short, the relationship between the subaltern public sphere and the state is that 
RearWindow is autonomous from the state although it cannot resist all of the state 
control effectively. Their collaboration is manifested in the acquiescence of 
RearWindow from the state and the self-conscious topic limitation of RearWindow. 
I 
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VI Relationships between the Subaltern Public Sphere and the Market Economy 
The market economy is the base on which the literary public sphere could evolve into 
the bourgeois public sphere according to Habermas. The new commercial 
relationships including the traffic in commodities and news created by the early 
capitalist long-distance trade strengthened the bourgeois class. On the one had, they 
expanded the number of the bourgeois and on the other hand, they made the bourgeois 
the center of economic activity and then the political activity. Habermas' opinion on 
initial relationship between the market economy and public sphere is consistent with 
the traditional understanding of civil society, which is that the market was the prime 
generator of civil society. However, Habermas made his unique contribution that he 
found that after years of development, the market economy was no longer the support 
for civil society. The market economy got more and more involved with the state 
power and the two systems were connected together to control the whole society. 
Habermas finally classified the market economy with the state as the system world 
and the civil society and its members as the lifeworld. 
The subaltern public sphere theory inherits Habermas' caution of the market economy. 
The subaltern public spheres must be autonomous from the state, the market economy 
and the dominant public. Their resistance toward being commercialized by the market 
power is always salient. However, since the subaltern groups are at a disadvantage in 
social resources, they could accept some collaboration with the market economy. 
Sometimes, they even actively use the market economy to enlarge their influence. The 
relationship between subaltern public spheres and the market economy is not as 
oppositional as that in Habermas' theory. The extent of the collaboration and 
opposition is determined by the environments the subaltern public spheres are in, the 
resources they can mobilize, and the goals they want to reach. 
Therefore, the subaltern public spheres are diverse and flexible. Even though most of 
the subaltern groups share the characteristics of the suppressed or marginalized, their 
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corresponding public spheres are not the same. For a single subaltern group, its public 
sphere is not always the same across different historical periods. The public sphere 
may change according to the change of the environment. Squires (2002) classified the 
subaltern public spheres into three types, which are the enclaved public spheres, 
counterpublic spheres, and satellite publics. The three types of subaltern public 
spheres are different in the spaces and discourse they have, resources they own, goals 
they want to reach, their performance before wider publics, and sanctions toward their 
activities. The enclaved public spheres hide counterpublic ideas and strategies in order 
to survive the sanctions from the dominant public, the political and economic 
institutions. Their external activities are rare and have low influence on wider publics 
due to their limited resources. Satellite public spheres desire to be separate from other 
publics and are not necessarily oppressed. They can emerge from both dominant and 
marginalized groups. They enter into wider publics' debates when there is clear 
convergence of their interests with those of other publics or when their activities cause 
controversies with wider publics. The resources they usually use are the 
self-supported group media and materials. 
Counterpublic spheres usually emerge in response to a decrease in oppression or an 
increase in recourses. Counterpublic discourse travel outside of the safe, enclave 
spaces to argue against dominant conceptions of the group and to describe group 
interests. Counterpublics test the reactions of wider publics by stating previously 
hidden opinions, launching persuasive campaigns to change the minds of dominant 
publics, or seeking solidarity with other marginal groups. Counterpublicity is 
facilitated by greater independent media resources and distribution channels. But 
counterpublicity is not always successful: Many of these discourse and 
self-determination were answered by the state violence or the dominant public may 
monopolize the opportunities for intersphere discussions. Furthermore, counterpublics 
are affected by their interactions with wider publics, often in ways not of their 
choosing. For example, the market power often appropriate selected aspects of 
counterpublic's imagery, opinions and performances in ways that benefit their profit 
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pursuing. The dominant media are often a source of this appropriation. When 
rejections or distortions of counterdiscourse occur, enclave spaces and discourse serve 
the group's needs to regroup and rethink strategies. 
RearWindow is such a kind of counterpublic sphere which actively interacts with the 
wider publics. If RearWindow users use the online discussion board as the enclave 
space, they are not satisfied with it and try to influence the wider publics via various 
strategies. The resources they are not only owned by themselves and the market 
economy may act as the resource provider in this case. However, RearWindow also 
faces the danger of being colonized by commercial power. There are three kinds of 
commercial powers that interact with RearWindow: The Internet economy, the pirate 
movie industry, and other market powers that provide resources for private movie 
watching organized by RearWindow. 
China has not formed the trisection of the state, the economy and the civil society 
completely. The market reform in China is an impulse for the birth of the civil society. 
Instead of talking about the disbenefits the market economy may bring, the dominant 
opinion is that the market economy will weaken the strict control of the state. After 
the backing off of the state power, the power of civil society may have the chance to 
emerge. Thus the relationship with the public sphere and the market power should be 
cooperative rather than oppositional in the early stage of the development of civil 
society. This is quite reasonable considering the historical development of bourgeois 
public sphere in Western countries. However, we must pay attention to the fact that 
the environment China now encounters is no longer the same as that of the 
century. First, the economic reform in China was initiated by the state government and 
not by the bourgeois. Second, globalization is another new condition that the early 
bourgeois public sphere in Western countries did not meet, which makes the power 
relations more complex. I keep my mind open and evaluate the relationship from both 
of the possibilities: The opposition and the collaboration. 
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In this part, I will first concisely introduce the role of the market economy in the 
development of the Internet in China. Then I will specifically relate the development 
of xici.net with the invasion of commercial power. Did these commercial activities 
influence RearWindow and if yes, how? Since RearWindow is a movie discussion 
board, I will pay attention to the movie industry that makes these discussions possible. 
In this case, it is the pirate movie industry that provides the RearWindow users plenty 
of cheap movies. The relationship with the market economy could be reflected in the 
private movie watching organized by RearWindow as well. The private movie 
watching is supported by many kinds of social resources and the market power is just 
one of them. Comparing the market economy and other resources, I will discuss the 
advantages and limitations that the collaboration with the market power may bring. 
This part will answer my fourth research question, namely, what is the relationship 
between the subaltern public sphere and the market power? 
The Internet economy in China and the subaltern public sphere 
The market power is often considered as destructive to the online public spheres. If 
the Internet becomes privately owned and governed by market-led regulation, 
freedom of speech on the Internet will be mined. The dominant market power would 
marginalize the groups which are challenging the existing system world. The 
companies could do so when they control the access and apply censorships. There are 
some findings indicating that the commercial power changed a public sphere into an 
entertainment format (Roper, 1998). Is it true that the online subaltern public sphere 
will be mined by the commercial power? If so, what can the sphere do to protect its 
space and resist the invasion from the market power? I will answer these questions in 
the following paragraphs. 
The Internet is considered a promising but underdeveloped market in China. The 
Internet economy is a brand new economy which can provide a big new market. This 
understanding of the Internet as a commercial opportunity drives the government to 
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develop the Intemet economy. In February 1996, the China International Electronic 
Commerce Center (CIECC) was established to provide services of e-commerce to 
Chinese enterprises, which represents the startup of the Chinese Intemet economy. 
Toady, the Intemet economy in China includes three kinds of economic forms. The 
first one is the electronic data interchange within a certain industry, which is used to 
shorten the interchange time and reduce the interchange cost. CIECC has been 
connected to the international e-commerce networks such as the Global Trade Point 
Network by the United Nations. It has established its branches in 97 cities in China. 
The second type of the Intemet economic form is the online trade. Consumers know 
about the information of products through the Intemet and buy the products via the 
payment system. The products will be transported to the buyers later. This is the most 
popular form of e-commerce in China now. The third type of e-commerce is to buy 
virtual commodities online. The website provides the online services and consumers 
pay for the services they needed. Charging for the email services and the BBS service 
belong to this kind of Intemet economic form. 
There are 145,719 domain names that ended with .com until March 2003 in China. 
The .com websites are for commercial enterprises. The development of e-commerce is 
rapid since there were only 4,147 .com websites in March 1998^^. In the early months 
of the year 2000, e-commerce in China reached its climax after one-year of 
propaganda aided by foreign investments. However, the upsurge passed quickly and in 
the following two years, a lot of e-commerce websites closed. For example, there 
were 1,665 B2C (business to consumer) websites in the beginning of 2000 and only 
1,188 existed till the end of 2001^^. However, the existing ones have seen their future. 
It was reported that some B2C websites like joyo.com, dangdang.com, and 
china.alibaba.com have reached the balance of income and expense. Some news 
websites like sina.com, sohu.com and netease.com have stopped losing money on 
The Statistics of Chinese Domain Names, http://www.cnnic.net.cn/registration/tongii.shtml 
19 Zhou Yiping. "Half of the B2B websites died: Who will be the Master of E-Commerce?". 
http://it.sohu.com/52/19/article204881952.shtm] 
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their businesses based on the income of a d v e r t i s e m e n t s � � . Most of the e-commerce 
websites have experienced such a development and xici.net and its parent company 
elong.com is one of the survivors. 
Xici.net was not a commercial website when it was established by Xiangma. All the 
spending on maintenance and management was paid by Xiangma personally. During 
the wave of e-commerce in China, elong.com bought xici.net in February 2000 and 
expected to enlarge its fame through the large number of users of xici.net. Elong 
reached its goal and became famous in a short period. However, elong has not got 
profits from xici.net yet. On the contrary, elong must pay more than three million 
RMB every year to maintain the running of xici. The advertisements cannot reach the 
maintenance costs because xici is just a BBS website and impossible to be as popular 
as the news websites such as sina or sohu. The main business of xici is to exchange 
advertisements with other mass media until the early 2003. 
Xiaocai: We cooperated with other print media mainly in the sharing 
of resources and changing advertisements. For example, we 
established columns on some print media, which introduced the culture 
and writers of xici.net. At the same time, we provide online spaces of 
advertisements for their activities. We gave them a resource of 
advertisement and they gave me an equal one. However, we did not 
necessarily make advertisements for ourselves in their media and we 
could sell them to other companies. (January 28, 2003) 
This kind of collaboration has limited ability to make money. There was one million 
RMB advertisement income every year. Xici.net also made money from their short 
message service, which earns 50,000 to 100,000 RMB per month. In 2002, the total 
income ofxici.net was 1.7 millions It fell short of the maintenance spending. 
20 Ji Fang. "Ten Suspense of E-Commerce in 2003". http://it.sohu.com/13/28/article206452813.shtml 
21 Caotian, "Why Xici.net Started to Charge". E Time Weekly, January 14, 2001. 
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In the beginning of 2003, xici suddenly announced that it would charge its users for 
the services. The announcement reads that 
From January 1, 2003, xici will add a type of VIP users who will pay 5 
RMB per month. The VIP users will be provided with more services 
than the other kinds of users. They are different from services of 
leaving messages, short messages and saving spaces. The non-VIP 
users will be limited in using some functions. 
According to my observation, the non-VIP users' personal saving spaces called “My 
Home" were cancelled at first. And only the latest five messages which are saved in 
the "Incoming Box" within the website could be read. If a non-VIP wants to check the 
older messages, s/he must delete the latest ones. These two functions are so important 
that users got angry at the decision of xici.net. To appease the anger, xici.net made 
another announcement that the registered users could apply to be temporary VIP users 
and all the functions limitations will be formally executed till February 1. Even 
though xici.net conceded, there were still many boardmasters who intimated that they 
would quit their boards if xici charges. 
From this event, we can see that there are contradictions between commercial logic 
and common users' logic. Elong company bought xici.net in order to make money. 
Their first principle is profit and based on it, they tried to provide good services to 
their users to keep them. When the profit principle contradicts with the keeping of 
users, elong.com chooses the profit finally. What they worried about is whether the 
charge will make too many users leave. That is why they finally concede a little. 
However, we cannot know the accurate result of VIP charges now. How many users 
have become VIPs and how many have left xici? According to my observation, most 
of the active participants especially the ones who have their own boards in xici chose 
to pay for the VIP. 
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Since xici and its users contradicted in charges, xici and RearWindow may have 
contradictions in xici's profit-oriented activities. The first contradiction is that since 
RearWindow wants to be as open as possible for their targeted audience, the charge 
may prevent poor users such as the students from entering into RearWindow. 
However, the boardmaster of RearWindow did not think that the VIP charge would 
hold back their users badly. 
Lvzi: I do not think that a lot of users will leave xici. It is impossible 
for you to leave. If you left, how about your online friends? Take me as 
an example, I have 200 online friends and every time I logged in xici, 
my messages are much more than my emails. It is said that the more 
online the more real. Xici has been a part of life. (January 29，2003) 
Another possible contradiction is that xici will make use of RearWindow to catch 
people's attention, which is not permitted by RearWindow. 
Lvzi: We have a big contradiction with xici on the recommendations 
on the home page. They often put some bad postings on the home page 
without our permission. Some of these recommendations were never 
recommended by us. I have strong antipathy towards it. Sometimes I 
cancelled the "cool" mark of the postings as soon as they were 
recommended on the home page. Once they put a really bad posting on 
the home page, which was about the ten movies the author watched at 
a university. The author wanted to discuss with others but we did not 
want this kind of posting to represent the level of RearWindow. I left a 
message to Xiaocai (sysop) and asked him to remove this posting from 
the home page but he did not answer me. Later I deleted the posting 
directly. Some users said that Jesus, postings on home page could not 
be read! This is the contradiction. What we think is different from the 
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sysop. (January 29, 2003) 
However, in most cases, xici.net does not directly use RearWindow to make money. 
That is why the boardmasters of RearWindow think that RearWindow and xici can 
co-exist well. 
VCD: They (xici.net) are totally merchants now. However, we 
ourselves do not exclude the commercial activities completely. You 
must take the advantage of this method (commercial activities) if you 
want to spread widely. It is possible that we should find a more 
appropriate method other than the commercial one. But it is difficult to 
change now since the board has become very large. (January 30, 2003) 
The users of RearWindow put xici on a very important position. Since 50.8% of 
respondents knew RearWindow from the home page of xici.net, 17 respondents 
thought that the RearWindow is dependent on xici. For example, xici and 
RearWindow are like skin and hair, father (mother) and son, water and fish, water and 
boat. 
Author: Is it impossible for RearWindow to exist in another website 
other than xici? 
Zaodao (active participant): Is there such an interface? Is there such 
kind of management? Many users of RearWindow including me knew 
it from the home page of xici. We are the old users of xici.net and not 
only that of RearWindow. How can RearWindow attract new users 
without xici, a bigger window? (April 3, 2003) 
Others thought that xici.net provided a space for RearWindow, like the market and the 
seller or the space provider and the content provider. There are also 22 respondents 
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who thought that xici and RearWindow should coexist instead of being dependent on 
each other. 
When asking whether the commercial activities of xici.net are beneficial or 
detrimental to RearWindow, nearly 1/5 of the respondents take the commercial 
activities of xici as positive. 
Table 6.1 The Influence of Commercial Activities ofXici.net 
The commercial activities The commercial activities of 
of xici.net are beneficial for xici.net are detrimental for 
RearWindow RearWindow 
Totally agree ^ 
Basically agree 11.3 29.1 
Don't know 39.0 ^ 
Basically disagree 27.1 15.4 
Totally disagree 16.9 1.1 
In short, xici.net is a commercial Internet website which is oriented to profit. Its goal 
to make money is different from that of the RearWindow. Although there are 
contradictions between them, xici and RearWindow have co-existed and will co-exist 
with each other. They can benefit from each other: Xici needs discussion boards like 
RearWindow to attract and keep users while RearWindow needs xici to provide such a 
space. The development of xici could help RearWindow to maximize its users. Since 
xici is a representation of Chinese Internet economy, I will conclude that the market 
power of Chinese Internet is more positive than negative for the development of 
online subaltern public sphere in this case. 
The pirate movie industry and the subaltern public sphere 
The market economy supports the development of RearWindow in another way, 
which is the source of the movies RearWindow users watch. One of my interviewees, 
Hanyu (active participant) said that "If the Internet provides the software for the 
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movie discussions, the pirate movie industry provides the hardware." Nearly all the 
RearWindow users watched pirate movies and most of the movies they discussed 
couldn't be bought through the legal way. In most countries, pirate movies are 
forbidden and cannot be sorted as part of the normal market economy. However, 
things are quite different in China. I will explain why I called the pirate movie 
production an industry which is part of the market economy. 
The pirate movie industry is made up of a production system and a distribution system. 
The production system includes various pirate movie producers. Some of them are 
illegal underground factories and some are formal registered companies. They use 
three methods to get the movie: First, they hire people to shoot the featured movies in 
movie theaters secretly. Second, they use computer technology to decode the security 
cipher of the original VCD or DVD and transform them into a new version which has 
Chinese captions or even Chinese dubbing. Third, they directly use the original copy 
of the movies and make VCDs or DVDs. For example, Zhang Yimou's Hero was 
pirated in this way. Thus the pirate movies do not always have low quality and some 
of them are as good as the original ones. Since producers need not pay the copyright 
for the movies, the pirate movies are very cheap, usually six to ten RMB per piece. 
The distribution system is made up of a lot of semi-public small stores dissipated in 
the cities. Although it is illegal to sell pirate movies in China, these stores did not get 
strict prohibition from the government. Before China entered into WTO, the Chinese 
government closed all of the big marketplaces which sold the pirate movies. Then the 
individual sellers in these marketplaces opened their small stores on the streets. It is 
still very easy for the buyers to have access to these pirate movies. 
The pirate movie industry in China can exist not only because of its low-price. The 
strict state control on movies also promotes the development of the pirate movie 
industry. 
Respondent: Most of us have no alternatives other than to be the 
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“complicit，’ (of the pirate movie industry). It is not only because of the 
low-price. We movie lovers cannot watch most of the good movies in 
the formal movie theaters and cannot buy the original movies VCDs or 
DVDs. What can we do if we do not choose pirate movies? (During 
April 21, 2003 - April 27, 2003) 
Therefore, it is the pirate movie industry not the formal movie industry which is the 
mainstream source of movies in China. In addition, the pirate movie industry is 
semi-public, which means that the legal and the illegal ones get involved with each 
other. That is why I consider the pirate movie industry as one kind of market power. 
In the responses to my question about pirate movies, all of the respondents indicated 
that they have bought and watched pirate movies. Most of the respondents supported 
the viewing of pirate movies but some of them felt that it is harmful for the 
development of the movie industry in the long run. Only a few of the respondents 
thought that it is urgent to forbid the pirate movies. Through these attitudes, we can 
find that the pirate movie industry as a market power is not only beneficial but also 
important for RearWindow. 
Respondent: Without pirate movies, there will not be so many movie 
lovers in China. Without pirate movies, RearWindow cannot exist. 
Without pirate movies, there is not a real world of movies! (During 
April 21, 2003 - April 27, 2003) 
The relationship between RearWindow and the pirate movie industry is not 
unidirectional. The pirate movie industry formed on the demand of buyers and they 
are sensitive to the change of interests of consumers. RearWindow promoted pirate 
movies in two ways. First, there is a kind of postings called DVD reports on 
RearWindow. The DVD reports are written by some DVD fans who are proficient in 
buying DVDs. Since the pirate movie industry is disordered and the versions of 
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movies have big differences in quality, DVD reporters give other buyers the latest 
information of the newly produced DVDs and at the same time, they evaluate the 
version and quality. However, these reporters are not inside the pirate movie industry. 
They know little about the inside stories of the pirate movie industry and what they 
use to evaluate the version of pirate movies is just their experience. 
Takethat (active participant): It is very difficult for ordinary buyers to 
judge the version of pirate movies from the cover. Only the DVD fans 
that buy DVDs often can find the differences. We judge the version 
from the cover and the print on the DVDs. In addition, there are some 
symbols on the cover to distinguish the pirate movie producers. For 
example, a famous pirate movie producer called Quanmei often puts a 
cartoon symbol on the cover. (May 15, 2003) 
The DVD reports function as free advertisement for pirate movie producers and 
distributors. The second way that RearWindow influences the pirate movie industry is 
that the movie reviews on RearWindow often become the directions for pirate movies 
producers. If a movie is discussed hotly on RearWindow, it will be soon that people 
can find it in the small DVD stores. The online movie discussion board becomes the 
respondents' area for the pirate movie producers to grasp the change of their 
consumers' taste. 
In a nutshell, the free market economy provides the premise of the emergence of the 
pirate movie industry. State control on movies indirectly accelerates its development 
which implies that the state and the economy are not always in the same side. The 
pirate movie industry provides the basic material resources for the online discussion. 
The online discussion board also provides an arena for the producers to get in touch 
with its consumers while the formal legal ways are forbidden. Here the subaltern 
public sphere benefits from the market economy to resist the control from the state. 
That is why many respondents said that they must thank the pirate movie industry in 
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China. 
Private movie watching and the market economy 
If the Internet economy and the pirate movie industry mainly support the internal 
activities of RearWindow, the market powers used in private movie watching reflects 
the efforts of RearWindow to reach and influence the wider publics. Private movie 
watching is organized by the citizens themselves and shows movies which are 
inaccessible through formal ways like movie theaters or legal VCDs or DVDs. The 
organizers collect their movie resources in two ways, one is from the pirate movie 
industry, and the other is from their personal relations. For example, they borrowed 
forbidden movies directly from the directors or other members of the working groups. 
However, most of the organizers do not have the resources for showing movies, which 
require a large place and some showing machines. The locale for showing movies is 
out of their personal ability. That is why private movie watching must cooperate with 
other social resources. 
22 . 
Private movie watching reached a nationwide emergence in 2000 • At that time, 
many cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Nanjing, Wuhan, Chengdu, 
Kunming, Shenyang and Taiyuan had their own private movie watching. Quite a 
number of audiences watched forbidden movies in this way. 35% of the respondents 
of my survey said that they had attended such activities. Nanfang Weekend named 
four of them as “the four biggest private movie watching" which includes 
RearWindow to Movies (Nanjing), Practice Society (Beijing), u-theque (Guangzhou 
and Shenzhen), and Film 101 Studio (Shanghai). All the four activities have lasted for 
several years and showed movies regularly such as once a week. The private movie 
watching of RearWindow was organized by VCD and his friends, from June 2000 to 
December 2002. But no new activities were organized after 2002. In fact, all the four 
22 Huang Xiaoxie. "The Watchers of Chinese Movies". Nanfang Weekend. March 19, 2001. 
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movie watching activities started to decline at the end of 2002, especially before the 
16th people Congress. Practice Society was asked to dismiss and the main organizers 
were cautioned to be quiet during the People Congress. After that, the private 
movie watching organized by Practice Society stopped. The bar where u- theque in 
Guangzhou showed movies was closed by the government. The reason is that bars 
cannot do the business of the movie theatres. After that, u-theque in Guangzhou 
became a subordinate department of Nanfang City News and changed its name into 
Nanfang Film Forum. Under this new form of organization, u-theque in Guangzhou 
could continue their activities. Film 101 Studio stopped organizing private movie 
watching due to financial reasons. The decline of private movie watching is not only 
due to the strict control from the state. The popularity of pirate DVDs which makes 
people get what they want easily also led to the decline. 
The vicissitude of Chinese private movie watching reflects the flexibility of the 
subaltern public spheres. When the oppression decreases, the subaltern public spheres 
make use of all kinds of social resources to interact with the wider publics and the 
state. However, when their activities provoke harder oppression, they will turn back to 
be the enclaved spheres which could provide safe discursive spaces. The online 
discussion board of RearWindow is the safe space for the subaltern group. The private 
movie watching of RearWindow reflects its external functions. In their external 
activities, various social resources converge and are applied. In the following 
paragraphs, I will introduce how RearWindow makes use of various social recourses 
and compare the advantages and disadvantages of different recourses. The market 
economy as a kind of resource will be discussed specifically. 
From June 2000 to December 2002, private movie watching of RearWindow moved 
from place to place for different reasons. They mainly cooperated with two kinds of 
social resources, one was the commercial power and the other was the universities. 
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Table 6.2 Private movie watching Organized by RearWindow 
Locale Time Ticket Fare Movies Reason of 
Showed Termination 
Multimedia June 2000 to 5 RMB per European art Renovation of 
Center in August 2000 person movies the center 
East-Southern 
University 
Multimedia September Free European art Closure of the 
classroom in 2000 to movies classrooms 
East-Southern February 2001 during winter 
University vacation 
Multimedia March 2001 to 2 RMB per European art Closure of the 
Center of August 2001 person movies, center during 
East-Southern forbidden summer 
University movies and vacation 
Taiwan movies 
Xindingtai August 2000 to Free Japanese Bankrupt of 
Emporium for March 2001 movies, the emporium 
Electronic Korean 
Products movies, and 
others 
Worker Movie November 50 free tickets Korean Change of the 
Theater 2001 to August each time, 20% movies, theater 
2002 discount for Taiwan manager 
students, 10 movies, Oscar 
RMB per movies 
person 
Amphitheater November to 1 RMB per Taiwan movies Termination of 
in Jiangsu December person the cooperator, 
Broadcasting 2002 the University 
University Student Union 
Some active RearWindow users who were studying in the universities at that time 
initiated the collaboration with universities. They often asked the University Student 
Union to be the cooperator; thus they can rent or borrow the establishments of the 
universities. The movie showing is open to the public although the main audiences are 
students. However, the collaboration is not predictable due to the easily changeable 
university policy. For example, the renovation of the establishments, the winter or 
summer vacation, the People Congress, and even the approaching of final exams 
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could be the reasons of terminations. The goals of the universities and RearWindow 
are different. 
X-Camoufleur: I can understand that they (the Student Union) 
organized the movie shows mainly for their students. They only want 
to provide an entertainment for students in order to make them stay in 
the university at nights. (February 3, 2003) 
The university often applies censorship on the contents of movies as well. 
X-Camoufleur: Every time I must give them the movies in advance 
and they would check them. I feel it is like the censorship from the 
state. Some movies were forbidden and I cannot understand why. They 
just said you couldn't show this movie. However, the original plan was 
disturbed. (February 3, 2003) 
But the universities also have their advantages. First, it can attain a certain size of 
audience who are the students. Second, university students more easily accept art 
movies. Nearly all the European art movies were shown at universities. In addition, 
the state often gives more freedom to academic activities since the influence of these 
activities is limited. Watching movies at universities could take the mask of academic 
activities. Another reason that the state did not intervene RearWindow to show 
forbidden movies at universities was due to the few times they were showed. 
Compared to universities, the commercial locales including Xindingtai and Worker 
Movie Theatre are more predictable in their requirements for private movie watching. 
Their principle is to attract more consumers and make money. Xindingtai is an 
emporium which sells the electronic products, including VCD/DCD players, speaker 
system, and TV/display. They have a small theatre for previewing the products. Since 
Chinese movie fans watch movies at home, they planned to use this method to attract 
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potential consumers to buy the products they sold. Xindingtai found VCD and asked 
him for the collaboration. Finally, they agreed that Xindingtai would provide the place 
and showing machines and RearWindow was responsible for finding the movies, 
organizing the showings and making the propaganda on the Internet. After the 
bankruptcy of Xindingtai, RearWindow cooperated with the Worker Movie Theatre, 
which is a state-owned movie theatre. After the state stopped funding the movie 
theatres, they had to survive by themselves. Commercial promotions became 
important for them. At that time, the entire Chinese movie theatres were stagnant and 
so was the Worker. Thus the manager of the Worker found VCD and wanted to 
cooperate with RearWindow. They expected that RearWindow could bring young 
movie audience to the theater. Both the two commercial resources considered the 
RearWindow users as the potential buyers. Therefore, if profits could not be achieved, 
the collaboration could no longer exist. The bankruptcy of Xindingtai indicated that 
commercial power needs the people as consumers only. Xindingtai was later 
transformed to a department store. The profit-orientation is more explicit in the 
Worker Theater. After half a year's collaboration, the Worker found that they could 
not make money from the collaboration since the RearWindow users were just a small 
social group and not the young audiences they expected. They became very passive in 
aiding the movie showings and the manager who decided to cooperate with 
RearWindow was moved to another movie theatre. 
In addition, the commercial influence is reflected through the movies RearWindow 
chose to show. 
Vian (the former boardmaster): The East-Southern University showed 
some movies and Xindingtai showed others. The movies shown at the 
university were more serious and that of Xindingtai were more popular. 
Thus all the popular movies were showed in Xindingtai. (February 5, 
2003) 
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The same applied to the movies shown in the Worker Theater. Except for Taiwanese 
movies, the Worker often showed Korean movies which were very popular in China. 
In fact, RearWindow users liked Taiwanese movies more. Vian said that the most 
successful one in the Worker was the topic of Lai Shengchuan, one of the most 
famous Taiwanese new movie directors. 
From the above analysis, we can see that despite the profit-pursuing nature of the 
commercial powers, it is possible for a subaltern public sphere to cooperate with the 
market economy. At least, it is more possible than to cooperate with the state. 
However, this collaboration often means compromise. The subaltern public sphere 
such as RearWindow must cater for the requirements of commercial powers. But the 
organizers thought these compromises were tolerable. The boardmasters of 
RearWindow are still looking for appropriate sites to show movies while insisting on 
autonomy. 
Lvzi: There are some bars which want to cooperate with us. But we 
must talk about what kind of movies will be shown, whether the 
watching will be charged, and what kind of people they want to attract. 
In fact, our audiences are mainly students and the people who cannot 
watch the movies. But those bars only hope to attract consumers and 
make money. Who will come out and not stay at home to watch these 
movies if s/he is rich enough? ... There are people that can support the 
activities but their expected audiences are quite different from ours. 
(January 29, 2003) 
Discussions and conclusions 
This part discusses the relationship between the market power and the subaltern 
public spheres. The relationship between the profit-oriented website company and the 
online discussion board is cooperative rather than oppositional. Although there are 
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frictions from time to time, the two can co-exist with each other well. The pirate 
movie industry provides the material resources to the subaltern public sphere, which 
are the cheap and diverse movies. The online discussion board functions as a feedback 
arena which could guide the production of pirate movies while there are no formal 
channels for interactions. Private movie watching is one kind of the external activity 
of the subaltern public sphere which is aimed at wider publics. Different from online 
discussions, offline activities need much more resources. RearWindow has made use 
of various social resources including the universities, the emporium and the formal 
movie theatres. The universities as state-sponsored institutions lack the impulses to 
continue the collaboration while the commercial institutions are eager to cooperate 
driven by pursuing profit. However, the money they can make from the subaltern 
group is very limited. As soon as they find this out: the collaboration ends. In addition, 
the subaltern public sphere cannot remain totally autonomous when cooperating with 
the market power. It is hard to make a balance between the goal of commercial 
institutions and that of the subaltern public sphere. 
The market is easier to cope with than the state for the subaltern public sphere. The 
Internet economy and pirate movie industry in China contributed to the development 
of RearWindow a lot. They will continue to be the necessary supports in the future. 
Collaborations with other market powers are temporary and inconstant since the small 
size of subaltern groups is contradictory with the goal of profit-maximization of the 
market institutions. Whether further collaboration is possible still relies on the 
individual chances. To avoid unexpected commercialization from market power, the 
subaltern public sphere must apply strategies in their interactions with the market 
economy. 
In short, the relationship between RearWindow and the market economy is mainly 
cooperative. However, collaboration is easily ended when commercial companies find 
that they cannot make a profit from the collaboration. In addition, RearWindow must 
make some compromises in order to satisfy the needs of the economy. 
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Part Vn Relationships between the Subaltern Public Sphere and the Mass Media 
According to Habermas, the mass media replaced the coffee houses, salons and 
societies as the institution of today's bourgeois public sphere. At first, he thought that 
critical-rational political discussions are lost in the mass media public sphere. The 
mass media changed the culture-debating public into the culture-consuming public. 
The convivial discussions were replaced by noncommittal group activities such as 
watching movies in theatres. The mass media were not eligible public spheres for the 
dominant bourgeois public, not to say a unitary public sphere for the whole society. 
However, many scholars did not agree that today, the mass media are totally a 
negative or pseudo-sphere for public debates. Thompson (1995: 81-82) argued that the 
mass media “creates new forms of action and interaction and new kinds of social 
relationships" because of their ability to transform the spatial and temporal 
organization of social life. The mediated discourse enables individuals to act for 
others and in response to actions which are in distant locale. The new interactions 
initiated by the mass media are not always uncritical or lack rationality. The 
"discursive elaboration" is a new kind of “responsive action" with which the 
recipients could critically elaborate, refine, and comment on the media messages 
(Thompson, 1999: 100-118). Habermas changed his passive attitude toward the mass 
media, too. He admitted that “I was too pessimistic about the resisting power and 
above all the critical potential of a pluralistic, internally much differentiated mass 
public whose cultural usages have begun to shake off the constraints of class" 
(Habermas, 1992). He concluded that, “There is considerable evidence attesting to the 
ambivalent nature of the democratic potential of a public sphere whose infrastructure 
is marked by the growing selective constraints imposed by electronic mass 
communication.', 
The subaltern public spheres theorists agreed that the mass media have an ambivalent 
nature in being the public sphere. Some theorists like Fraser (1992) thought that the 
mass media are controlled by the entangled powers from the state and the market 
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economy. Therefore, the mass media are unavailable to unequally empowered social 
groups and thus have no need to be discussed. Others like McLaughlin (1993) thought 
the role of the mass media are obstructive in the dissemination of counter-claims and 
they actively create oppositional impulses. We must reveal the media's participation in 
marginalization. In addition, there are a few theorists who thought that the mass media 
were not so negative in the development of subaltern public spheres. Felski (1989) 
concentrated on the institutional mechanisms and sites, both within the feminist public 
sphere and the dominant public, which create avenues for the dissemination of 
feminist thought. For instance, feminists have taken positions of power within the 
capitalist institutions such as corporations and Hollywood media firms. In these varied 
sources, feminist women can deliver and debate feminist positions and women's 
interests. That is why Squires (2002) classified the mass media as an important social 
resource that the subaltern public spheres could make use of. However, he was aware 
that "The dominant media are often a source of this appropriation" which 
misappropriates counterpublic's history and imagery. Therefore, when we are 
discussing the role of the mass media, we should pay attention to its ambivalence in 
the influence on subaltern public spheres. 
The Chinese mass media also have an ambivalent role in disseminating counterpublic 
claims although they are quite different from the mass media in Western countries. If 
the Western mass media are controlled by their political economy, the Chinese mass 
media are mastered by the economic polity. The Chinese mass media have 
experienced the process of commercialization but the maketised media do not oppose 
the ideological premise of the party-state. The freedom of the mass media mainly 
remains in the non-political discourse (Lee, 2001). However, the commercialization 
did drive the mass media to dedicate themselves to their favoured media clients, 
satisfying their informational and entertainment needs. The subaltern social group in 
my study, which is defined as the underdeveloped middle class, is one of the clients 
that the Chinese mass media pursued. In addition, the movies are often considered as 
entertainment and not politically sensitive. The desire of consumers and the low risk 
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of movie topics made it possible that the Chinese mass media could provide some 
relatively free discursive spaces for the RearWindow users to disseminate their claims 
on movies. However, entering these spaces risks the danger of being misappropriated. 
The discourse of RearWindow may be filtered and distorted by the mass media to 
cater for their goal of profit-pursuing. The analysis of the relationship between 
RearWindow and the mass media could help us to understand the complication of the 
Chinese mass media, which is influenced by the state and the market at the same time. 
Another implication may lie in the relationship between the Intemet and traditional 
mass media. Since RearWindow is an online discussion board, its interaction with the 
mass media could manifest the competence and collaboration among various media. 
Considering the competence among media, the media niche theory states that 
replacement seldom happens since the media niche is made up of three measurements, 
which are niche breadth, niche overlap and competitive superiority. Any media which 
have one advantage in the three measurements could not be replaced and defeated 
easily. On the contrary, they can cooperate with each other to overcome their 
deficiencies and thus a media environment forms (Dimmick, Kline, & Stafford 2000). 
In the following parts, I will first introduce the competition between RearWindow and 
the mass media in media contents, media authors and media audiences. Then I will 
discuss the possibility of collaboration which is limited by the state-controlled nature 
of the Chinese mass media. How the mass media use RearWindow to attract their 
targeted audiences and how RearWindow uses the mass media to disseminate its 
opinions? During this process, the mass media must take the risks of offending the 
domination of the state while RearWindow is in danger of being misappropriated. 
Finally, I will discuss the effect of RearWindow's activities to influence wider publics 
through the mass media. This part will answer my final research question, namely, 
ys,hat is the relationship between the subaltern public sphere and the mass media? 
The competition between RearWindow and mass media 
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It is claimed that the Intemet is easily accessible and infinite in information and also 
gives the discursive right to everybody. We could expect that as a discussion board 
specifically for movies, RearWindow may have to compete with the mass media in 
content, authors and audiences. For example, RearWindow users will not buy 
magazines or newspapers if their articles will appear on RearWindow at a later time. I 
designed five items that represent the quality of contents, which are faster, more 
comprehensive, freer, truer, and higher taste. For instance, the content on 
RearWindow is faster than the corresponding content in the mass media. The result 
looks like this: 
Table 7.1 The Quality of Contents on the Internet and Mass Media 
Totally Basically Do Basically Totally 
agree agree not disagree disagree 
know 
RearWindow is faster than 12.0% 43.7% 26.8% 15.3% 2.2% 
mass media. 
R e a r W i n d o w i s ~ m o r e 9.8% 39.1% 25.0% 24.5% 1.6% 
comprehensive than mass 
media 
RearWindow is freer than 16.4% 60.1% 16.4% 6.6% 0.5% 
mass media. 
RearWindow is truer than 13 .1%51 .4% 29.0% 6.6% 0% 
mass media. 
RearWindow has higher 19.0% 39.1% 25.0% 14.7% 2.2% 
taste than mass media 
We can see that RearWindow does not have many advantages in the first, second, and 
fifth items. But it is better than the mass media in the freedom and authenticity of its 
contents. 
Zhuozi: RearWindow is not as good as the mass media in information 
and I think it is because that RearWindow focuses on the movie 
reviews. ... However, RearWindow is faster than mass media in some 
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aspects. For example, when the DVD of Infernal Affairs was sold, 
there was someone who wrote the reviews immediately. The movie 
reviews are faster than that on the mass media. (April 16, 2003) 
Guzhiyu: The contents of RearWindow are not very comprehensive 
since they are mainly related to videos. And the contents are selected 
according to the taste of RearWindow. (April 16, 2003) 
RearWindow and the traditional mass media also compete for the authors. The 
competence exists because some traditional mass media forbid their authors from 
posting the articles they wrote for the mass media on RearWindow. Others often ask 
the authors to post them several days after the mass media have published them. 
45.4% of the respondents said that they will not put the articles which are written for 
the mass media online. 
Ju: We will put the good articles online and ask for the critiques on 
them. But they must be put two days after newspapers began to sell. 
We also asked our paper's website to put the articles two days after 
that. Or it will influence our selling. (January 30, 2003) 
The first two competences are aimed at audiences. The mass media want to attract 
Intemet users to their products with the authors who are popular online. However, 
since the Intemet is free, the consumers of mass media may be reduced if they can 
read the articles on the Intemet. 
Hanyu: I never buy the movie magazines or newspapers. I know that 
they will finally post these articles on RearWindow. I can save my 
money to buy DVDs. (April 3, 2003) 
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This analysis shows that RearWindow has advantages in the freedom and authenticity 
of the contents, while the mass media may be better in fast speed and comprehensive 
coverage. The media niches of the two are not totally replaceable and thus, they can 
co-exist for a long time. However, the competence could be fiercer if mass media put 
stricter limitations on their authors. For example, they forbid their authors to post 
articles at any time and claim for their copyrights seriously. But I do not think this will 
turn into fact soon. Until now, the Internet and mass media can exist together and even 
cooperate with each other. 
Subaltern public spheres on the Internet like RearWindow could cooperate with the 
mass media under the premise that the mass media are in the process of marketisation. 
State control on informational and entertainment services of mass media has been 
relaxed. Movies as entertainment or commercial products thus could be discussed 
more freely than other topics. The collaboration is bidirectional and both of the two 
parties benefit. 
The collaboration between RearWindow and mass media 
The collaboration of RearWindow and the mass media could be reflected in the 
components of users. There are 11.9% of the users who are editors or reporters, which 
ranks third in the occupation category and only fewer than students and company 
employees. Instead of formal collaboration with the mass media, the interaction 
between RearWindow and the mass media often occurs at the personal level such as 
the boardmasters introduced the board on newspapers or one editor found an author 
on the board. Although the collaboration remains on a personal level, we cannot say 
that it is nothing with the Internet. At least, it is RearWindow that provides the space 
where they can meet together, which is rare in the offline world. 
RearWindow is firstly used by the mass media as a news resource. The mass media 
reported the activities of RearWindow including the private movie watching and 
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contacted the boardmasters or active participants for interviews. At the same time, the 
interviewees from RearWindow took use of these chances to propagandize the board. 
VCD have received more than ten times of interviews and nearly all the local media in 
Nanjing have interviewed him. Other boardmasters such as Gedaer, Lvzi, and 
X-Camoufleur have received the interviews from radio stations and TV stations while 
VCD did not like to show his face on TV. A lot of national media have reported them 
such as Nanfang Weekly and Hunan TV. Even Ming Pao in Hong Kong has contacted 
them for interviews although finally not successful. The reports of RearWindow are 
quite different in the attitudes toward RearWindow. Most of them wrote RearWindow 
as a newly emerged and positive thing which could bring the public benefits. 
Qiangjiang Evening: The point that touched me is that little by little, 
movies have descended from its highness which makes normal people 
have to look up at it. 
But some of them talked about RearWindow from an official point of view with 
caution. 
Jinling Evening: The boardmaster is VCD and the core members of the 
organization have developed into more than 30 persons. ... The 
government department must pay attention to the correct 
administration of these civil organizations and their activities. 
In fact, there are no core members at all since RearWindow is not an organization. In 
addition to the distortion in the reports, propaganda in the mass media may incur the 
control from the government. 
VCD: Activities (private movie watching) are not very right (in the 
eyes of government). Both the u- the que and Film 101 Studio are 
treated as the illegal organizations. We survived perhaps because 
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Nanjing is a smaller city when compared to Guangzhou and Shanghai. 
(April 30, 2003) 
13.5% of the respondents knew RearWindow through the mass media. So we can say 
that the reports on mass media made RearWindow more popular. However, there are 
risks to be the highlights of the mass media. It may draw the attention of the 
government and incur strict control. At the same time, the reports were often out of 
the control of RearWindow and distortion existed. Since there are so many 
contradictions, I asked in my survey whether the reports on the mass media are true 
and beneficial for RearWindow. 59.0% and 49.2% of the respondents in the two 
questions answered that they did not know whether the reports are true or beneficial. 
This implies that a lot of users have not seen the reports or they cannot judge, which 
shows that the direct reports of RearWindow are not the main method of interaction. 
Meanwhile, 34.4% and 47.0%, respectively, agreed that the reports are true and 
beneficial. 
The main form of collaboration between RearWindow and the mass media is that the 
mass media looked for articles and authors from RearWindow. At the same time, the 
posters who became media authors later made their own reputation from the 
collaboration, and more importantly, disseminated their discourse to wider publics 
through the mass media. More than half of RearWindow users (51.1 %) have contacts 
with the mass media, and 18.3% of them are media authors, including regular and 
irregular ones. Among this half of the users, 12.6% said that the editors found them 
through the Internet. The RearWindow users have established collaboration with all 
kinds of mass media, from the national ones to local ones, and from the mass ones to 
professional ones. For example, CCTV, Ray magazine and Movies World magazine. 
The mass media like to look for authors from RearWindow because Internet users are 
a part of their targeted clients. Online writers who are favored by Internet users would 
attract the same people in the offline world as well. 
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Ju: Why did I pay attention to the Intemet? The first reason is that I 
recognized its importance. The Intemet users are vogue youths who 
are overlapping with my targeted readers. ... I must make my readers 
overlap with the Intemet users and then the Intemet users will buy my 
newspaper. It looks like the Intemet is on the newspaper. (January 30, 
2003) 
The second reason is that the Intemet is considered as a new medium and the 
language on the Intemet is considered as the texts most in vogue. A lot of 
entertainment newspapers and magazines want to catch the fad through the using of 
Intemet writers and articles. Compared to other nonsense writings, the articles on 
RearWindow are of a higher quality and are more appropriate to be published in the 
mass media. Nearly all the famous folk movie reviewers came from the Intemet. The 
editors usually left messages to the posters while some other authors established 
relationships with mass media via interesting ways. 
Zhuozi: At first my article was plagiarized by someone and published 
on the Watching Movies magazine. This is unavoidable today thus I 
did not pay attention to it the first time. Then the plagiary occurred 
again and this time it was more disgusting because s/he plagiarized the 
whole article. Therefore I emailed the editor of the magazine and soon 
they answered me. They apologized for that and at the same time, they 
asked me to write articles for them. (April 16, 2003) 
The collaboration seems likely to move the online articles to offline mass media. But 
in fact, it is more than a simple action of moving and the online authors needed to 
make some changes to fit the requirements of mass media. 64.2% of the media 
authors agreed that there are differences between online postings and articles for mass 
media. They found that they must obey some rules of mass media and cannot write as 
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personally or freely as on RearWindow. 
Vian: I was disgusted with the editors that when I wrote the Korean 
movies for them, they often asked me to provide some sexy photos of 
the stars. . . . N o matter whether they be the radio stations, the TV 
stations or the magazines, all of them are controlled by Chinese 
government. ... It is totally impossible that the media do not have any 
limitations. There are definitely guides that forbid some discourse. We 
were once to be the guests in radio programs, I saw that the guidelines 
were posted on the wall, writing what kind of things could never be 
mentioned. All were there. It was serious. (February 5, 2003) 
Leon (editor of Orient magazine): The authors from the Intemet like 
writing things with an unconstrained style. Their language and 
thoughts are different from the traditional authors. ... Some authors 
could write very good articles online, but I felt that these articles are 
not appropriate to use in the magazines. In addition to the 
inappropriate style, the contents of the articles are often inappropriate 
to publish in magazines. For example, the articles about movies talked 
about the sensitive topics like religion or the polity. You can speak 
about it freely on the Intemet but cannot on the mass media. Mass 
media pay attention to the leadership effect and they must have the 
‘‘correct propaganda guide". (January 28, 2003) 
In this environment, RearWindow users could not move their online discourse 
completely to the mass media. Their opinions are selectively disseminated to the 
wider publics. The ranges of selection are different due to different media. The mass 
media which are oriented to normal citizens or provide entertainment are freer in the 
discourse. For example, the editor of Nanfang City Newspaper, Maxiangxin 
(2002/9/14) told me that reports about private movie watching, the forbidden movies, 
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and the critiques on state-controlled prizes are all allowed to appear in the newspaper. 
At the same time, she admitted that she tried to avoid the too sensitive topics such as 
June 4仇.However, the movie magazines which are under the administration of the 
Film Bureau are forbidden to mention in the underground movies in any cases. The 
selection by the mass media is more often the blocking of certain information and 
opinions than the distortion or appropriation. Thus, it did not harm the online 
discursive space much, although the influence on wider publics is buffered. 
Due to the double-edged effect of collaboration with mass media, 67.8% of the 
respondents thought that RearWindow should keep a distance from the mass media 
and not contact the mass media on its own initiative. 15.8% of the respondents 
thought that RearWindow should cooperate with mass media forwardly and acquire 
media exposure as often as possible. Only 2.7% of the respondents thought that 
RearWindow should totally isolate itself from the mass media. 
Discussions and conclusions 
In the case of RearWindow, the Intemet could cooperate with other traditional mass 
media because their media niches are quite different. Although they are competitive in 
contents, authors and audiences, they can benefit from each other. The mass media 
could transform Intemet users into their consumers when they persuade Intemet 
authors to become their hired writers. At the same time, the RearWindow users could 
propagandize their subaltern public sphere and disseminate their counter-claims to the 
wider publics. However, we must realize that the collaboration is possible because of 
the commercialization of the Chinese mass media in addition to the media niches. 
The Chinese mass media are semi-governmental and semi-commercial. The 
governmental part often rejects and distorts the discourse from subaltern public 
spheres while the commercial part is more open to diverse discourse. However, since 
the freedom of the commercial part is determined by the governmental part, it is an 
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inconstant social resource for the subaltern public sphere. Whenever the state 
strengthens its control, the commercial part would easily betray its cooperators. In 
addition, most of the mass media filtered out the discourse which is too serious and 
not sufficiently entertaining. In a word, the market power in mass media is more 
beneficial than the state power for the subaltern public sphere. But it is probably due 
to the underdevelopment of the market power and the harms market power would 
bring which have not been manifested. 
The interaction between subaltern public spheres and the mass media is significant 
because the mass media are the main channels through which subaltern public spheres 
could influence wider publics. In the case of RearWindow, we can see that the online 
authors have become an important discourse creator in the field of movies on the mass 
media. They have introduced good movies other than the definition of the state and 
the market. At least, they proposed other criteria the normal people could use to judge 
what good movies are. However, all their discourse is processed by the gatekeepers in 
the mass media. The radical aspects of the discourse are deleted and wider publics 
could not receive the completed discourse from the subaltern public sphere. It is very 
possible that the wider publics cannot understand the counter-claims well due to the 
lack of information. In short, the relationship between the subaltern public sphere and 
the mass media is both competitive and cooperative. They competed for media 
contents, authors and audiences. RearWindow could make use of the mass media to 
disseminate their counter discourses but this discourse may be filtered and distorted 
by the mass media gatekeepers. 
160 
Discussions and Conclusions 
This thesis about subaltern public spheres on the Internet has three theoretical 
concerns. The first concern is about the theory of subaltern public spheres. Since this 
theory is under development, my research applies the theory into the case of a Chinese 
online discussion board and examines the analytical power of the theory. The data 
from a context different from the West help us to rethink the theory and make some 
adjustment to enlarge the scope and applicability of the theory. The second theoretical 
concern is about the Internet's democratic potential. Is cyberspace a paradise of 
freedom and democracy? The third concern is about the civil society, which is often 
considered as the base of democracy in China. A popular understanding of the 
evolution of China is that it will move from a market economy to civil society and 
then to democracy. However, after years of development of market economy, Chinese 
civil society remains in its early stage and is unable to limit state power. My thesis 
addresses these three concerns. In this concluding part, I will integrate the findings of 
these concerns and discuss their implications. 
Subaltern public spheres 
The prime conclusion of this thesis is that RearWindow to Movies, an online 
discussion board on movies, is a subaltern public sphere. This conclusion extends the 
connotation of subaltern public spheres, redefines the relationships around subaltern 
public spheres and develops the basic functions of subaltern public spheres. Subaltern 
public spheres were considered as the discursive spaces for marginal groups, which 
are disadvantageous in their social positions. The minority races, women, queers and 
proletariats are representative groups of subaltern publics. At the same time, the 
bourgeoisie is the dominant public and never considered as a subaltern public. 
However, the research subject in my study, a part of the underdeveloped middle class 
in China, could be the rudiment of the bourgeoisie. 
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This situation raises several questions. First, what does "subaltern" mean? Second, 
what is a dominant public? Third, could a subaltern public sphere exist when the civil 
society is underdeveloped? The greatest contribution of subaltern public sphere theory 
is its recognition of the contradictions within a civil society，which corresponds to 
Marx's analysis of the ruling and the ruled classes. However, the dominant public is 
not the ruling bourgeoisie and the subaltern public is not the ruled proletariats. 
"Subaltern" is not classified on the basis of classes which are determined mainly by 
economic factors. "Subaltern" refers to the party which is oppressed in any 
relationships among social groups. Women are oppressed because of the gender; black 
people are oppressed due to their skin color; and queers are oppressed since their 
sexual preference is different from most others. According to this definition, any 
social group which is oppressed in a relationship with other social groups could be 
called "subaltern". In my case, the social group RearWindow represents is oppressed 
by the tiny political and economic elites, who wield the powers of the state and 
economy. However, RearWindow is only one of the social groups which are 
oppressed in China and definitely not the most marginal one. Compared to the 
unemployed urban workers or pauperized peasants, RearWindow users have higher 
social status and more social resources. But they are subaltern just like the workers 
and peasants when considering their political position. In addition, the resources they 
own make it possible for them to resist the oppression and sometimes change their 
oppressed position. 
The dominant public is the bourgeoisie in most of the subaltern public sphere studies. 
It is because that the social hierarchy in Western countries has developed into a 
relatively stable state. The bourgeoisie has occupied the core position both in the 
economic and political realm. Even their value systems and worldviews have been the 
mainstream thought in society. Habermas depicted that the literary public sphere 
transformed into the bourgeois public sphere when the discussion topics began to 
focus on political issues. The transformation from early bourgeois public to bourgeois 
public was smooth and affirmative. The early bourgeois public is naturally considered 
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as the promising dominant public and is not considered as part of the subaltern publics. 
This is understandable given the specific historical contexts of Europe and North 
America. But things are different in the context of China. 
The underdeveloped middle class in my study could be seen as a kind of early 
bourgeois since it does share many similarities in living style and value judgement 
with Western bourgeoisie. However, we cannot say that this underdeveloped middle 
class will necessarily evolve into Chinese dominant bourgeoisie one day. The two 
supporting forces for the development of Western bourgeoisie, the market economy 
and the mass media, are still out of the control of the Chinese middle class. Economic 
reform was initiated and led by the state while the middle class is just the followers. 
The mass media are semi-governmental and semi-commercial while the commercial 
parts do not belong to the middle class. If the early bourgeoisie in Western countries 
struggled with the state with the aid of the market economy and the mass media, the 
Chinese middle class may not have these supports. On the contrary, they may face 
suppression from the state, the market, as well as the mass media. 
In this study, I argue that a subaltern public sphere could exist even when there is only 
an underdeveloped civil society? The analysis in Part III shows that the accessibility 
to group members and the discourse of RearWindow reflect the characteristics of 
subaltern public spheres. 
In summary, the connotation of subaltern public sphere could be extended to other 
social groups than women, minority races, queers and proletariats. The dominant 
public could be extended to other publics apart from the bourgeoisie. The conditions 
in which subaltern public spheres exist could be extended to underdeveloped civil 
societies such as in China. These extensions could make the subaltern public spheres 
theory more powerful in analyzing the contradictions in civil society. RearWindow 
and its underdeveloped middle class could be considered as a subaltern public and the 
corresponding dominant public is the political and economic elites who are more like 
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the aristocracy than the bourgeoisie. 
Although most of the researchers emphasized the oppositional aspect of the 
relationships among subaltern public spheres and the other three parties: The state 
represented by government officials, the economy represented by economic elites, and 
the dominant public represented by the bourgeoisie, there are some researchers who 
claimed that collaboration exists and is important (Felski, 1989; Squires, 2002). My 
research findings support that the relationships among the four parties could be at the 
same time oppositional and collaborating. RearWindow formed its own discourse to 
counteract the discursive domination from the state and the economy. These discourse 
made the state-controlled and profit-oriented institutions of movies invalid in film 
groups like RearWindow. On the other hand, RearWindow interacts with other parties 
positively if conditions permit. It collaborates with the state by limiting the 
discussions to movies. There are even more collaboration between the subaltern 
public sphere and the market power. The Intemet economy, the pirate movie industry 
and other commercial institutions provided supports to RearWindow although the 
supports were driven by the profit earning. Mass media are controlled by the state, but 
the marketization process opened some space for the subaltern public spheres, in 
which the counter claims may be disseminated. Collaboration exists because it can 
benefit the subaltern public spheres. If the subaltern public wants to influence the 
outer world and change its social position, it must take advantage of other social 
forces since it lacks social resources. Moreover, the state and the economy do not 
always have the same goals. The strict control from the state may contradict with the 
profit-maximization principle of the market. The contradiction may open some space 
for collaboration with subaltern public spheres. 
My research reveals that providing a safe discursive space is the prime and most basic 
function of subaltern public spheres. Strategies of actions are made in this space. A 
new identity is not always constructed in the space because some social groups have 
already formed a clear identity when they established the sphere. To mobilize 
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members is not always active especially when the sphere is enclaved. The outward 
activities to influence wider publics, the state, and the economy are flexible and vary 
with different social conditions. RearWindow has introduced new criteria of good 
movies to other publics and counteracted with that of the state and the economy. 
However, the public attitude toward the dominant and subaltern public discourse was 
not changed totally. Until now, RearWindow does not have the power to change the 
state policy on movies. 
Democratic potential of the Internet 
From the review of former studies, we found that there is optimism on the micro level 
and pessimism on the macro level about Internet's democratic potential. In other 
words, the empowerment effect of the Internet on individual social groups does exist, 
but the whole situation of democracy is not improved by it. The theory of subaltern 
public sphere and the data analysis help us to understand this apparent contradiction. 
It is not really a contradiction because there can be two stages of democracy. As the 
subaltern public sphere theory implies, the Internet provides safe discursive spaces to 
marginal groups to develop their own discourse, which are voiceless in other 
discursive spaces such as the mass media. This kind of discursive formation is mainly 
an internal activity of the subaltern public sphere, which is a basic and important 
function of the sphere. The empowerment effect is manifested at this point. However, 
the internal activity could not ensure the success of external activities. The 
improvement of the whole situation of democracy needs other publics to change their 
attitude toward the subaltern public and the state-economic forces to change their 
policies. The external activities are much more complex and difficult than the internal 
activities because not only the subaltern public but also other forces could influence 
the process. The Internet provides some support in the early stage of democratic 
development but it cannot promote democracy as an institution because there are 
other forces that control the society. To evaluate the democratic potential of the 
Internet, we must consider the powerful institutions in society, especially the state and 
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the market. 
From my analyses, I found that the controls of the state and the economy have 
extended into the online world. However, these controls have not dominated 
cyberspace and are not as powerful as that in the offline world. For example, 
RearWindow is autonomous from the state although it cannot resist all the control 
effectively. RearWindow ensures its members form discourses that are totally opposed 
to the state discourse. But these oppositional discourses are limited to the topic of 
movies because of the strict blocking of the politically sensitive topics by the state. 
The market economy mainly functions as a support RearWindow. However, 
misappropriation from the market power has emerged in the collaboration with 
RearWindow. This can be seen in the relationship between RearWindow and the mass 
media. The discourse which could enter into the mass media have been selected and 
amended by the gatekeepers in the mass media. This discourse is innovative enough 
to attract consumers but harmless enough to avoid state intervention. On the other 
hand, when the popularization contradicts the media's profit motive, the dissemination 
of this discourse is restricted by the mass media. My research findings suggest that the 
Intemet does not have the ability to change the whole democratic situation because it 
is only one of the actors who can influence the result. Whether the subaltern publics 
could change their social positions depends on their ability to influence the outer 
world and their social conditions. 
Chinese civil society and Chinese public sphere 
The final concern of this thesis is about the development of Chinese civil society. The 
existence of civil society is important because it is the force which prevents the state 
and the market to destroy democracy. This belief drove a lot of Chinese scholars to 
trace and explore the development of Chinese civil society. My research is just one of 
the rethinking about Chinese civil society. 
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The subaltern public spheres studies point out that the existing civil society is not 
good enough. As for the Chinese civil society, one may not expect to see a unitary and 
powerful civil society either. The disappointment about the Chinese civil society 
maybe due to a misunderstanding of the current situation. Scholars only focused on 
the traditional forms of civil society, namely, social organizations. Public spheres and 
various media, which have been ignored, are new signs of civil society (Li, 2001). 
The discursive interactions among the public spheres, the state and the economy 
function as that of civil society in restricting the state-market powers. Even though 
some scholars are disappointed at the Chinese mass media as public spheres, there are 
alternative media like the online discussion boards. The subaltern public spheres 
represent some forces of civil society . My research implies that the Chinese civil 
society is in the process of development. 
Most scholars still consider the market as a positive element in the growth of civil 
society. My research findings suggest that the market is certainly a beneficial resource, 
but its nonsense consequences toward subaltern publics should not be ignored. First, 
the profit-maximization principle of the market may contradict the goals of the civil 
society. Second, the Chinese market has deep involvement with the state. It is wrong 
to attribute the underdevelopment of Chinese civil society to uncompleted 
marketization only. We can see that even if the mass media are totally commercialized, 
the civil society could still be weak if they are controlled by a few monopolies. 
RearWindow, as a case of subaltern publics, is significant to the growth of the Chinese 
civil society because it represents an alternative discursive space other than the mass 
media. Chinese mass media are limited in serving as public sphere and their discourse 
is out of the control of most citizens. The Intemet provides the space in which the 
citizens could train their critical rationality and form their own discourse. This is very 
similar to the literary public sphere in Habermas' discussions, which is a necessary 
step toward the ideal bourgeois public sphere. In addition, RearWindow actively 
influences the wider publics including less self-conscious social groups. RearWindow 
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users may be a part of the earliest self-conscious citizens and their activities may 
arouse more social members to construct their own discourse. Subaltern public 
spheres like RearWindow function as precursor and training schools. 
Limitations of the study 
This thesis used case study as the methodology and thus has some limitations. The 
most salient one is the generalisability of the study. RearWindow is only one of 
thousands of online discussion boards and it is possible to be a deviant case. Even if it 
is a normal case, it is still problematic to draw conclusions only from one case. For 
instance, I concluded that the market is easier to work with than the state because 
RearWindow received more support from the market than the state. Generalisability is 
more critical when I discussed the trends or the future. How could one predict things 
only based on an individual case? Therefore, this study is more about the possibility 
than the reality. My research pointed out what is possible and how the possibility 
could happen�People may challenge that the significance of the study if it is only a 
one-shot game. My response is that it maybe a one-shot game and at the same time, it 
may not be. Whether the case represents a common phenomenon could be the topic 
for further studies. My study provides a research framework and analytical tools that 
further studies can use. 
The quantitative methods used in this thesis also have some problems. The online 
survey used a self-selected sample, which may lose some significant respondents. Due 
to sample limitation, percentages could be unreliable especially when the differences 
are small. If time permits, I would like to do some advanced statistics to test the 
reliability and validity of my survey data. Further studies may extract some variables 
from my study and make some correlational analyses. 
The qualitative method often suffers the critique as subjective or not scientific. So 
does my discourse analysis of online postings and interview transcripts. I selected the 
168 
discourse that I considered as related or important to report in this study. My 
inclination may influence the selection and oppositional data are possible to be 
ignored unconsciously. However, I tried to pay equal attention to all kinds of voices 
that appeared on RearWindow. I do not know whether my effort is successful. I think 
one possible way of examining is to present my conclusions to the insiders of 
RearWindow. Another limitation of my qualitative analysis comes from the limitation 
of the data sources. Since I analyzed much about the relationships among different 
parties, I should collect data from all the parties. However, my textual data mainly 
come from RearWindow, a few from the gatekeepers in mass media and none from 
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